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Abstract
This thesis intends to address one type of approach to evolutionary theory that 
seeks to criticise the neo-Darwinist account of evolution and individuation, that of 
symbiosis. This thesis will begin by examining current evolutionary theory through 
Darwin to neo-Darwinism, with a view to discerning which types of mechanisms neo- 
Darwinism rules out, and which it allows. This will be achieved by using a 
methodology which treats groups of related scientific theories or practices as research 
programmes This methodological approach will allow comparison between competing 
research programmes, and it will be possible to determine whether or not a competing 
research programme is really a challenge to neo-Darwinism, or simply a sub- 
programme which shares some of the same metaphysical commitments and 
mechanisms as neo-Darwinism The second half of the thesis will assess the ‘symbiosis’ 
challenge to neo-Darwinism on these terms This section will conclude that symbiosis 
as it is usually formulated by its proponents is not a separate research programme that 
rejects neo-Darwinism in any significant way, but rather it is a sub-programme of neo- 
Darwinism But I will also argue that there are aspects of this programme, if they were 
to be made more prominent, would in fact constitute an alternative research 
programme which could not only be treated as a separate research programme, but a 
research programme that is incompatible with neo-Darwinism. Bacteria in particular 
are organisms which function through symbiosis and their functioning problematises 
neo-Darwinism’s account of individuation on a fundamental level It will be concluded 
that neo-Darwinism is either a theory of very limited scope, or one which can be made 
into a general theory, but this can only be achieved through fundamental changes to 
neo-Darwinism itself.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: An explanation of the approach this thesis will 
take to problems in the philosophy of biology
1.1 Context: The difficulties in assessing challenges to a theory 
which has many interpretations
Darwin’s powerful explanation of the adaptedness of living things has given rise to one 
of the most pervasive conceptual changes science has encountered in modem times 
Odd, then, that the proper interpretation of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural 
selection has been the subject of intense debate almost since its inception. Seldom has 
such an important scientific theory been so variously understood.
At the time of the publication of The Origin o f Species in 1859 there was not 
only the notoriously hysterical reaction from the Church of England, and all of its 
concomitant argument against Darwin’s theory on theological grounds, but also many 
other reactions, coming from the much more receptive scientific community itself. 
French biologists (as well as many English ones) saw traces of vitalism in Darwin’s 
theory of evolution by natural selection, and heartily agreed German biologists saw 
Darwin as the ultimate weapon against vitalism. British biologists influenced by 
empiricism saw Darwin as the scion of empiricism at work (general laws discovered 
through particulars) On the other hand, rationalist philosophers of science were quite 
happy to claim Darwin as one o f  their own as well, as an anti-metaphysician par 
excellence.
What can one make of a theory that has so many antagonistic interpretations? 
In fact, given this multitude of interpretations, is it proper to call this a theory at all? 
Even if we ignore the higher-level philosophical interpretations of Darwin’s theory, it is 
not at all clear that biologists themselves have ever agreed on the proper interpretation 
of Darwin’s theory. Of course, there is nothing surprising in the fact that a theory may 
mean different things to different people, or even have entirely different consequences 
depending upon its application. However, what is remarkable about evolutionary 
theory is that, since Darwin’s initial formulation, evolutionary theory’s theoretical and 
methodological refinement has been carried out by research groups with widely 
varying interests and viewpoints. It was often the case that their views of biology and
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the nature of life were so at odds with each other that it is hard to see how they were 
even talking about the same ‘theory’ at all. Add to this the fact that operational terms 
introduced into evolutionary theory were often treated in totally different ways 
depending on the research interests involved, and the picture becomes even more 
complicated. For instance, in the area of genetics, followers of Mendel were interested 
in the mechanism of heredity, but used a methodology that was allied with the 
statistical methods used in mathematics to deal with variation in an otherwise uniform 
population.1 At the same time, plant biologists in Germany were looking at the same 
problem through techniques in botany and biochemistry to see how variation was 
transmitted in a population. And the discoverers of the physical basis of heredity used a 
different methodology entirely. All were refining the mechanisms o f heredity, but it 
seems unlikely that they were all seeking the same type of refinement of Darwin’s 
initial description of the role of heredity. The same phenomenon, that of the disparate 
approaches to operational terms integral to evolutionary theory, has also occurred with 
reference to other important fundamental terms in evolution: for instance, phenotype, 
adaptation, fitness, species, and others.
The fact that evolutionary theory and Darwinism itself are so variously 
understood has important ramifications for any philosophical treatment of biology as a 
discipline. Evolutionary theory seems such a remarkably concise and simple 
explanatory framework with which to describe the living world, yet from the point of 
view of philosophy of science 'its precise theoretical structure and mechanisms seem 
elusive However, the problem is not that evolutionary theory is so widely contested 
This may in fact be a positive aspect of evolutionary theory. That it is an explanatory 
theory which is so flexible as to allow such divergent interpretations and still enjoy 
progress, although in a peculiar manner, is perhaps the reason why even today 
evolutionary theory enjoys such controversy and redescription. Rather the difficulty 
lies in deciding how to differentiate between the different interpretations of neo- 
Darwinism as the theory which currently dominates evolutionary theory and biology.
1 Depew and Weber provide a useful and complete account o f Mendelianism in 
Chapter 9 of Darwinism Evolving. Depew, David J. and Weber, Bruce H. Darwinism 
Evolving: Systems Dynamics and the Genealogy o f Natural Selection (Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press 1995)
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Debates over the proper interpretation of evolutionary theory have led to the 
rise of what has been called the “Darwin industry.”2 Although, as has been described 
above, there has always been controversy in the scientific community about how 
evolution actually functions (and the nature of this ‘scientific community’ has been 
fragmentary due to the wide variety of disciplines which have come to constitute 
modem biology), these debates have tended to have a somewhat limited audience 
outside academic science itself. The popularisation of Darwin has led to a seemingly 
endless supply of popular science books that seek to explain Darwin and his theory, as 
well as the science by which the theory is used, to a more general readership3 
Nevertheless, the growth of this industry, rather than simplifying the interpretation and 
mechanisms o f evolution, has instead exposed the presence of different camps not only 
in the scientific community, but also within Darwin scholarship. This has made for an 
interesting and sometimes confusing mishmash of approaches and agendas, involving 
biologists, geneticists, biographers, philosophers of biology, cognitive scientists, 
microbiologists, and mathematicians. In such an environment, it is difficult to decide 
where popularisation begins and scholarship ends, and even more difficult to identify 
the areas of real debate and difficulty in evolutionary theory itself and distinguish them 
from debates o f a more ideological or methodological nature
This thesis intends to identify some of these areas of difficulty. Much has been 
made in both academic and popular scholarship of various ‘alternative’ approaches to 
Darwinism, or more specifically neo-Darwinism There are attacks on neo-Darwinism, 
defined as the combination of Darwin’s macro-evolutionary framework with modem 
genetics and molecular biology, from many sides. The scope of this thesis will only 
address some of these It will not address creationist anti-neo-Darwinist attacks, and 
will not address ‘vitalist’ attacks where vitalism is conceived of as the mere postulation 
of a ‘life force’ with no more sophistication than this It is outside the scope of this 
thesis to discuss ‘dialectic’ approaches to Darwin in the vein of Hegelianism and 
Marxism, and the critiques of Darwinism in the philosophies of Bergson and Nietzsche. 
In short, an analysis of neo-Darwinism and its purported alternatives at this level of
2 See Brown, A The Darwin Wars How Stupid Genes became Selfish Gods (London, 
Simon and Schuster 1999).
3 For example, Dawkins, Richard Ihe Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1976) and Dennett, Daniel. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (New York: Penguin Books 
1995)
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generality will not be adopted An approach at this level of philosophical analysis 
would obscure the ‘scientific’ or at least methodological issues involved in the debates 
I wish to address.
1.2 Methodological Approach: The relative advantages and 
disadvantages of other approaches
This thesis intends to address one type of approach to evolutionary theory that seeks to 
criticise the neo-Darwinist account of evolution and individuation. It is thus a challenge 
of a different nature than challenges to neo-Darwinism which merely seek adjustments 
to its theoretical apparatus. This approach will be treated under the heading of a 
‘symbiosis-based research programme’. Symbiosis is a term which has been used to 
characterise the evolution of early life on earth, namely bacterial evolution, by 
proposing that early collective cells were symbiotic unions of various bacteria, and that 
these symbiotic unions formed the basis of later complex organisms. Thus, symbiosis is 
not merely a perspective on evolution, but also a scientific research programme with 
important results. In order to look at the specific issues I wish to address, those of 
symbiosis and bacterial evolution, it is necessary to adopt a methodology that will 
allow structural as well as historical aspects of the theory of evolution captured by 
neo-Darwinism to become clear.
A methodology which might focus only on the larger metaphysically oriented 
criticisms of Darwinism and neo-Darwinism, such as a Bergsonian or a Dialectical 
one,4 would simply obscure the scientific practices and changes in theory that neo- 
Darwinism represents. This type of approach would be too broad for my purposes. 
However, neither can this thesis adopt a methodology which would treat neo- 
Darwinism merely as a collection of theories in a certain structural relationship to each 
other, for this approach would be too narrow. The exclusive adoption of any one 
approach from the philosophy of science, which might treat the issues in this thesis on 
the level o f ‘theory’ only, would obscure the differences between various alternatives 
to neo-Darwinism, although it may make possible a description of neo-Darwinism 
itself A characterisation of neo-Darwinism, although essential in this thesis as a
4 See Levins, Richard and Lewontin, Richard. The Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1984)
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starting point from which to view its alternatives, is not the final purpose of this 
overview. It is plain that issues in the philosophy of biology are important to this thesis 
and will be discussed, but a methodology adopted exclusively from this discipline 
would eventually prove too cumbersome. This is again because the status of 
evolutionary theory as ‘theory’ is an issue that is already very complex, and any such 
endeavour would involve a precise commitment to a view of issues of causality, 
probability, classes, and theories. A simple theory-oriented approach might eventually 
allow a characterisation of neo-Darwinism as theory, but would not allow a meaningful 
comparison with other alternative challenges to neo-Darwinism. Another approach that 
would be too narrow would be one that focused on the actual practice of science at the 
cost of theory. Although this thesis will depend on the results of actual scientific 
practice in reaching its conclusions, it does not seek to conclude from this any ‘logic of 
discovery’ in evolution or an exhaustive description of the theoretical-experimental 
apparatus of evolutionary theory.5 Nor does this thesis intend to tell a history of the 
various challenges to neo-Darwinism by investigating ‘what scientists do’ in the 
manner of sociology of science What is needed in order to adequately address the 
‘symbiosis-based research programme’ is a methodology which is not too exclusively 
oriented toward metaphysics, theories, or practice, but one that is able to deal with 
each of these without cost to the others
In this thesis, I will focus on those alternatives to neo-Darwinism which claim 
to challenge it through a change of emphasis. These alternatives, though they often 
claim to be at odds with neo-Darwinism, are really attempts to refine neo-Darwinism, 
or at least to re-interpret its basic tenets in such a way that they can better reflect the 
actual processes of evolution. These alternatives do not want to do away with the 
whole theoretical apparatus of evolutionary theory, but they do disagree with some of 
the theoretical tenets of neo-Darwinism. For instance, symbiosis as an approach to 
evolution does not seek to deny that natural selection is important in evolution, but it 
does deny that its usual characterisation in neo-Darwinism (as a competitive process) is 
correct
Because the alternative approaches I wish to consider in this thesis do not seek 
to undermine completely orthodox evolutionary theory but only to challenge it, they
5 For ‘logic of discovery’ see Popper, Karl. Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: 
Hutchinson, 1959)
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can only be discussed with reference to the actual theoretical tenets of neo-Darwinism. 
And since they purport to challenge neo-Darwinism, we must examine neo-Darwinism 
itself to determine whether or not they can be regarded as challenges of note. 
Therefore, the methodology required for the purposes of this thesis is one that can 
accurately describe the actual theoretical apparatus of neo-Darwinism in such a way 
that both the fundamental tenets of neo-Darwinism and the challenges to these can be 
compared.
Furthermore, this methodology must also be able to track the changes that 
evolutionary theory has undergone in its past and present interpretations. Since it is the 
case that theoretical aspects of evolutionary theory are both theoretical idealisations as 
well as interpretations that affect the progress of actual research, it is necessary that 
the methodology we adopt in this thesis be able to meet these demands. This approach 
will allow an analysis that is aware of both the philosophically oriented debates within 
evolutionary theory together with the actual orientation of scientific research in 
evolution.
In order to outline a methodology which succeeds in meeting these demands, 
we must first examine some alternative methodologies which deal with biology and 
evolutionary theory I will show that these approaches do in fact delineate a conceptual 
structure for evolutionary theory which I will also adopt and expand upon in the 
course of this thesis. Yet they are not sufficient if our aim is to deal adequately with the 
dynamic controversy both inside and outside neo-Darwinism. I will adopt a structure 
for discussing neo-Darwinism in which neo-Darwinism is seen as consisting of three 
elements: natural selection, variation, and heredity. I wish to exploit this structure in 
such a way that useful comparisons can be made between alternative approaches For 
this purpose I propose to use a neo-Lakatosian framework for evaluating the changing 
dynamics of research programmes
1.3 The Structure of Neo-Darwinism: the three interdefined
components of natural selection, variation, and heredity
Let us first look at some ways in which philosophers of science, and philosophers of 
biology in particular, have characterised the structure of Darwin’s theory of evolution
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as descent with modification6 The ways in which various aspects of the theory of 
evolution by natural selection are related to each other, either inferentially or 
deductively, have been treated at length by many writers of the history of biology7 In 
this thesis, I will characterise Darwin’s theory with reference to what I see as the three 
main elements of a theory of evolution: variation, natural selection, and heredity. It 
would appear that any theory of evolving entities must contain these three features. In 
fact, these elements seem to be the base-line necessity for any naturalistic theory of 
evolving entities, as opposed to an argument by design or a creationist account of 
adaptedness. No naturalistic theories of evolution have been produced which do not 
include these three elements of variation, natural selection, and heredity. Darwin’s 
insight was to propose the interaction of these elements as an alternative explanation 
for the adaptedness of living things. It is often stated that evolution needs only natural 
selection and variation (in the sense of differential selection of variants) in order for 
evolution to occur. However, if this were true, evolution could never be cumulative or 
progressive. Without a hereditary mechanism of some kind, evolution would lead to 
constantly shifting and disorganised change Therefore it is correct to characterise 
evolutionary theory in these terms.
6 Interestingly, the word “evolution” now means exactly the opposite of what it used to 
mean, as pointed out by S.J. Gould in Ontogeny and Phytogeny (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1977). The proper way to describe Darwin’s theory would 
be “descent with modification”, while “evolution” would (and used to) describe the 
unfolding of previously existing characteristics However, in this thesis I will use the 
more common term “evolution” to describe Darwin’s theory and the contemporary 
neo-Darwinist theoretical apparatus. I think it would be foolish to ignore common 
usage to make a philosophical distinction that is, after all, somewhat outside the scope 
of my thesis.
7 By “writers of the history of biology” I mean in particular those writers who have 
described Darwin’s theory by reference to ideas of evolution contemporary to Darwin, 
for instance, Emst Mayr’s One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of 
Modern Evolutionary Thought (New York: Penguin Books, 1991); David L. Hull’s 
Darwin and His Critics: Ihe Reception o f Darwin's Theory o f Evolution (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); Michael Ruse’s The Darwinian Paradigm: 
Essays on its History. Philosophy and Religious Inspiration (London: Routledge, 
1989). These writers focus on the differences between Darwin’s ideas and 
contemporary accounts of evolution, especially on the Church of England’s 
antagonism toward the idea of evolution However, they do not focus precisely on the 
structure of the theory itself, and thus are of limited use in an endeavour which seeks 
to clarify the way in which the theory functions today Therefore, use of this material 
will be left until the second chapter of this thesis, where it will be of more relevance
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Elliott Sober points out that “evolution” is difficult to define precisely as it 
“denotes the subject matter of an extremely variegated discipline ... [whose] subfields 
differ from each other in their aims, methods and results.”® But he concedes that^at 
base, evolution is change in gene frequency in a population.8 9 Now this minimal 
definition of evolution, though clear, does not really describe the processes that are 
involved in such change in gene frequency. Robert Brandon is a bit more explicit and 
uses a definition adopted from Lewontin:
The following three statements are crucial components of the 
Darwinian (or neo-Darwinian) theory of evolution.
(1) Variation: there is (significant) variation in morphological, 
physiological, and behavioral traits among members o f a species
(2) Heredity: Some traits are heritable so that individuals resemble their 
relations more than they resemble unrelated individuals, and, in 
particular offspring resemble their parents.
(3) Differential Fitness: Different variants (or different types of 
organisms) leave different numbers of offspring in immediate or remote 
generations 10
Whilst I agree with Brandon and Lewontin’s characterisation for the most part, I do 
have some problems with it. My own characterisation includes both variation and 
heredity, as does theirs, but my third element is natural selection, while theirs is 
differential fitness Although ‘differential fitness’ is perhaps closer to the minimal 
definition posed by Sober above, I think it is perhaps not the best way of characterising 
an important process in evolution, that of natural selection. I will leave until chapters 2 
and 3 my own analysis of natural selection, but for the moment I would like to point 
out that the way in which ‘change’ occurs in an evolutionary process is through a 
‘selecting mechanism’ of some type (for want of a better term) and this mechanism is 
at least structurally separate from the variants it ‘selects’ even if this ‘selection’ is
8 Sober, Elliott Philosophy o f Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 5
9 Sober, Ibid
10 Brandon, Robert “Adaptations and Evolutionary Theory” in Concepts and Methods 
in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp 5-6. 
Lewontin’s own formulation can be found in Lewontin, Richard C. “Adaptation” in 
/he Encyclopedia Einaudi (Milan Einaudi, 1980)
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conceived o f as ‘culling’ variants. It is for this reason that “differential fitness” does not 
really express the third element of evolutionary theory well, for it makes this third 
element a ‘result’ of evolution and not a separable process or mechanism. In fact, 
Brandon and Lewontin’s ‘components’ have more the look of ‘facts which must be 
dealt with’ than ‘processes’ in evolution. Even if there were general consensus about 
the correctness of these facts, there might still be no consensus about the mechanisms 
which explained these facts. For instance, their definition of differential fitness displays 
a curious interest in the number of offspring produced In contrast, Sober points out 
that evolution is not itself interested in the actual number of organisms in a population 
(this would have ecological and not evolutionary significance) but rather it is interested 
in the gene frequencies of statistical proportions of these populations "  The actual 
“different numbers of offspring”discussed by Brandon following Lewontin have little 
place in evolutionary analysis. For these reasons I designate the third element as 
natural selection.1 21 would characterise the three crucial components in such a way as 
to draw attention to the mechanisms that these elements either presuppose or are 
linked to, rather than to merely focus on the ‘results’ of evolutionary processes.
Such characterisations as those of Brandon and Lewontin clearly have their 
place in terms of looking at Darwin himself and his own development of the theory of 
evolution. However, these characterisations are somewhat limiting in terms of looking 
at the structure of neo-Darwinism as a scientific theory and its corresponding 
mechanisms. Although I agree for the most part with the characterisation of neo- 
Darwinism in terms of this three-part structure, it is clear that more is needed. In order 
for useful comparisons to be made in terms of challenges to neo-Darwinism, it is 
necessary that we have a more refined approach to neo-Darwinism’s theories and what 
they reflect. This can be done by using the idea of a research programme which can 
show that what is ruled out by a theory is at least as important as the explanatory 
structure o f the theory itself. This brings into focus the difficulties that one encounters 
with giving a definition of neo-Darwinism which only notes its theoretical structure, as 
do Sober and Brandon’s above First, such characterisations do not give enough
11 Sober, Elliott Philosophy o f Biology p. 6
121 also have some difficulties with Brandon’s expression of the second component of 
heredity, though I will accept that it is a necessary component. To me, heritability must 
have much more to do with the actual mechanism of “copying”, or at least with the 
mode o f transmission, than with mere “resemblance”
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weight to the actual mechanisms that play an important role in evolutionary theory. 
Second, whilst they do point to some o f the ‘metaphysical’ considerations that are at 
the heart of neo-Darwinism as a naturalistic theory of evolution, they do not succeed in 
locating the precise role that metaphysics plays in the theory
1.4 Metaphysics versus mechanisms: merits and disadvantages of
different approaches to research programmes
The role of metaphysics and mechanism must be more precisely characterised in order 
for challenges to a theory to be evaluated.13 This can be done by using the concept of a 
‘research programme’ to show the various roles that these two aspects play in 
scientific theory.
Karl Popper introduced the idea of a “metaphysical research programme” to 
describe how untestable metaphysical considerations could be seen as ‘guiding’ or 
‘steering’ a line of scientific inquiry 14 Although these metaphysical commitments were 
not testable parts of the scientific theories, they did play an important role in at least 
delineating the general trends of two competing metaphysical research programmes. 
However, for Popper the way in which one of these competing programmes won out 
in the end was through the success of its own theories considered as hypotheses. The 
test was whether these hypotheses provided better predictions and explanations Thus, 
for Popper’s metaphysical research programmes there was no internal means of ruling 
out any scientific theory; anything is fair game and the proof is in the pudding, so to 
speak
Now there are many reasons why this picture may intuitively seem incomplete, 
since one might point out that there do seem to be constraints on what types of 
theories are acceptable or unacceptable in any given scientific community, practical and 
ideological reasons at least After all, not every testable theory that is proposed is 
taken seriously. But I do not want to consider this intuitive objection too seriously
13 A point of clarification: I do not mean to use “mechanism” in the sense of the 
philosophical doctrine that is the subject of “mechanism versus vitalism” debate in 
philosophy of biology Rather, my use o f this term reflects a methodological principle: 
to show how the metaphysical principles of a research programme are instantiated in 
certain physical models of functions or processes at the empirical level.
14 See Popper, Karl Conjectures and Refutations, (New York: Basic Books, 1962)
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Rather, I intend to focus on the role of ‘mechanism’ in a scientific theory. For Popper, 
a theory’s content lies entirely in the collection of its true statements and thus there is 
no need for internal constraints on what a theory rules out. Consequently there is no 
need to look at the actual practice of the scientific community which wields the theory 
nor to look closely at any mechanism which might embody these theories. 
‘Metaphysics’ for Popper is uncoupled from the actual scientific theories which make 
up a research programme and merely records the untestable commitments which, while 
driving the research programme, cannot constrain the content of science Popper’s 
view of science is similarly not concerned with how ‘mechanisms’ figure in scientific 
theories since in his view scientific theories are only collections of true statements
Thomas Kuhn’s picture of scientific theories took the objection from the actual 
practice of science very seriously indeed 15 16Kuhn’s recommendation that ‘research 
programmes’ ought rather to be treated as “paradigms” at least was more concerned 
with the actual history of science itself. Additionally, Kuhn was concerned to make it 
clear that science, as a progressive discipline, ought to be described as a dynamic and 
changing activity, whereas Popper’s view o f science had little to say about where any 
given theory or research programme was heading. For Popper, there was no way to 
look at a given hypothesis and say whether it was going to be fruitful in future 
scientific research; this could only be said after a hypothesis made correct predictions. 
Kuhn proposed that science was, in the main, a “puzzle-solving” activity.1'’ When 
things were going well with a theory, scientists were generally agreed on the 
fundamental points and simply tied up the loose ends. But when major problems began 
to be noticeable, in the form of anomalies that could not be explained away easily, this 
marked the beginning of an incipient “paradigm shift”. In this situation theories were in 
a chaotic state, amenable to complete transformation, and could be turned on their 
head, as with the famous “Copemican Revolution” But even Kuhn was not explicit 
about the reasons for these transformations. That is, he did not claim that there was 
anything about the way the paradigms were constructed that could give any hints about 
why they might come to fail eventually. Furthermore, he did not give any special 
priority to the role of metaphysical considerations, or the content of theories 
themselves
15 Kuhn, Thomas. S. The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1962; 2nd edn 1970)
16 See Kuhn, Ibid
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Imre Lakatos used Popper’s basic terminology to deal with these very issues.17 
For Lakatos, in this sense very much like Kuhn, research programmes could be seen to 
be either “progressing” or “degenerating” and the reasons for this could be seen in the 
way in which the research programmes themselves functioned. But Lakatos, while 
using the terminology of Popper, turned the entire role of metaphysics on its head 
Whilst for Popper, the metaphysical untestable considerations were in a way ‘outside’ 
the research programme itself, for Lakatos metaphysics was the core of the research 
programme itself. Metaphysics were considered to constitute the core of the research 
programme in the form of a ‘protective belt’ of hypotheses which ruled out certain 
types of competing hypotheses in a controlled way. Thus, metaphysics could serve 
both roles, namely as a ‘steering’ ideal, and as a practical internal brake on challenges 
to the theory Thus, Lakatos thought he had responded to the claim made against 
Popper earlier, namely that in order for science to proceed as an activity at all, there 
must be some constraints on what is to be taken seriously as a challenge. For if each 
theory was falsified every time a new one came to light (as Lakatos believed Popper’s 
philosophy of science entailed) nothing could ever get done. Furthermore, Lakatos 
believed that he had responded to and improved upon Kuhn’s picture. Whereas Kuhn 
had provided no means of gauging the progress o f any scientific paradigm except ex 
post facto, Lakatos claimed that the means of deciding whether a research programme 
was progressing or degenerating was to look at the ‘protective belt’ of the research 
programme Since the protective belt of hypotheses served to rule out challenges to the 
theory in the form of ‘anomalous phenomena’ that could not be easily explained away, 
these hypotheses took the form of allowable exceptions. If the protective belt had too 
many exception statements in it, this meant the theory was in trouble, and was 
degenerating If challenges, or anomalies, could be absorbed by the research 
programme, then the research programme was progressing and explaining more and 
more.
Thus for Lakatos, metaphysics served two roles; it guided the research 
programme as well as constituting it. The “hard core” o f the research programme was
17 Lakatos, Imre. “Falsification and the methodology of scientific research 
programmes” in Criticism and the Growth o f Knowledge; Lakatos, I and Musgrave, 
A., eds (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970); Lakatos, Imre. The 
Methodology o f Scientific Research Programs (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1978)
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composed of the untestable metaphysical theoretical statements of the theory. Yet 
there were some problems with Lakatos’ story, which were highlighted by Watkins’ 
treatment of the research programme 18 Watkins recognised that the ‘untestable’ nature 
of the hard core presented problems for any positivist conception of truth since this 
hard core, if thought to consist of metaphysics, was technically meaningless. The 
difficulty was how to deal with these untestable metaphysical statements, for if  they 
were central to any scientific theory, yet strictly metaphysical, then they were 
untestable and meaningless. One might ask that if this were the case, then how could 
one ever evaluate the theoretical core of any scientific theory?19 Watkins’ response was 
to conjoin metaphysical theoretical statements or hypotheses with other parts o f  the 
theory, that is, with those parts of the theory that made reference to testable or 
observable consequences of the theory; in effect with mechanisms. For instance:
Now a metaphysical hypothesis, as I conceive them, though neither 
entailed by, nor compatible with, any finite observation report 
whatever, may very well be entailed by some, and incompatible with 
other, unverifiable scientific hypotheses. It is this which ensure that 
such metaphysical hypotheses have truth values and helps to explain 
their significance for science20
This response resolved part of the difficulty. The “metaphysical core” or “theoretical 
ontology^’ as Watkins called it, was still the distinctive part of any scientific theory 
However, it was testable by its conjunction with other aspects of the theory, namely 
the observables or mechanism which the theory used Phrased in terms of 
corroboration, the above allows metaphysical statements to be at least falsifiable, even 
if not verifiable. Phrased in terms of the structure of scientific theory, it also makes 
clear the interdependence of metaphysics and mechanism for the delineation of 
research programmes.
18 Watkins, J.W.N. “Metaphysics and the Advancement of Science” British Journal for 
the Philosophy o f Science 26 (1975) pp. 91-121
19 Watkins, J.W.N. Science and Scepticism (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1984) p 
193
20 Watkins, J.W.N. “Confirmation, the Paradoxes and Positivism” in The Critical 
Approach to Science and Philosophy ed Mario Bunge (New York: Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1964) pp 92-115
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Furthermore, in Watkins’ earlier paper in Mind, he pointed out that 
metaphysics can be said to have regulative role in science even if metaphysical 
statements are untestable in themselves:
Although [metaphysical statements] are unempirical in the sense that 
they are compatible with every conceivable finite set of observation 
statements, they are not analytic or vacuous, but synthetic and factual, 
because there are empirical theories with which they will not be 
compatible.21 2*
Thus, metaphysics can play a regulative role by clashing with certain empirical 
hypotheses which they rule out.
In a later paper of 1975 Watkins claimed that he, like Lakatos, did seek to 
provide “an internalist account of the influence of metaphysical ideas on scientific 
developments .’,22 That is to say, he attempted a method of finding the metaphysical 
statements which were internal to scientific theories themselves, as opposed to 
Popper’s method of treating metaphysics as having merely an external steering role. 
Watkins believed it was incorrect to suppose that science only needed metaphysics in 
its infancy, and suggested that this conclusion about the role of metaphysics in science 
was what Popper’s externalist view of the influence of metaphysics on science led to 24 
We might summarise this discussion as follows. Metaphysics imposes internal 
constraints on a research programme by ruling out certain types of theories, namely 
those that contradict the internal metaphysics of the programme. The conjunction (or 
collision) described here leads to the formation of what Lakatos called a “protective 
belt of auxiliary hypotheses”, where certain challenges to a research programme are 
ruled out.24 But these auxiliary hypotheses might better be called ‘mechanisms’ in the 
sense of empirical claims. The metaphysics must be expressed as a mechanism in terms 
of empirical research Watkins, in his 1958 paper, also used this term to show how 
untestable metaphysics could clash with related empirical theories For instance, he
21 Watkins, J.W.N. “Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics” Mind (67) 1958 pp 
344-365
22 Watkins, J.W.N. “Metaphysics and the Advancement of Science” pp 91-121
22 Watkins, J.W.N. “Metaphysics and the Advancement of Science”, p. 106
24 Lakatos, Imre “Falsification and the methodology of scientific research 
programmes”
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argues that the metaphysical doctrine of Atomism, which can be expressed as the belief 
that all that exists is particles moving in a void, might be expressed as mechanism in the 
corpuscular theory of light, and this mechanism would clash with a theory which said 
light is transmitted instantaneously. Thus the metaphysics is replaced by a mechanism, 
namely the corpuscular theory of light, which is at odds with any other mechanism 
which does not share the same metaphysical assumptions.
We have now established a framework for discussing the issues I wish to deal 
with in the course of this thesis and the methodology I adopt might be termed a ‘neo- 
Lakatosian’ approach to appraising scientific theories It should be clear that it is very 
different to Lakatos’ view in many respects. For instance, it is not particularly 
concerned with evaluating the ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerating’ aspects of scientific 
research programmes However, it can still disclose the dynamism of historical changes 
in science It is concerned with theory, but is also intended to make plain the way that 
theories are instantiated in certain physical models of functions or processes at the 
empirical level.
1.5 A ‘neo-Lakatosian’ methodology for dealing with evolutionary 
theory
The methodological considerations above allow us to show that both metaphysics and 
mechanism play a role in defining a research programme. I will argue in this thesis that 
neo-Darwinism can be largely defined by its anti-Lamarckist constraints as instantiated 
in its mechanisms. The apparatus described above can now be applied to neo- 
Darwinism.
This thesis will examine a challenge to Darwinism embodied by a set of 
approaches to biology which can loosely be grouped under the heading ‘symbiosis’ 
The purpose of setting up neo-Darwinist evolutionary theory in the way described (as 
composed of three mutually dependent components, each recording both the 
metaphysical claims behind the theory as a whole as well as defining the hard core of 
the research programme through the elucidation of an appropriate mechanism) is to 
allow us to evaluate whether or not challenges to neo-Darwinism should best be 
characterised as separate research programmes or mere sub-programmes That is, by 
defining the ‘protective belt’ as constitutive of any given research programme in terms
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of both metaphysics and mechanism, a more sophisticated analysis o f exactly what falls 
inside and outside the scope of neo-Darwinism is available
In this thesis I will provide a characterisation of neo-Darwinism as a research 
programme in terms of the methodology outlined above. I will conclude that the 
allowable mechanisms (the ways in which the three elements o f neo-Darwinism 
function in relation to each other) instantiate metaphysical commitments that are anti- 
teleological and anti-Lamarckist. Then we will be in a position to assess the symbiosis 
challenge to neo-Darwinism on these terms. I will conclude that symbiosis as it is 
usually formulated by its proponents is not a separate research programme that rejects 
neo-Darwinism in any significant way, but that^at best, it is a sub-programme of neo- 
Darwinism. But I will also argue that there are aspects of this programme which, if 
they were to be made more prominent, would in fact be an alternate research 
programme which could not only be treated as a separate research programme but a 
research programme that is incompatible with neo-Darwinism. This will be shown by 
example of bacterial evolution, which shows exactly which aspects of the symbiosis- 
oriented research programme might be taken more seriously for this incompatibility to 
be manifested.
Neo-Darwinism can be seen to be a theory which rules out several 
metaphysically oriented explanations For instance, it is a naturalistic theory of 
evolving entities and thus might be said to rule out explanations which appeal to a God 
or Creator. Similarly, neo-Darwinism is an anti-teleological theory and thus it rules out 
explanations or theoretical claims which postulate final causes for life on earth or 
which account for modification in terms of intentional explanations. Neo-Darwinism 
might similarly be conceived of as an anti-vitalist theory, and would then rule out any 
explanations that resorted to a ‘life force’ as an explanation of the evolution of living 
forms. Similarly, it might rule out any in principle distinction between the living and the 
non-living. I am aware that these characterisations themselves merit further 
examination, but I use them here only to show that the various metaphysical ‘anti-’s 
that neo-Darwinism is defined by are not present in any one o f the elements of the 
theory of evolution that neo-Darwinism provides, but rather in the interaction between 
different elements in the theory as they are expressed in the form o f  mechanisms.
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For instance, one of the anti-Lamarckist constraints of neo-Darwinism which 
will be discussed at length in this thesis is the Weismann Barrier.25 The Barrier 
excludes the possibility of the environment actively influencing the organism toward 
hereditary change during its lifetime. It effectively claims that the organism cannot 
actively change itself to  suit the environmental constraints it lives in, for such an option 
would be teleological, or perhaps even vitalist. The Weismann Barrier posits a physical 
barrier which prevents the environment from changing the hereditary component of an 
organism, and prevents the ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’. It might be 
thought that this constraint is simply part and parcel of the hereditary component of 
neo-Darwinism’s theoretical apparatus. But if we look closer, we see that the 
constraint is bom o f the interaction between natural selection and heredity, and is 
expressed as a physical mechanism. That is, natural selection is conceived of as a force 
that ‘weeds out’ unfit organisms, and heredity is the means by which organisms make 
copies of themselves. Natural selection can only reject unfit organisms but it cannot 
influence organisms to change in any directed or adaptive way. An organism’s 
hereditary material is sequestered from the action of natural selection by the Weismann 
Barrier, and thus cannot be influence by natural selection in any adaptive way. Thus the 
way in which both natural selection and heredity are conceived are expressed in the 
mechanism of the Weismann Barrier
Another example of the way in which the elements of neo-Darwinism are 
mutually dependent and expressed as a constraint in the form of a mechanism is in the 
idea of variation as ‘random’. This is usually expressed by the phrase ‘evolution 
proceeds through the accumulation of random mutations’ or the like. To avoid the 
possibility that the organism could generate variation toward a pre-defined ‘plan of 
nature’, variation is conceived of as stochastic or random This might seem to be a 
mere theoretical definition of variation as one of the components of neo-Darwinism, 
but again, it is really an effect of the interaction of several of the components, and 
again, it takes its form as a mechanism. It is not so much that variation is random, but 
that variation must he random, in order for natural selection to function as an 
undirected, goal-less process Heredity too is implicated, since if evolution needs 
faithful copying in order to be a stable, progressive, and conservative process, then 
heredity must be constrained as a process which admits of only small ‘random
25 See Glossary
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mutations’. So the stochastic metaphysical guiding ideal of neo-Darwinism as an 
undirected, non-teleological process is expressed in the mechanism of random 
mutation.
Therefore the methodology outlined allows an investigation into the way in 
which the theory of evolution functions, and also a means o f assessing challenges to it 
from both inside and outside neo-Darwinism. Discussions concerning the ways the 
three elements are to be properly interpreted can be addressed, for instance, in terms of 
the adaptationist programme, the role of random drift, and the unit o f selection. 
Additionally, challenges such as the symbiotic challenge, which focus on questioning 
the entities or individuals which neo-Darwinism delineates (the organism, the 
environment, the role of the gene), can also be addressed
1.6 General outline of the thesis
This thesis is comprised of two parts. The first part, comprised of chapters 2 and 3, 
will discuss Darwinism and neo-Darwinism, and the various tensions within this 
conception of evolutionary processes, with a view to discovering just how 
metaphysical considerations behind it are instantiated into mechanisms which both 
define the theory and rule out certain other processes in evolution. The second part, 
comprised of chapters 4 and 5, will assess challenges to neo-Darwinism and see 
whether they can be said to be true challenges to the fundamental assumptions behind 
neo-Darwinism. The conclusion will address what the implications of the results of 
these chapters are for neo-Darwinism, and ultimately, for the philosophy of biology
It is important first to characterise Darwinism and neo-Darwinism as a body of 
theory and mechanism, even if not a wholly complete or homogeneous one This thesis 
will begin by undertaking such a characterisation through an examination of the history 
of Darwinism, tracing its refinements, additions, and unifications with other areas of 
biological theory. This account will culminate in a characterisation of contemporary 
neo-Darwinism. Along the way, some of the tensions within the theory will become 
clear, as they must if we are to consider that what neo-Darwinism rules out determines 
in a real sense its central tenets
After a characterisation of neo-Darwinism is in place, we will turn to an 
approach to biology that is, in an important sense, outside the scope of neo-
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Darwinism. Symbiosis is a general category, but ‘symbiotic approaches to evolution’ 
have been touted as true alternatives to neo-Darwinism in recent years26 The category 
of ‘symbiosis’ is useful since it can incorporate discussion of many different alternative 
approaches to neo-Darwinism, such as self-organisation, coevolution, Gaia theory, and 
the like. The analysis of symbiosis as several symbiosis-based approaches will show 
how it conflicts with neo-Darwinism It will also be discussed to what extent symbiosis 
can be incorporated into neo-Darwinism. During the course o f this discussion, the 
importance of bacteria in symbiosis will become apparent. Bacteria are in fundamental 
ways different to the types of entities envisioned as explainable in neo-Darwinism The 
results of this analysis will then be applied to some debates in the philosophy of 
biology, and these results may help to discern exactly what is at issue in these debates.
In Part I, chapter 2 I will argue that,within the context o f  Darwin’s theory of 
evolution as he delineated it, there is more than one way to interpret the three 
components of natural selection, variation, and heredity The limitations placed on the 
interpretations of these elements by the work of August Weismann and Gregor Mendel 
were incorporated into evolutionary theory as it developed into neo-Darwinism In the 
case of natural selection, it is possible to read this component as either an active 
creative force or as a passive mechanism which simply conserves existing adaptations. 
The possibility that natural selection may be treated as an active force allowed a 
teleological interpretation of Darwin’s theory to become prominent, at least for a short 
time But this type of metaphysics was eventually ruled out, as changes in the 
interpretation of the theory of evolution by natural selection led to an anti-Lamarckist, 
anti-teleological metaphysical interpretation. Both of the two other components, 
variation and heredity, similarly could be treated in such a way that their functioning 
was consistent with a teleological metaphysical principle. The work of Weismann and 
Mendel, as it was incorporated into neo-Darwinism, led to a denial of this type of 
interpretation. The mechanisms which Weismann and Mendel helped to create were 
anti-Lamarckist, and anti-teleological. However, there was still room for much 
disagreement even with these explicit mechanisms in place. For even though certain 
mechanisms which would violate the anti-Lamarckist character o f Darwinism and neo- 
Darwinism had been ruled out, there was little agreement about the way each
26 For instance, Lynn Margulis, Kevin Kelly, Stanley Shostak, Humberto Maturana, 
Francisco Varela.
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component should be defined. Moreover, there was no general agreement on the 
question o f what role each played in evolution and how powerful this role might be
Chapter 3 continues to address the fact that it is still possible for evolutionary 
theory as a discipline to have varying interpretations of each of the three components 
of evolution. Although the question of whether natural selection was an active 
teleological force was answered in the negative by neo-Darwinists, this result causes 
problems for any theory which purports to be explanatory or predictive The question 
of how natural selection can be an empirical law if it is a passive conserver of 
adaptations becomes paramount for philosophers of biology. It is necessary to deal 
with this problem before one can address the question of whether natural selection has 
a powerful role in evolution or merely a subordinate role to other sources of 
evolutionary change. The question of the role of chance in evolution is similarly 
difficult to address unless one has a view on the relative roles of natural selection and 
variation. In the case of heredity, which depends upon a concept of information in 
order to fulfil its role as the ‘copying process’ in evolution, one cannot investigate the 
role of heredity without examining closely this concept of information. The question of 
whether heredity is an important source of evolutionary innovation requires an 
investigation into its functioning I shall argue that questions such as these can only be 
answered by looking at the way in which the three elements of evolution are mutually 
dependent. This entails looking at the mechanisms which instantiate the metaphysical 
principles that underlie neo-Darwinism. What these mechanism rule out are at least as 
worthy o f discussion as what they rule in.
Part II of the thesis, beginning with chapter 4, attempts to use the results of the 
analysis in Part I to address some challenges to neo-Darwinism. Chapter 4 will 
explicitly discuss symbiosis-based challenges to neo-Darwinism. A short history of the 
‘symbiosis research programme’ will be provided, which will serve to make clear the 
various differing claims behind the symbiosis challenge. It will be argued that some 
aspects o f  the challenge, particularly those which criticise natural selection and 
randomness as parts of neo-Darwinism, do not succeed in fundamentally challenging 
neo-Darwinism. However, it will be noted that in the case of one challenge (that neo- 
Darwinism fails to deal with cooperation as an evolutionary strategy), neo-Darwinism 
may in fact be guilty as charged This does not, however, constitute a fundamental 
contravention of neo-Darwinist tenets, and at best, this criticism entails some small
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adjustments to neo-Darwinism, changes which it can easily accommodate There is one 
aspect to the symbiotic challenge to neo-Darwinism which does contravene neo- 
Darwinism’s basic metaphysical assumptions, and this concerns the proposal of a 
Lamarckist mechanism of heredity.
Chapter S will explain the importance of this Lamarckist mechanism through 
the example of bacterial evolutionary processes and explain that this type of hereditary 
mechanism is not only highly important in evolution, but also inadequately addressed 
by neo-Darwinism’s metaphysics and mechanisms. This leads to several important 
results. It will be shown that these Lamarckist bacterial processes cause such a 
fundamental shift in the way that the organism (or individual) is to be conceived, that 
they are incompatible with neo-Darwinism This leads to the further result that neo- 
Darwinism is a very narrow theory, which only applies to a small proportion of life on 
this planet. And this in turn means that neo-Darwinism, if it wants to be able to apply 
to all evolutionary systems, must fundamentally change some of its metaphysics and 
mechanisms The conclusion of the thesis will provide a sketch of what might be 
involved in such a change, and what this might mean both for science and for 
philosophy of biology.
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Parti
Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism: 
Characterisation and Controversy
“I assure the reader that I find the task of forming a clear, well-defined conception 
o f Mr. Darwin’s  meaning comparable only to that o f one who has to act upon the 
advice o f a lawyer who has obscured the main issue as far as he can, and whose chief 
aim is to make as many loopholes as possible fo r  himself... ”
—Samuel Butler, Evolution, Old and New (1882)
Introduction to Part I
The first part of this thesis will outline the development of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution and describe some of the tensions within it. These tensions, as well as 
various limitations on the mechanisms of Darwinism which form the basis of the neo- 
Darwinist interpretation of evolution, will be shown to have significant effects upon 
various debates within the neo-Darwinist research programme. Thus, a historical 
discussion of Darwin, and the work of Weismann and Mendel in the wake o f the 
Origin o f Species will be essential in setting the stage for some of the debates over the 
proper interpretation of natural selection, variation, and heredity that were to become 
prominent in neo-Darwinism itself. These different interpretations will then be 
discussed in the context of neo-Darwinism itself and also as they appear in philosophy 
of biology. The central questions in both the history of Darwinism and neo-Darwinism 
are: what role does natural selection have in evolution? Is it the cause of evolution, or 
a description o f the result of the interaction between organism and environment? Does 
natural selection produce variation, or select variation? How is variation passed on 
between generations of organisms? Does heredity produce variation or simply 
conserve it? These questions will be discussed in Part I.
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Chapter 2
The History of Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism
This chapter will serve as both an historical introduction and a theoretical exposition of 
the fundamental aspects of the theory of evolution by natural selection. It will first 
describe the fundamental elements that are present in Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection. The first section will deal with these elements of variation, natural 
selection, and heredity in terms o f Darwin’s own ideas. The second section will show 
how limitations on the mechanisms of Darwinism were completed by neo-Darwinism 
The limits on heredity and variation as introduced by August Weismann and Gregor 
Mendel will be explained, as well as what is at stake in this limitation. In the third 
section the move from Darwinism to neo-Darwinism, known as the “Modem 
Synthesis” will be discussed.
Section 2.1 will look at the three elements of Darwinism through Darwin’s own 
exposition of how these elements were to function in relation to each other. In each 
case, I will show that the element under scrutiny has more than one metaphysical 
interpretation and that often these metaphysical aspects are not yet grounded or 
instantiated in a specific mechanism. This is often a result of the way in which Darwin 
himself presented his ideas in the Origin o f Species. Rather than positing specific 
mechanisms, Darwin instead makes use of comparisons and metaphors to draw 
attention to the ideas that he wanted to convey. Additionally, the structure o f the 
Origin moves through examples to generalisations or principles It is for this reason 
that I have considered variation, natural selection, and heredity in that order, since this 
mirrors more closely the order in which Darwin’s argument is presented. I will show 
that variation and natural selection are tightly knit together, insofar as natural selection 
needs variation to work upon and, unchecked, variation cannot lead to evolutionary 
change without the selecting influence of natural selection
However, there is still a difficulty in determining whether or not natural 
selection is an active or passive principle, for this distinction cannot be made unless we 
consider the way in which natural selection works with variation as a mechanism. If we 
assign an anti-teleological character to Darwinism as a theory we must find a 
mechanism for the generation o f variation apart from the action of natural selection 
itself. For if natural selection is an active producer of evolutionarily valuable change,
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then this might violate the anti-teleological character of Darwinism in its metaphysical 
aspect. This need for, and characterisation of, heredity as a means of transmitting traits 
between generations of organisms will also be addressed in section 2.1.3. This will be 
approached through Darwin’s theory of Pangenesis. It will be argued that Darwin’s 
characterisation of the element of heredity still leaves unanswered many questions 
about mechanism. That is to say, Pangenesis left open the possibility of a teleological 
interpretation of the functioning of natural selection and variation since it still allowed 
variation to come from use and disuse or through the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. These notions of heredity are now thought o f as Lamarckist ideas
Section 2.2 will examine the limitations on Darwinism which resolved some of 
the issues concerning its metaphysically anti-teleological character through the 
introduction of certain mechanisms which embodied these metaphysical prohibitions 
These took the form of the Weismann Barrier and of Mendel’s laws of heredity. These 
mechanisms forced a change in the way in which natural selection and variation were 
envisaged. Ultimately these changes were incorporated into the Modem Synthesis of 
neo-Darwinism which will be outlined in section 2.3. However, whilst it will be noted 
that these proposed mechanisms still did not completely solve the question of whether 
natural selection was an active or passive force, they did at least shift the question from 
one of how structure was passed on from parent to offspring, to that of development 
and growth. This interest in development rather than heredity as a mechanism 
eventually came to be established as a separate research programme within biology 
The interest in how an organism grew after it received its hereditary material meant 
that this separate research programme could still make use of a teleological or ‘vitalist’ 
life force to explain how the organisation of living beings emerged in the process of 
embryogenesis.27 But this teleological principle was on a different explanatory level 
from that of natural selection and variation, mediated by heredity For after Weismann 
and Mendel, the flow of information was curtailed in such a way that the organism 
could never produce adaptive variations by itself, to be transmitted to its offspring. 
This was the anti-Lamarckist and anti-teleological result of the limitations on 
Darwinism.
27 For an example of this tendency within biological research, see Hans Driesch’s The 
Problem o f Individuality (London: Macmillan, 1914)
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Yet the Modem Synthesis, while retaining and strengthening these limiting 
mechanisms, still faced issues connected with the relative importance o f these 
mechanisms in evolution. As we shall see, defining heredity as particulate and discrete, 
or variation as random, did not lead to any necessary consensus about which of them 
were important agents of evolutionary change. Disputes concerning these questions 
form the basis of controversy in neo-Darwinism today, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.
2.1 Darwinism: the history of Darwinism and Darwin’s own 
conception of his theory
The contemporary opinions in Darwin’s time concerning the natural world were 
ideologically conservative.28 The strongest themes were creationist and teleological in 
character. Paley’s Natural Theology focused on the evident perfect adaptedness of 
living things to their environment, which was considered to be empirical evidence of 
God’s perfect divine plan All species were thought to have been separately created 
Bishop Ussher’s widely accepted calculation of the age of the world made it less 
plausible that change in species could occur in such a short time
The discipline of geology was one area where change was studied seriously, it 
became clear that the earth was subject to change and catastrophe, and massive 
extinctions of flora and fauna Those who studied change in species due to extinction, 
such as Lamarck, believed that species did not become extinct, they rather transformed 
completely into other forms. This transformation has been characterised as one of 
teleological progression toward perfection 29 Charles Lyell, on the other hand, believed
28 There is a large body of research into the history of Darwin’s path to his theory of 
evolution by natural selection. Much of it concentrates on the Voyage of The Beagle, 
and on the intellectual reaction to  the publication of On the Origin o f Species in 1859. 
The intellectual and socioeconomic background in which Darwin worked is covered 
well in Michael Ruse’s The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and Claw 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). Another discussion of the history of 
Darwinism is in Ernst Mayr’s One Tong Argument A discussion of Paley can be found 
in Depew and Weber, and Gigerenzer, Gerd et al. The Empire of Chance: How 
Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989)
29 This characterisation has been disputed, and indeed it seems that Lamarck’s 
Philosophic Zoologique (English trans. H. Elliott The Zoological Philosophy (London: 
Macmillan, 1914)) does not contain many explicit claims about tendency toward
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that species did become extinct, but were replaced with other new species that filled 
the gaps, presumably through Divine creation. Lyell was therefore able to accept the 
notions of extinction and geological change while also appeasing creationists. It was 
Lyell who most influenced Darwin, but for Darwin the most important matter was the 
one Lyell had left somewhat unresolved; how do species originate, if not by Divine 
creation? Darwin’s first break with the thought of his contemporaries was to recognise 
that species did in fact change, and this in turn led to the postulation of a mechanism by 
which species could do so
At this stage it is worth introducing an issue concerning the character and rate 
of change in evolution that will become important later in the thesis; that of 
‘gradualism’ versus ‘saltationalism’ Lyell, in claiming that species could and did 
change over time, also thought that this change must be sustained by a uniform 
process, thus gradually and not subject to sudden changes. This was in opposition to 
Lyell’s ‘catastrophist’ opponents who held that evolutionary change was caused in the 
main through geological events, like volcanic eruptions. As will be argued later in this 
thesis, this opposition is difficult to maintain unless a single privileged time scale is 
agreed upon. For as Depew and Weber note, even in geological time, events seem to 
happen ‘gradually’ if you look back far enough.30 Although this gradualism has more 
to do with the timescale of the earth than it does with the process of evolutionary 
change, it appears that Darwin accepted that change happened gradually in species and 
that this was mirrored in the internal laws of life insofar as natural selection worked 
gradually as well In opposition to this meaning of gradualism, there was 
‘saltationalism’ (based on Huxley’s phrase natura non facil saltum, nature does not 
make leaps) Saltationalists, such as Francis Galton (Darwin’s cousin) believed that 
evolution could happen quickly, in ‘jumps’ by the evolutionary phenomenon of ‘sports’ 
or in Richard Goldschmidt’s phrase, “hopeful monsters”. These strange variations, 
freaks of nature, if you will, were the means by which evolution speeded up 31 Again,
perfection, rather, it implies a mere tendency toward progression or complexity The 
descriptor ‘teleological’ for Lamarck’s theory of evolution, is, however, 
uncontroversial in this context, in my opinion It could be said that for Lamarck, no 
evolutionary change is merely accidental or random, all changes are directed in some 
way. Samuel Butler claims that Lamarck’s treatment of causality (as well as Darwin’s!) 
is teleological, but not theological. See Butler, Evolution, Old and New (London: 
Fifield, 1911)
30 Depew and Weber, p 98
31 Depew and Weber, p. 200
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here it is difficult to differentiate between these two claims about the rate of evolution 
since there is no baseline timescale available with which to compare them. The dispute
should rather be seen as an indication of the various ways in which natural selection
and variation can be interpreted as acting.
2.1.1 Variation: Can be seen as the material upon which natural
selection acts, and as that which is created by natural selection
We can see Darwin as having several ‘insights’ all of which contributed to elements of 
his approach to the problem of change in the natural world. First, on his Beagle 
voyage, Darwin noticed that species, which were previously thought to be essential 
types and thus sharply delineated from one another, showed a great deal of variation 
Darwin was always bothered by the arguments between naturalists in taxonomy. Some 
thought that variants from the normal range of organisms in a species were varieties, 
some saw them as subspecies, and others saw them as separate species. It was difficult 
to judge whether a given variation was significant enough to distinguish a variety as a 
separate species, given the contemporary dependence on what Mayr has called the 
typological species concept (adhered to by the taxonomist Linnaeus).32 This 
typological species concept depended upon each species having an ‘essence’ of some 
kind which gave that species its ‘species-ness’. Given the intangible nature of this 
supposed essence (since a horse was a member of the species horse depending upon its 
similarity to, or participation in, ‘horse-ness) it was difficult to even distinguish variants 
sufficiently, much less be able to classify them in a meaningful way. More importantly, 
this intangible species essence was unobservable, and had to be inferred in some way, 
thus making it impossible to have any criteria at all for distinguishing types. The 
problem of distinguishing species from variants seemed to engage Darwin for much of 
his life and eventually, in the final chapter of On the Origin of Species, he claimed that 
his theory solved this problem once and for all
The endless disputes whether or not some fifty species of British 
brambles are true species will cease Hereafter we shall be compelled 
to acknowledge that the only distinction between species and well-
32 Mayr, One Ix>ng Argument, pp. 40-42
I
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marked varieties is, that the latter are known, or believed, to be 
connected at the present day by intermediate gradations, whereas 
species were formerly thus connected... This may not be a cheering 
prospect; but we shall at least be freed from the vain search for the 
undiscovered and undiscoverable essence of the term species33
This insight is immensely important. It marks a major shift in the way in which species 
were conceived ontologically. Rather than treating species as natural kinds or ideal 
types, as had been done previously, species were henceforth to be treated as 
spatiotemporally contingent entities. In addition, Darwin here makes it clear that the 
intangible ‘essence’ of species in the typological species concept is an obstacle to 
proper taxonomy Variation should be constitutive of species and speciation, in 
Darwin’s view. Yet when Darwin was on the Beagle voyage the problem of 
taxonomising varieties suggested itself only because he saw such endless variety within 
a species He consequently concluded that species could not be sharply delineated A 
population o f  individuals showed sufficient variety such that a species could be seen as 
consisting o f  gradations along a continuum. Mayr suggests that shortly after returning 
from the Beagle voyage, Darwin had given up the typological species concept and was 
already using a definition of species that had much more to do with breeding habits. In 
particular he suggests that Darwin was concerned with the propensity of species to 
interbreed with each other.34
Darwin had noticed the great variability amongst organisms, and this 
observation led to a confusion in his thinking which seems to have persisted 
throughout the development of his theory of natural selection. On the one hand, 
Darwin’s observations of variation in nature made him realise that the existence of 
such variation had to be explained by his theory. On the other hand, he also thought of 
variation as a major mechanism or component to his theory of evolution, in the sense 
that variation was the material upon which natural selection acted. Thus variation is 
both the already extant variability within species in the natural world and also the 
mechanism by which such variability is produced. The ambiguity in the term ‘variation’ 
will be examined in more detail later. However, for the moment let us note that
33 Darwin, Charles On the Origin of Species (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 
pp 391-2
34 Mayr, One Long Argument p 29
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variation and natural selection are closely tied to each other in terms of their 
functioning within evolution. Natural selection needs variation to work upon, yet the 
action of natural selection also produces variability by differential selection of varying 
traits.
Darwin’s second ‘insight’ was in relation to the selection processes instituted 
by man in domestication and breeding. Darwin saw that man himself selected 
organisms that were beneficial to him and ‘perfected’ these organisms through 
breeding techniques Darwin eventually decided that since breeders ‘picked’ the best 
individuals to be bred later on, this was the ideal way in which to characterise the 
action of selection in nature as a whole; natural selection picked those organisms that 
were better suited to their environments. Darwin clearly realised the power of this 
metaphor in explaining his theory
Both of his early essays before the long-delayed publication of the Origin, (the 
1842 Sketch and the 1844 Essay)35, show that Darwin saw human selection processes 
as analogous to what actually occurred in nature as a whole. However, in these early 
works it seems that Darwin thought that although human selection in breeding tended 
to increase the amount of variety in species (in that breeders tended to choose variants 
that had unusual characteristics and develop these by crossing them with other unusual 
organisms to obtain an ever-widening variety of traits), he also seemed to think that 
natural selection might actually tend to decrease variability. It might decrease 
variation, in Darwin’s view, because in a natural environment organisms would breed 
randomly with each other, and crosses between organisms with varying traits would be 
unlikely to produce novel variants, since Darwin believed in blending inheritance, 
where a cross between a tall and short organism would generally produce a medium 
height organism, so natural interbreeding would tend to diminish the strength of 
unusual variations.
Thus, his earlier works appear to suggest that Darwin was unsure as to where 
variation came from in nature and, since he thought that variation would tend to 
decrease through natural selection, he needed some external means of generating 
variation. Thus natural selection in this earlier form is quite weak as a speciating force. 
Since by this time he was unsure of his metaphor which equated human selection with
35 Reproduced in On Evolution ed Thomas F. Glick and David Kohn (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1996). pp 87-115
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natural selection, Darwin had difficulty explaining both where variation came from, and 
how it was acted upon in a context of selection Later, after his work with barnacles36, 
Darwin began to accept what he had initially suspected on the Beagle, that variation 
was rampant in the natural world, and he then decided that natural selection already 
had the raw materials to work upon for the process of speciation. Again, Darwin was 
struggling with two aspects of variation. On the one hand, variation was seen by 
Darwin as the raw material already extant in nature and upon which natural selection 
acted On the other hand, since he was trying to explain change and speciation in 
nature, he needed to explain by what means variation is produced.
So at first Darwin seemed to have been unclear about the extent to which 
variation was available or produced in nature. His reliance on the phenomena of human 
selection and breeding processes may have contributed to this. Darwin was struck by 
the way in which human cross-breeding techniques often caused sterile offspring and 
clearly considered this as a problem for his theory. If natural selection really was like 
human breeding techniques, he thought, then it may tend toward producing sterile 
offspring which would obviously not contribute toward evolution and change in the 
long run. Also, Darwin noticed that breeders tended to pick varieties that would breed 
‘true’, that is, these true breeds would have little variation. This fact, when placed in 
the context of natural selection, would also lead to less variation, which would again 
be counter what he saw his theory as trying to explain. In Darwin’s 1838 Notebook C 
he tried to explain away these problems:
If varieties produced by slow causes, without picking become more and 
more impressed in blood with time, the generation will only produce an 
offspring capable of producing such as itself,—therefore two different 
varieties will produce hybrids but not varieties, which are not impressed 
on blood, will cross and produce fertile offspring.37
36 Darwin studied barnacles and concluded that male and female sexes evolved into 
each other, passing through an intermediate hermaphroditic form He wrote extensively 
on this in A Monograph o f the Sub-class Cirripedia (1851) reproduced in On 
Evolution ed Glick and Kohn. See also Glick and Kohn, p 130
37 Darwin, On Evolution ed by Glick and Kohn, Notebook C, [34] p 68
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An elliptical remark to be sure, but here is one way in which we can reconstruct it. 
Darwin is worried that any variety produced “without picking” (that is to say, through 
natural and not artificial selection) will tend toward limited variation and will “become 
impressed in blood” and ‘breed true’. If these true breeds cross, they will only produce 
hybrids and Darwin knows that hybrids from distant breeds are often sterile. He hopes 
that these varieties, “not impressed on blood” will be able to cross with each other to 
produce viable non-sterile offspring. The remark at least shows that he is unsure as to 
whether or not natural selection is really the same as human selection with respect to 
how variation is managed.
The problem for Darwin of whether variation is produced by natural selection, 
or already extant in nature was probably made more pressing for him because Darwin 
did not think that ‘mere chance’ had a very great role in producing variants. Darwin 
greatly depended on the effects of use and disuse for the generation of variation, as will 
be examined in the remarks to come about heredity. Later, ‘random’ as a 
characterisation of variation came to be adopted by neo-Darwinism, so it is worth 
noting that there are very few references to the role of chance in Darwin’s writings, he 
did not appear to think it important to the generation of variation. Mayr himself 
concludes that the role Darwin assigned to chance has never been properly analysed, 
but suggests that Darwin did have a basic understanding that chance may operate on 
some level in evolution, although Darwin appeared to be satisfied with use and disuse 
as a mechanism of change18
We can see that at this stage in Darwin’s thinking variation, already abundant in 
nature, has a very strong role in evolution as the raw material upon which natural 
selection acts. We can also see that variation does not at this stage have the character 
later assigned to it by neo-Darwinism: as random in nature. But what is clear at this 
stage is that variation and natural selection are closely tied together as an evolutionary 
process: there must be variation for selection to occur, but selection itself serves in 
turn to cause yet more variation. We may now turn to Darwin’s characterisation of 
natural selection, to see more about this relationship between variation and natural 
selection.
38 Mayr, One Long Argument, p. 49
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2.1.2 Natural selection
The concept of natural selection was famously inspired by Darwin’s reading of 
Malthus. His notebook entry on 28 September, 1838, after reading Malthus, is now 
regarded by many as the most important moment in Darwin’s thinking in terms of the 
concept of natural selection.39 It is at this point that Darwin appears to rely less on his 
metaphor of human selection and turn more toward competition as a characterisation 
of natural selection. What impressed Darwin most was Malthus’ insight that the 
population of human beings, left unchecked, would increase at an exponential rate 40 
Darwin realised that limited resources were the key to the fact that species, with minor 
fluctuations, maintained the same number of individuals. Since any population, no 
matter how high or low its output of offspring, would increase exponentially, the 
stability of any population was governed by limited resources. Competition for limited 
resources meant there was a struggle for existence. A further insight to note was 
Darwin’s realisation that this struggle could be construed as a cause of adaptive change 
in organisms This of course is the source of the characterisation of natural selection, 
and evolution in general, as essentially competitive; ‘Nature red in tooth and claw’. 
This issue is related to many ideological disputes concerning Darwinism and this 
therefore outside the scope of the methodology of this thesis. However, the 
interpretation of natural selection as ‘competitive’ forms the basis of some challenges 
to neo-Darwinism which will be discussed in part II of this thesis Therefore the 
characterisation of natural selection as ‘competitive’ as opposed to ‘cooperative’ will 
be addressed on the level of function and mechanism later in the thesis, not on the level 
of ideology.
Darwin’s reading of Malthus led him to suppose that natural selection, in a 
context of a struggle for existence, actually produced variation in the sense of different 
modifications. In the section “Natural Selection” in the Origin, Darwin clearly states 
that chance could not support such variation. Rather, speciation is the result of a 
struggle for existence: “Mere chance, as we may call it, might cause one variety to 
differ in some character from its parents...but this alone would never account for so
39 Darwin, On Evolution ed by Glick and Kohn, Notebook D [134] p 73
40 Ibid , p. 75
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habitual and large an amount of difference as that between varieties of the same species 
and species of the same genus”41 Since more offspring are bom than can possibly 
survive in a struggle for existence, any checks on survival will serve to cause 
speciation, and in effect produce variation. But this raises the question of whether 
natural selection causes variation or merely selects variations. The two descriptions are 
clearly different.
We have seen that Darwin used at least two different metaphors to illustrate 
natural selection, that of artificial human selection, and that of the “struggle for 
existence” via Malthus. From the use of these metaphors alone it is difficult to 
reconstruct how exactly natural selection should be characterised. The issue of what 
Darwin meant by his term ‘natural selection’ in terms of how it was supposed to 
function in evolution, is made more difficult since Darwin was not always consistent in 
his discussion of this term Above it was noted that Darwin did occasionally use 
natural selection in an active sense, since he used it in conjunction with the metaphor 
of human breeding processes. Let us look at a few selections from the Origin to make 
this point. To begin with, keep in mind that this discussion is concerned with whether 
natural selection has a positive active role in producing variation.
This preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious 
variations, I call Natural Selection 42 (italics added)
We have reason to believe, that a change in the conditions of life, by 
specially acting on the reproductive system, causes or increases 
variability; and in the foregoing case the conditions of life are supposed 
to have undergone a change, and this would manifestly be favourable 
to natural selection, by giving a better chance of profitable variations 
occurring, and unless profitable variations do occur, natural selection 
can do nothing Not that, as I believe, any extreme amount of variability 
is necessary...to produce new and unoccupied places for natural 
selection to fill up by modifying and improving some of the varying 
inhabitants43 (italics added)
41 Darwin in Glick and Kohn, p. 195
42 Darwin, On the Origin of Species, p. 68
43. Darwin, On the Origin of Species, p. 69
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I have added the italics to show the difference in what Darwin is saying about natural 
selection in both remarks: first, “preservation of favourable variations” is all that 
natural selection consists in, it is a mere culling mechanism. Second, Darwin is saying 
that variability would be “favourable to the action of natural selection”, and natural 
selection can do nothing without variation to work upon. But in the same remark, 
natural selection is characterised as “producing” and “filling up” niches, “modifying 
and improving” inhabitants, seemingly a more active role in promoting variation. 
Darwin’s remark after reading Malthus, though still a bit obscure, seems to treat 
natural selection in an active sense: “one may say there is a force like a hundred 
thousand wedges trying force into every kind of adapted structure into the gaps of in 
[sic] the ceconomy of Nature, or rather forming gaps by thrusting out weaker ones ”44 
Yet in later editions of the Origin, Darwin claimed that natural selection was 
not a force that induced variability. In these later works it seems that Darwin thought 
that natural selection acted only when there was available variability. Furthermore, in 
this passage Darwin seems to claim that the misconstrual of natural selection as an 
active force is simply a result of his use of an expression that indicates a natural law, 
just like the law of gravity.
Several writers have misapprehended or objected to the term Natural 
Selection. Some have even imagined that natural selection induces 
variability, whereas it implies only the preservation of such variations as 
occur and are beneficial to the being under its conditions of life. . . In the 
literal sense of the word, no doubt, natural selection is a misnomer; but 
whoever objected to chemists speaking of the elective affinities o f the 
various elements?. ..but whoever objects to a an author speaking o f the 
attraction of gravity as ruling the movements of the planets? Every one 
knows what is meant and is implied by such metaphorical expressions; 
and they are almost necessary for brevity.45
44 Charles Darwin, Notebook D [134] in Glick and Kohn, p. 74
45 Quoted in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology ed Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth A 
Lloyd (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 216
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Darwin’s remark here seems at first to solve the argument about what natural 
selection is once and for all, for here he seems to reject any active use of the concept. 
However, the interpretation of natural selection in the years after Darwin shows that 
Darwin’s final proviso was not taken as seriously as he would have liked, and varying 
interpretations of variation and natural selection became important aspects of different 
research programmes that dealt with evolutionary theory. Both versions make sense 
given what Darwin himself claimed about evolution, and we will see later in the thesis 
that neo-Darwinism’s resolution o f  this difference caused more complex issues 
surrounding a characterisation of natural selection to be raised.
The two possible interpretations of natural selection, as either an active force 
which generates variation, or as a passive force which simply works with existing 
variation, show two possible metaphysical interpretations of natural selection. 
Moreover, this distinction shows very clearly the tight relationship between variation 
and natural selection. Natural selection needs variation to work upon, but this variation 
must come from somewhere, and it is not wholly clear whether natural selection 
generates it, or if there is some other source for variation.
At this stage in characterising Darwinism as opposed to neo-Darwinism as a 
research programme, it is difficult to tease apart these two quite distinct 
interpretations Although the metaphysics behind each interpretation are different, 
these are not yet instantiated in a mechanism which would allow us to rule out 
anything as non-Darwinist in this case. Again, we might characterise the difference as 
follows: if natural selection generates variation, then metaphysically it is tantamount to 
a cause or force, then natural selection itself causes change But this might lead to a 
teleological view o f natural selection, it might even lead to a teleological 
characterisation of life in general. German biologists immediately after Darwin 
certainly tended toward this view, as we shall see shortly. However, if we decide that 
natural selection must act on variation that already exists, after such variation is 
generated (by whatever means) we can see that the metaphysical thought behind this 
interpretation is anti-teleological. For here, selection is not correlated with adaptive 
variation.
On this second interpretation the variation must come from somewhere else, 
since it is not created by natural selection, but merely culled by natural selection 
Perhaps it comes from the function of heredity itself? That is, there may be something
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in the way that organisms pass on their characteristics to their progeny that itself 
generates variants, as the raw material for natural selection to act upon. At any rate, 
we could say that Darwin on this interpretation needed a mechanism for the generation 
of variation that was different from natural selection. It is hence not surprising that he 
began to depend on heredity to solve his problem. And the history of heredity after 
Darwin shows how the changing conceptualisations of heredity hinged to a large 
degree on the tension I have outlined between interpretations in the term ‘natural 
selection’.
2.1.3 Heredity: Darwin’s Pangenesis and the Spectre of Lamarck
It has often been remarked that Darwin treated the mechanism of heredity as a “black 
box”46, in the sense that he did not have a theory to explain it at his disposal, and 
simply glossed it. However, this assertion is not fully accurate. Darwin knew that in 
order for cumulative evolution to work, there must be heredity, since there must be 
some kind of faithful copying process involved. In order to accumulate variations over 
time, successive generations must by and large resemble their progenitors, and then 
minute changes in their morphology can be cumulatively conserved. He did not gloss 
the problem of heredity, he even came up with a theory to explain it. Darwin’s theory 
of heredity, called Pangenesis, is clearly a theory that proposes a mechanism for 
heredity. Furthermore, this hereditary mechanism had to explain not only how 
offspring resembled their parents, but also how the offspring were slightly different to 
their parents. So Darwin treated heredity as a “black box” only in the sense that he did 
not need a sophisticated mechanism of genetics for the theory of natural selection to 
get off the ground. He did, however, realise that heredity was necessary for cumulative 
natural selection.
Darwin’s own theory of heredity attempted to explain how heredity worked by 
appealing to the existence of what he called “gemmules”. These gemmules were like 
tiny replicas of cells that were “thrown off”47 during cell division and accumulated in 
the reproductive organs of sexually reproducing species Alternatively, they could 
accumulate in asexually reproducing organisms and lead to budding and the growth of
46 Mayr, One Ixmg Argument p. 82
47 Glick and Kohn, p. 219ff
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new individuals. Darwin’s Pangenesis thus attempted to cut across both sexual and 
asexual organisms and was intended as a unifying theory. Darwin thought Pangenesis 
could unify many different phenomena, but all these need an explanation of both how 
offspring resemble their parents, and how they can be different from their parents, and 
in turn how asexual reproduction is related to these:
Everyone would wish to explain to himself, even in an imperfect 
manner, how it is possible for a character possessed by some remote 
ancestor suddenly to appear in the offspring; how the effects of 
increased or decreased use of a limb can be transmitted to the child; 
how the male sexual elements can act not solely on the ovules, but on 
the mother-form; how a hybrid can be produced by the union of the 
cellular tissue of two plants independently of the organs o f  generation; 
how a limb can be reproduced on the exact line of amputation, with 
neither too much or too little added, how the same organism may be 
produced by such widely different processes, as budding and true 
seminal generation...48
Pangenesis could explain observed ‘examples’ of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics since the gemmules were thrown off during the whole of the organism’s 
development, and any changes that occurred would then be transmitted to the offspring 
of that individual Darwin’s theory importantly recognised that what was needed was a 
theory that could explain how offspring were generally similar to their parents, but 
nevertheless dissimilar in some respects. Fidelity in heredity is needed, but not perfect 
fidelity, since some variation is necessary for natural selection to  work. Pangenesis is 
Lamarckist in that it relies, in some part, on the inheritance of acquired characteristics 
As was noted above, Darwin needed variation as the raw material for natural selection 
to work upon, and the inheritance of acquired characters was one possible source for 
such variation The reasons why this source was later ruled out by August Weismann, 
as an important influence on the neo-Darwinist Synthesis, will now be discussed
48 Darwin, Charles The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication ed. by 
Francis Darwin (London: John Murray, 1905) p. 433
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Before we examine Weismann’s work, it will be useful to discuss the importance of 
Lamarck and his ideas concerning heredity.49
Lamarck, as has already been discussed, saw species as evolving or progressing 
in a teleological manner. By this I mean that Lamarck thought that this change in 
organisms was largely due to an active response in the organism to the conditions of its 
environment. As the standard (and somewhat unfortunate) example of Lamarck goes, 
the long necks of giraffes could be explained by way of the conditions they lived in, 
through the effects of use and disuse while trying to eat leaves off tall trees These 
changes in the organism would be transmitted to their progeny, and long-term 
environmental conditions became impressed upon the species over time. In effect, what 
Lamarck proposed was that organisms came up with responses to suit the changes in 
their environments.
There is considerable debate as to the extent to which Darwin agreed with the 
ideas of Lamarck, and of course the debate is somewhat ideological in nature.50 But it 
is important to differentiate between Lamarckism as first, a reliance on the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics, and second, an account of evolution where change or 
variation in the organism is directly influenced by the environment in the sense that an 
organism actively seeks solutions in response to a given environmental condition 51 The 
first is a statement of the actual mechanism of heredity, the second is a characterisation 
of the generation of variation as teleological with respect to the interaction between 
the organism and its environment. Earlier it was shown that Darwin’s theory of 
Pangenesis relied in some part on the inheritance of acquired characteristics, but it is 
not wholly clear that Darwin believed that variation was directed by the environment in 
quite the same way Lamarck did Lamarckism taken as the permissibility of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics as a source for variation was prevalent for many 
years until the work of August Weismann
To conclude what we have learned through our discussion of Darwin’s own 
ideas concerning his theory, we may say that there were several possible interpretations 
of natural selection, variation, and heredity To begin with, variation could be thought
49 Depew and Weber provide an excellent discussion of the history of Lamarckism in 
America and Germany in chapter 7 of Darwinism Evolving:
50 See for instance chapter 3 of On Evolution ed. Thomas F. Glick and David Kohn
51 It is in this second sense of Lamarckism that Lamarck’s position has been called
teleological.
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of as either the extant raw material for selection to work upon, already abundant in 
nature, or alternatively as that which is created by natural selection. This in turn allows 
two possible definitions of natural selection. Natural selection can be thought of as a 
passive law or force which simply culls existing variation, or alternatively, as an active 
force which creates variation, if it is the case that variation is not particularly abundant 
in nature. The availability of these two opposite interpretations leads to the further 
result that heredity can be conceived of in two different ways. First, if it is the case that 
natural selection itself is not sufficient to create variation and relies upon existing 
variation in nature, there might be a way for variation to be created through heredity 
itself, and these changes at the hereditary level may come about through use and 
disuse, or the inheritance of acquired characters. But if it is the case that natural 
selection creates variation through its own action, then this extra source of variation is 
not necessary
This may go some way to explain why it is unclear to what extent Darwin was 
Lamarckist, since it is clear that two interpretations are possible Given the different 
and opposite ways all three components of Darwin’s theory can be interpreted, it can 
be said that Darwin either needed Lamarckist mechanisms as a further source for 
variation, or it can be claimed that he did not need such a source for variation. Of 
course, it is clear that Darwin did not respect some of Lamarck’s ideas,52 but this in 
itself does not preclude the possibility that Darwinism as a theory needed use and 
disuse, or the inheritance of acquired characteristics It all depends upon one’s 
interpretation of the three components as to whether or not one assigns a teleological 
interpretation to Darwinism, at least at this stage Later, in the change from Darwinism 
to neo-Darwinism, one interpretation was settled upon and it was this interpretation 
that defined neo-Darwinism as essentially anti-Lamarckist. This was achieved through 
the establishment of certain limitations on Darwinism, to which we now turn.
52 Glick and Kohn provide a discussion of the annotations Darwin made to Lamarck’s 
Philosophic Zoologique, one of which reads “Very poor & useless Book” See Glick 
and Kohn pp. 82-86
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2.2 Limitations on Darwinism: Weismann and Mendel
2.2.1 Weismann and the Weismann Barrier: the anti-Lamarckist 
reinterpretation of Darwinism
As was noted before, Darwinism allowed two possible interpretations o f natural 
selection and the relative importance of its role in evolution. It could be regarded not 
only as an active or passive force, and one’s view on this question often determined 
whether or not it was the most important force in evolution, or whether it was a weak 
force. Ernst Haeckel, probably the most influential contemporary reader of Darwin in 
Germany, had a rather unDarwinian interpretation of Darwin, and it was this 
interpretation that had a strong influence in Germany for many years”  Haeckel 
emphasised Darwin’s story about the common descent of all living things, but tended 
to downplay the role of natural selection in speciation Haeckel’s “recapitulationist”53 4 5
doctrine reflects the way in which he took Darwin to be telling a story more about 
progressive development than natural selection. Natural selection, for Haeckel, had a 
limited role in evolution, as an occasional ‘tweaker’ of life forms toward perfection. 
Haeckel believed strongly in the role of inheritance of acquired characteristics as a 
source of variation, he relegated natural selection to the subordinate role o f culling 
novel forms that did not contribute to developmental perfection”  The actual 
mechanics of heredity as the generation of variation, for Haeckel and his followers, 
was part and parcel of the progressive direction of evolution. This is the interpretation
53 Haeckel was not bothered by teleology, but he was bothered by vitalism. He was 
also a reductionist, since he was anti-idealist. His reductionist materialism did not 
include a belief in Newtonian physics, interestingly enough. This distrust o f  Newton 
allowed Haeckel to concede that life was reducible to fundamental laws of nature, but 
these laws were intrinsic to life itself, and were more ‘laws of life’ than ‘laws of 
nature’, yet these laws of life were somehow to be carefully distinguished from a 
vitalistic ‘life force’. A more thorough discussion of the strange bedfellows found in 
German philosophy of biology at this time can be found in Depew and Weber, 
Darwinism Evolving, chapter 7
54 Also known by the slogan “Ontogeny recapitulates Phylogeny”, it claims that each 
individual organism’s development reflects the stages that the life form itself took in 
historical speciation and development. S. J Gould relates the details of 
recapitulationism in Ontogeny and Phylogeny, pp. 76-85
55 Depew and Weber, Darwinism Evolving, p. 179
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of Darwin’s natural selection that August Weismann was working within, as one of 
Haeckel’s students.
Weismann as a young man still believed in the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, as did most biologists of the time. What impressed Weismann the most 
about Darwin’s theory was its assault on teleology.56 He was happy to explain 
selection as an adjunct to the inheritance of acquired characteristics, or use and disuse, 
until 1883, when he wrote his essay “On Heredity” where suddenly he utterly 
repudiated all Lamarckist ideas57 The reasons for his sudden shift are fairly obscure, 
since even in 1881, Weismann still used Lamarckist explanations. One possible reason 
for his shift is his work on the separation of germ cells and somatic cells in 
embryogenesis, where he claimed that the differentiation between these types of cells 
must happen very early on in development, and this separation persists throughout the 
life of the organism. Weismann’s experiments showed that rats with their tails cut off 
did not breed tail-less baby rats, he interpreted this result in the light of cytological 
discoveries of the time regarding the separation of germ and soma. Weismann’s 
‘Theory of the Continuity of the Germ Plasm’ reflects this 58 This led him to postulate 
a theoretical barrier, known as the Weismann Barrier, which separated the germ from 
the soma Changes in the environment could affect the soma, or body of the organism, 
but these changes were prevented from affecting the hereditary material of the 
organism by the Weismann Barrier The Weismann Barrier, although it was a 
theoretical entity, did have a physical counterpart, the nucleus of the cell, which 
sequestered the genetic material from the rest of the cell.
As we shall discuss in more detail later in chapter 3, Weismann’s work was 
interpreted as delineating the flow of information in living systems by denying the 
possibility inheritance o f acquired characters, although Weismann himself did not think 
in these terms. Information59 flows only in one direction, in the sense that the organism 
cannot gain information from the environment and change itself accordingly. This
56 Mayr, One Long Argument p. 113
57 Cited in Mayr, One Long Argument p 110
58 The Theory of the Continuity of the Germ Plasm states that the germ line and 
somatic line are separate, but the germ line is continuous between generations, whereas 
the somatic line dies with each organism. The germ plasm line, in effect, is continuous 
through all generations.
59 Admittedly, the use of the term “information” needs more discussion in the context 
of evolutionary theory, the use of this term will be more thoroughly investigated in 
section 3.3.
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requirement of one-way information flow was eventually reflected in the Central 
Dogma of Biology after Watson and Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA.60 The 
Central Dogma states that information flows from the DNA to protein via the 
mediation of RNA, but never from protein back to DNA, thus the Central Dogma of 
neo-Darwinism claims that information flows from the genome to the phenotype o f  the 
cell. In effect, it is a restatement of the same limitations that the Weismann Barrier also 
defined. This means that the organism only has its own genomic instructions that are 
made manifest in the morphology of the organism, and it is on the organism as its 
phenotype that natural selection acts. Any organism unable to cope with its 
environment is culled, and those left over are able to carry on reproducing, and hence 
their genomes survive. At no time is an organism able to selectively reprogram its own 
genome to cope with an unfriendly environment. Hence the organism cannot 
reprogram itself since information about the environment can never be retranscribed on 
the genome of the organism
Weismann had now thoroughly reinterpreted German biology’s view of 
Darwin, and insisted that phenomena observed in nature could be explained through 
selection without any reference to the inheritance of acquired characteristics. So 
Weismann’s work was a limitation on how variation can be generated, by way o f the 
way heredity functioned. The nature of heredity, in terms of the Continuity o f the 
Germ Plasm, was in fact the reason that certain types of variation were ruled out. 
Weismann went some way to establishing the neo-Darwinism view of natural selection 
as the only source (or creator) of variation, and gave it a very prominent role in 
evolution.
By disallowing the inheritance of acquired characteristics, Weismannism 
effectively made the flow of information one-way This move meant that a more 
detailed level of explanation for the generation of variation and heredity is necessary 
Weismannism shifted the problem of heredity from one of how structure is passed on 
(Darwin’s Pangenesis treated the problem on these terms) to one of development and 
differentiation.61 Since the germ plasm or germ line is ‘immortal’, the problem of 
heredity is really one of how organisms develop from this separate germ plasm. This
60 Watson, James D., and Crick, Francis “Genetical Implications of the structure of 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid” Nature 171 (1953)964-967
61 Kauffman, Stuart. Origins o f Order: Self-organization and Selection in Evolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p 8
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divorcing of the mechanics of heredity from the development of the organism meant 
that heredity was suddenly a separate level of explanation in evolutionary terms. This 
meant that heredity itself had to be looked at to find out how variation was generated, 
especially since now natural selection could only act upon variation after it was 
generated
This allowed Weismann to provide his own alternative account of a mechanism 
of heredity, the theory of germinal selection, which was largely concerned with 
explaining the existence of maladaptive traits. Anticipating the ‘unit of selection’ 
debate, it allowed for different levels of competition and selection by proposing that 
germinal cells might compete with one another, and the result may be maladaptive for 
the organism at large. Though Weismann’s work put a much stronger emphasis on 
natural selection as the agent o f evolutionary change, it also caused hereditary 
mechanisms to become much more prominent in research programmes dealing with 
evolutionary theory Many writers have commented on this effect, and Weismann’s 
work is seen as the most important move in the shift in emphasis toward genes in the 
Modem Synthesis, which has elsewhere been called the “gene program” by Kauffman, 
and the “nucleocentric” research program by Sapp 62 However, Weismann’s research 
was eclipsed by another conception of heredity which led to the development of the 
science of genetics, and this conception was due to the work of Gregor Mendel.
So Weismann, even though he had given natural selection a strong role in 
evolution, was also claiming that natural selection culled existing variation. It was thus 
a passive force which merely culled variation and did not create variation in an active 
sense. So there was still room for another source of variation in nature, but Weismann 
claimed that this source could not be the inheritance of acquired characteristics, or use 
and disuse. It could, however, be the case that heredity itself had another means of 
generating variation Perhaps it was the case that hereditary material itself contained 
latent traits which might be brought out through the action of natural selection This 
idea was taken up by the followers o f Mendel, as we shall see.
62 Sapp, Jan Evolution by Association:A History of Symbiosis (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), Kauffman, Origins of Order
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2.2.2 Mendel and particulate inheritance: the introduction of statistics 
into evolutionary theory
Gregor Mendel, the pea-counting monk, was devoted to discovering the laws of 
variation that were observed in hybrids. He and others had noticed, as Darwin had, that 
certain traits in hybrids tended to dominate others. Mendel sought an explanation for 
this in the form of a law. But importantly, Mendel proposed a statistical law, not a 
causal law that referred to what actually happened in the organism in terms of the 
generation of variation; Mendel’s laws merely describe the expected statistical 
distribution of traits63 Mendel’s studies led him to believe that blending of traits did 
not occur in the way that plant and animal breeders (including Darwin) had believed 
That is, the union of a tall and a short plant did not yield a medium-height plant, as it 
would if ‘blending inheritance’ did occur. As we saw above, this was a source of worry 
for Darwin, who believed that natural selection may tend to decrease variation if 
blending occurred. Mendel’s work showed that sexual recombination, though it always 
involved two traits in the zygote, led to the expression of one dominant trait in the 
organism However the recessive trait was preserved, it could be expressed in the 
progeny of that organism. A fuller explanation of Mendel’s work is provided in 
appendix 1. Although Mendel’s work focused on the discovery of a statistical law 
governing heredity, its results did give a hint as to the physical basis of heredity, it 
meant that heredity had to be particulate in nature It must be particulate since the 
discrete ‘factors’ joined up with each other in pairs, there was no blending of factors, 
and hence the mechanism in its physical basis called for discrete particles that could 
pair off in this way. Watson and Crick’s discovery of the structure of DNA supported 
the particulate nature of heredity
More importantly, Mendel’s work showed that variation could be latent in 
organisms, due to the dominant-recessive relationship for some traits. This could be 
interpreted in such a way as to downplay the role of natural selection, however. First, 
the ‘statistical’ interpretation of Mendel allowed the possibility of downplaying the role 
of natural selection in generating variation by appealing to random, chance factors in 
‘mixing’ sexual reproduction, given the particulate nature of heredity This aspect of
63 An excellent treatment of this point is present in Gigerenzer et.al. pp. 145-152
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Mendelism was taken up by the geneticists in the Modern Synthesis by R. A. Fisher and 
Sewell Wright, as we shall see. Second, it was also possible to downplay the role of 
natural selection by appealing to the possibility of latent traits hidden in the recessive 
traits of organisms, and thereby still seek a more active role for the organism itself in 
evolution.
So again we see two possible interpretations of the three components of natural 
selection, variation and heredity. What was conserved from Weismann was the 
separation between the germ and the soma, where he disallowed the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics. And this gave a strong role to natural selection. Furthermore, 
it influenced researchers to look more closely into the way heredity functioned as a 
mechanism. Paradoxically, due to the influence of Mendel’s work, this led to a view of 
heredity where it was possible to downplay the role of natural selection by claiming 
that random mixing and latent traits hidden in the actual physical mechanism of 
heredity were important factors in the generation of variation What was conserved 
from Mendel was, in the words of Depew and Weber: “The key concept of the 
Mendelian revolution is that heredity comes in discrete units that are combinable and 
dissociable in mathematically predictable ways.”64
So these limitations on Darwin still allowed various metaphysical 
interpretations of the way in which the three components of natural selection, variation 
and heredity were thought to operate. These limitations served only to establish neo- 
Darwinism as an essentially anti-Lamarckist theory, but they did not succeed in giving 
a strict definition of any of the three components. For instance, Weismann’s prohibition 
of the inheritance o f acquired characters, by postulating a one-way flow information 
flow between organism and environment, (the anti-Lamarckist move par excellence) 
did not succeed in making it clear that natural selection was the only important force in 
evolution, although it did show that natural selection only acted upon variation after it 
was created And Mendel did tighten up the definition of heredity by providing a 
particulate mechanism, where traits combined in discrete units, but this did not lead to 
any particular notion of how natural selection acted upon heredity to create variation 
In essence, we can say that these limitations on Darwinism only ruled out specific
64 Depew and Weber, p. 217 Depew and Weber provide a useful and complete account 
of Mendelianism in Chapter 9 of Darwinism Evolving. See also Mayr, One Long 
Argument and David Hull in The Philosophy o f  Biological Science (Prentice Hall: 
New Jersey, 1974), Chapter 1.
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mechanisms: those that are Lamarckist. They did not stop debates about which role 
each component was supposed to have in evolution. And as we shall see, the period of 
the Modem Synthesis did not solve many of these issues either, the metaphysics of 
neo-Darwinism was still up for grabs, but the mechanisms which were considered 
allowable began to fall into place.
2.3 The Modem Synthesis
The Modem Synthesis describes the development of what is now called neo- 
Darwinism. Neo-Darwinism is usually characterised as the marriage of modem 
genetics and populational genetics with Darwinism. This characterisation receives 
much discussion,65 but for the purposes of this discussion I would like to concentrate 
only on the way in which neo-Darwinism as embodied in the Modem Synthesis deals 
with the issues already covered, variation, heredity and natural selection. To many 
writers, the most important debate in the Synthesis focused on what many have called 
the issue of “hard” versus “soft” inheritance.66 Closely related to this issue, is of course 
the role of natural selection. In ‘soft' inheritance, the organism is thought of as actively 
responding to the environment and changing toward it. Thus variation occurs before 
natural selection acts upon it, and this could occur through use and disuse, or the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics In ‘hard’ inheritance, all changes in the 
organism arise purely by chance, and natural selection then acts upon these changes 
afterwards One o f the most important features o f the Modem Synthesis was to reject 
soft inheritance completely. When hard inheritance was agreed upon, this in turn 
changed the nature o f natural selection
As we shall see, it was still possible to disagree over whether natural selection 
was the only important force in evolution, but the rejection of ‘soft’ inheritance, as an 
extension of Weismann and Mendel’s limitations on Darwinism, did have the effect of 
making neo-Darwinism explicitly anti-Lamarckist That is, certain Lamarckist 
mechanisms were ruled out. The adoption of the Weismann Barrier as a theoretical 
entity which prevented the organism from actively changing itself to suit its
65 For instance, see Mayr, One Long Argument, Maynard Smith The Theory of 
Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
66 Mayr, One Long Argument ch. 8
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environment and then passing on these changes to its offspring meant that change had 
to  come from other avenues. Mendelianism allowed these changes to come from latent 
traits in the hereditary material of the organism, as well as from statistically random 
mixing of these traits during recombination.
In ‘soft’ inheritance, natural selection could be quite weak as an evolutionary 
force, since the active changes in the organism while responding to the influence o f the 
environment could provide the needed evolutionary change. In ‘hard’ inheritance, since 
all evolutionary change occurred by the action of natural selection after variation was 
extant in the organism, natural selection could be considered as the only speciating 
force available, and therefore became much more important as an agent of evolutionary 
change. Yet equally important is the reappraisal o f  the role of chance in evolution 
necessitated by the acceptance of hard inheritance. If organisms could not actively 
change themselves in response to their environments, then all change in them had to be 
a matter of chance. In fact, all variation had to be due to chance. The Mendelian use of 
statistical methods to look at the distribution of traits in an organism gave chance a still 
more prominent role. But even this did not lead to any consensus on whether natural 
selection was the only important force in evolution.
M.J S. Hodge notes that the introduction of population genetics to neo- 
Darwinism by R.A.Fisher, Sewall Wright, and J B.S. Haldane had the effect of altering 
what was meant by natural selection67 These three contributors to the modem 
synthesis had different beliefs about the role of natural selection. R.A. Fisher was 
interested in marrying genetics to evolution by way of probability; he was convinced 
that models from statistical mechanics and thermodynamics could be imported into 
evolutionary biology. His interpretation of evolutionary biology in this probabilistic 
spirit led him to claim that natural selection could be divorced from factors that 
changed variance in other ways, for instance Mendelian dominant factors. His 
conclusion was that though there may be other factors that influence evolution, these 
were relatively unimportant, and natural selection therefore was the most powerful 
force in evolution. Fisher in effect agreed with Darwin insofar as Darwin claimed that 
natural selection could only occur when variation was present However, he disagreed 
with Darwin’s equation of Malthusian competition with natural selection The
67 Hodge, M.J.S. “Natural Selection” in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology p 215 
Discussions of Fisher and Wright can also be found in Depew and Weber, Darwinism 
Evolving and Mayr, One Long Argument
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introduction of probabilistic reasoning into evolutionary theory meant that in Fisher’s 
view, Malthusian competition was best interpreted as a limit, rather than a law or force 
in itself. Fisher eventually claimed that Malthus was a special case, or consequence of 
natural selection. Selection was everything, in Fisher’s programme.
Wright, on the other hand interpreted natural selection somewhat differently. 
He believed that Fisher’s recasting of evolutionary biology into the thermodynamic 
model did not solve the issues regarding the possible causes of evolution; it did not 
permit the inference that natural selection was paramount, while Mendelian dominance, 
random drift etc. were unimportant in evolving populations. Wright claimed that 
Fisher’s version of evolutionary biology was too idealised, real populations, he argued, 
were apt to change in ways that were not reducible to statistical mechanics. He 
believed that real, isolated, imperfect populations were able to change by means of 
random drift, without reference to natural selection In effect, Wright downplayed the 
role of natural selection, and believed random drift, migration, mutation and other 
factors were much more apt to affect population change. Wright, therefore, believed 
natural selection was less important in evolution.
Thus were the battle lines drawn, (and interestingly, they are drawn along the 
lines of Britain versus America, a gap that may still persist to some degree today) 
However, Depew and Weber remark that the issue in the background is one that has to 
do with the status of laws in the biological sciences; they see Fisher as a proponent of a 
kind of reductionism where the ‘law’ of natural selection is analogous to the laws of 
physics, accepting that such laws are inherently statistical in nature Wright, on the 
other hand, tends toward a view of science where laws are in the explanatory 
background, and parameters and models are more important in explanation.68 Yet 
important issues for neo-Darwinism were already in effect in the Fisher/Wright 
disagreement: to what extent could one distinguish drift from natural selection? What 
would it mean to even compare causes of evolution in this way, if natural selection was 
an omnipresent background assumption? These issues will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapter
But for now we may conclude that the Modem Synthesis of neo-Darwinism did 
put some limitations on the types of mechanisms that were permissible in terms of 
evolutionary theory. The adoption of the Weismann Barrier as an anti-Lamarckist
68 Depew and Weber, p 284
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theoretical construct, or mechanism, meant that the organism did not adapt toward an 
environment, as the more teleologically oriented followers of Darwin might wish. 
Rather, natural selection was a process by which the organism was passively moulded 
by the environment. Such considerations, however, still left the question of what 
exactly natural selection is open to question. Furthermore, the ways in which the three 
components interacted with each other made it possible to debate the question of 
whether natural selection, if only a culling process which preserved variations after 
they were generated, by means of mechanisms other than the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, could be said to be the most important force in evolution. This question 
still concerns the philosophy of biology, as we shall see in chapter 3. The Weismannian 
contribution toward the anti-Lamarckist, anti-teleological character of neo-Darwinism 
did serve to constrain the flow of information to a one-way flow: from germ to soma, 
never the reverse. But this move did not do much to elucidate just what sort of 
information was being transmitted in heredity. And the Mendelian inclusion of 
statistical methods to describe the frequency of discrete particulate units which were 
the basis of the variational traits of organisms did make the notion of chance, 
randomness and probability more prominent in evolutionary thinking. Yet here again, it 
was not clear just what role chance or randomness was to play in living evolutionary 
systems. Questions such as these, which were raised but largely unanswered during the 
shift from Darwinism to the Modem Synthesis of neo-Darwinism, will be addressed in 
the next chapter
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Chapter 3
Contemporary Neo-Darwinism and Philosophy of Biology
The previous chapter examined the three elements of evolutionary theory by tracing 
their development through their initial formulation by Darwin, through the limitations 
placed upon them by Mendel and Weismann, and through their development in the 
Modem Synthesis Changes in their interpretations were noted, as well as the inherent 
ambiguities in how they are to be understood. This development and reinterpretation 
continues in the context of contemporary biological research today. This chapter will 
examine some recent controversies in biology in the three areas of natural selection, 
variation and heredity with a view to showing that these three elements, though central 
to evolutionary theory, remain problematic with regard to their proper role in 
evolutionary theory.
These three elements are fundamental to evolutionary theory, and each focuses 
on questions that are not only empirical, but also philosophical in nature. That is, each 
element’s interpretation is largely governed by the way in which it is instantiated in 
terms of mechanisms, yet these mechanisms themselves entail wide-ranging 
implications in philosophical or metaphysical terms Thus natural selection, treated as a 
force or mechanism, is interpreted in varying ways for reasons to do with the types of 
evolutionary systems under enquiry. Yet the notion of force or cause in evolution is 
always subject to philosophical interpretations. Similarly, variation as a ‘random’ 
process has links to an understanding of evolutionary systems as stochastic in some 
sense, and this in turn relates to concepts such as ‘chance’ and ‘randomness’. Finally, 
heredity is connected with an empirical determination of the mechanisms of 
reproduction, but is also connected with a notion of ‘information’ which is conserved 
in the element of heredity
This chapter will therefore discuss the interrelation of these three elements of 
evolution in terms of their empirical interpretations and their philosophical 
implications. Section 3.1 will discuss natural selection as a force, and investigate the 
role of fitness in the interpretation of natural selection. Natural selection will also be 
examined with reference to the controversy regarding adaptationism, a position that 
holds natural selection to be the most powerful, or even the sole, force in evolution.
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The claim that natural selection is a perfecting or ‘ordering’ force distinct from mere 
chance will lead into the discussion in section 3.2. This section will examine the role of 
chance in evolutionary theory, as either a characterisation of novelty or as a 
constitutive aspect to evolution in the larger sense. The third section will examine 
heredity and its relations to information and selection in the context of the “unit of 
selection” debate
In the case of each of the three elements, we will see how the metaphysical 
underpinnings of the neo-Darwinist research programme as a whole are expressed in 
the way the mechanisms of the theory of evolution are understood. In addition, it will 
be shown that the three elements must be interdefined - they all three come as a 
package. Attempts to define any element on its own, without reference to its 
interaction with the other two, inevitably lead to a skewed or incomplete 
characterisation of neo-Darwinism as a research programme. Finally, this chapter will 
allow a characterisation of neo-Darwinism as a research programme, which in turn will 
allow us to assess how challenges to neo-Darwinism, or alternative research 
programmes, can be evaluated
We can present the results of this chapter as follows: Natural selection, as the 
first element of neo-Darwinism we will examine, is variously interpreted as a force, a 
cause, a law of nature, a result of the interaction between organism and environment, 
etc. Yet in order for natural selection to serve more than a merely metaphysical role, in 
order for it to be given any empirical grounding or predictive ability, it must function in 
conjunction with both variation and heredity. It must either ‘act on something’, upon a 
‘unit of selection’, or act via something, a measure of fitness perhaps, in order to be 
incorporated in a mechanism. Thus, the question “Is natural selection the most 
important force in evolution?” which is at the heart of the “adaptationist debate”, 
inevitably presupposes that natural selection can somehow be decoupled from the 
other two elements of variation and heredity. This, I will show, is impossible. And 
moreover, I conclude that natural selection, variation, and heredity are interdefined in 
such a way that selection is uncorrelated with the generation of variation We shall see 
that natural selection is treated as an anti-Lamarckist constraint on evolution where it 
cannot be a creative force, acting toward an adaptive goal or plan of nature, but rather 
it is understood as a means of change that functions in an essentially stochastic way
This ‘stochastic’ aspect of neo-Darwinism leads us to the conclusion that in the
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case of variation, which is often described as random, we may say that this randomness 
is not truly random, but only random with respect to evolutionary advantage. Again, 
this second element of variation cannot be characterised alone, without reference to 
natural selection and heredity. This can be shown by example of the “drift controversy” 
which attempts to evaluate the difference between “evolution due to random factors” 
and “evolution due to natural selection”. It will be shown that there is no way to 
distinguish these hypotheses either experimentally or theoretically within the confines 
of the neo-Darwinist research programme. In the end, variation cannot be 
characterised as random per se, but only as random with respect to evolutionary 
advantage. This also is an anti-Lamarckist constraint expressed as a mechanism
Lastly, in the case o f heredity, I will show that the role of heredity as a part of 
neo-Darwinism cannot be divorced from the way natural selection and variation 
operate. Since heredity serves the role of a ‘copying system’ to preserve evolution as a 
conservative process, it is natural to characterise the third element of heredity as an 
‘information carrier’. But the application of the concept of information to heredity is 
problematic, since at base the function of heredity is closely associated with natural 
selection, as the “unit o f selection problem” will make clear For a reductionist 
approach to biology allows heredity to be closely allied to natural selection. Moreover, 
even if heredity is conceived of as an information carrying system, it is still expressed 
as a mechanism in such a way that the flow of information through it is constrained as 
one-way flow only. This mechanism, which took the form of the Weismann Barrier, is 
now enshrined in the Central Dogma of Biology as the strict one-way information flow 
from DNA to protein, never the reverse. Thus natural selection and variation are also 
implicated* their role as anti-Lamarckist elements which act only to preserve 
adaptations, not to induce them, is assured by the ‘simplex’ informational flow 
constraints of heredity. Even if the concept o f information itself is somewhat 
problematic in application to biology and evolutionary theory as a whole, it is the 
mechanism which expresses the flow of information which serves as an anti-Lamarckist 
constraint. With this summary in mind we now may turn to natural selection.
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3.1 Natural Selection
The contemporary period of research and discovery in evolutionary theory really 
begins with what has been called the “molecular revolution”. One of the crucial events 
in the molecular revolution was Crick and Watson’s elucidation of the molecular 
structure of DNA. (see appendix 2) This elucidation reinforced Weismann’s definition 
of heredity: information flowed from the germ (DNA) to the soma (proteins) via the 
translation mechanism of RNA. This so-called Central Dogma of Biology has never 
been seriously disputed. The main thrust of the molecular revolution was to try to 
show how Mendel’s laws and Fisher and Wright’s various added dimensions to 
population genetics could be tied to the physical mechanisms of heredity Weismann’s 
influence led to a search for the nature of this physical mechanism The separation of 
germ from soma caused a change in the focus of research leading to the demand that 
heredity itself must be examined Mendel’s discoveries showed that heredity was 
particulate in nature. Thus it was thought that discovering the nature of heredity in its 
physical manifestation would show the means by which this physical mechanism would 
be made manifest in the phenotypic traits of the organisms themselves, and furthermore 
would show how these traits would be distributed in a population of organisms.
It was thought that an elucidation of the nature of heredity would lead to 
uncovering the way in which variation functioned in evolution. This variation, 
whatever its source, was then supposed to be acted upon by natural selection. On this 
approach, there was no question as to the ability of natural selection to create variation 
or adaptations, as the tensions outlined in the last chapter suggested. Rather the 
physical nature of heredity itself was examined to see how variation was provided as a 
kind of ‘raw material’. Natural selection simply acted upon this variation after its 
generation Elliott Sober characterises natural selection in this way: “The process of 
natural selection has two components. First variation must arise in the population; 
then, once that variation is in place, natural selection can go to work” 69
However, this approach to the importance of heredity in variation could still 
lead to varying approaches to research On the one hand, since the physical basis of 
heredity was seen as integral to the generation of variation, one might think that
69 Sober, The Philosophy o f Biology, p. 37
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heredity had its own means of generating variation, and that these means may be 
structural properties of DNA itself, or organisational propensities, or a host of other 
variation-generating mechanisms. On the other hand, it might be thought that natural 
selection was all important, the only force in evolution, and could be decoupled from 
variation-generation in the mechanism of heredity itself. Therefore, it might be the case 
that change in the hereditary material itself was random with respect to natural 
selection. Of course, these two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. However, I 
would note that a strong belief in the second will entail that any other factor in 
evolution will be random definiiionally. This will be considered later in section 3.2. 
For the moment let us examine the claim that since natural selection can be decoupled 
from mechanisms that provide the generation of variation, natural selection is the only 
force in evolution This will be discussed in the context of the adaptationist debate, 
which recalls some of the issues raised in section 2.3, in the discussion of R.A. Fisher 
and S. Wright’s ideas concerning the power of natural selection.
3.1.1 Adaptationism
The adaptationist controversy highlights some of the problems that surround the 
conceptual definition of natural selection in terms of its proper characterisation as an 
element of neo-Darwinist theory. I will not attempt to resolve these difficulties here, as 
such an endeavour is outside the scope of this thesis. However, I wish to note thatv 
even if issues surrounding the proper characterisation of natural selection in terms of 
the criteria for explanation in scientific theories remain unresolved, evolutionary theory 
can still use the notion of natural selection without thereby attempting to define it in 
isolation from its interactions with other components of neo-Darwinism, variation and 
heredity In this regard the adaptationist controversy centres on the relative importance 
of natural selection in comparison with other evolutionary mechanisms, but does not 
concern the definition of natural selection in itself. Though it is equally clear that a 
dispute over the relative importance of natural selection does appeal in some part to a 
characterisation of natural selection, 1 would argue that this characterisation need not 
be constrained by the criteria usually required by the philosophy of science in treating 
theoretical terms.
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It was noted in chapter 2 that Neo-Darwinism designates natural selection as a 
mechanism of change in organisms over time. However, this designation has 
sometimes been extended to the belief that natural selection is by far the most powerful 
force in evolution, this belief is known as adaptationism. The most outspoken 
opponents o f adaptationism are Stephen Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin, and their 
1979 paper on ‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm”70 outlines 
their concern that adaptationism was ‘dominating’ English and American evolutionary 
thought. They recommend a more pluralistic approach to evolutionary theory, one 
where factors other than natural selection are given more considerations as agents of 
evolutionary change. As they see it, evolutionary theory fails to investigate other 
possible explanations of genetic change in favour of an adaptationist approach that 
tends to support simple explanations based on the isolation of adaptive traits and the 
establishment of processes which could have led to this selection, which may appear 
plausible, but are liable to be false.
Elliott Sober notes that adaptationists do not necessarily deny the existence of 
other evolutionary casual mechanisms, such as mutation, migration, and drift, but 
rather they downplay the importance of these mechanisms. Adaptationists do not deny 
that drift, mutation, pleiotropy71 or other factors can affect the course of evolution 72 
Yet Sober recognises that there are several senses in which the adaptationist claim 
“Natural selection is the most powerful force in evolution” can be taken. If it is taken 
as “Natural selection is a more powerful force than mutation” then Sober’s response is 
that this is a legitimate question that can be answered by comparative analysis. At this 
point Sober’s larger concerns in the philosophy of biology become apparent. Sober’s 
view is that evolutionary theory is a “theory of forces” in much the same way as 
physics, and he is furthermore concerned to explicate exactly how causation works
70 Gould, S.J. and Lewontin, R.C. “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme” Proceedings of the Royal 
Society vol.B205 (1979) 581-98
71 Pleiotropy is a term that describes a situation in which one gene can have many 
different phenotypic effects, some of which are advantageous and some of which may 
be disadvantageous Because of this, it is harder for selection to weed out 
disadvantageous traits, as such traits have “hitchhiked” onto advantageous traits that 
selection would presumably preserve Pleiotropy has therefore been mooted as an 
alternative, opposing force to that of selection.
72 Sober, Elliott. “What is Adaptationism?” in The Ixitest on the Best ed. John Dupre 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1987) pp 105-118
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with regard to neo-Darwinism. Sober’s treatment of adaptationism is thus useful in 
illustrating the concerns that the philosophy of biology has with natural selection, and 
it is worth pointing out that there are some unresolved issues surrounding natural 
selection from this standpoint.
Sober believes that evolutionary theory is a “theory of forces”73 and that the 
adaptationist debate is “not a claim about the power of selection in evolution, but 
about the power of certain simple models of evolution.”74 In a theory of forces, the 
forces must be decomposable for identifications of the relevant causal force to be 
possible. This means that, in order for a model which reflects these forces to function, 
the nature of the functional entities must be well-defined In the case of adaptationism, 
the difficulty lies in deciding which factor is the cause o f evolutionary change. Sober 
claims that mutation and selection are common currency in terms of their effects on a 
genome, therefore it is possible to decompose their effects and thus determine their 
relative causal contribution. Local facts about the population under study will 
determine which causal factor is more important in such an analysis. Therefore, natural 
selection as opposed to mutation can be investigated comparatively, but the same 
cannot be said for natural selection as opposed to drift. Natural selection as opposed to 
pleiotropy is similarly difficult to investigate, because Sober argues that situations of 
drift and pleiotropy are marked by non-local facts, which give little information about 
the causal factors involved. Here of course Sober is focusing on the use of the concept 
of cause to denote a relevant predictive factor, and thus concludes that questions about 
the relative force of natural selection that do not allow the decomposability of causal 
factors are predictively, and therefore explanatorily useless We will investigate this 
line of thought further in section 3.2.
It is clear that the issues raised by the adaptationist debate are related to issues 
in the larger area of the philosophy of science, if only in the sense that what would 
count as an answer to the question of whether natural selection is the only cause in 
evolution is subject to a principled decision about what would constitute a causal 
explanation. This is in fact evident in Gould and Lewontin’s attack on adaptationist 
accounts as unverifiable, or pseudo-explanations, what they call “just-so stories”.75 
M J.S. Hodge notes that this is an issue that is inadequately addressed. “A quite
73 Sober, Elliott. The Nature o f Selection (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1984), ch. 1
74 Sober, “What is Adaptationism?”, p 116
75 Gould and Lewontin, “Spandrels of San Marcos”
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general issue has still received no canonical treatment: what kind of thing is natural 
selection, anyway? A law, a principle, a force, a cause, an agent, or all or some of 
these?”76 There is a sense in which it may seem more appropriate to talk of natural 
selection as being the ‘constraints’ on evolution, in the sense that it is what allows 
some variants to get through to reproduce, and keeps others from getting through. 
Similarly, it could be seen as the ‘result’ of the interaction of the organism with the 
environment which exerts selection pressures upon it. This option though, might be 
heading straight into the ‘tautology trap’; that is, that since natural selection is 
“survival of the fittest”, and the fittest are the survivors, then this type of definition of 
natural selection is circular
3.1.2 The Tautology Problem and The Propensity Interpretation of 
Fitness
The possibility that natural selection is not really a force in the way other scientific 
theoretical terms such as gravity are, is important to consider. If natural selection 
simply selects out organisms through environmental constraints on these organisms, 
then in what sense can it be said to ‘cause’ evolution or change? After all, if natural 
selection is merely the result of environmental constraints, then this does not sound 
much like a force or cause. And what exactly does natural selection ‘select’ anyway? If 
natural selection does not really actively select anything, but is simply the result of the 
interaction between organism and environment, and simply describes the “survival of 
the fittest” then it cannot be an agent of change in any causal, predictive, or 
explanatory sense. For instance: What does natural selection allow to survive? The 
fittest And what makes these the fittest? The fact that they have survived. In order for 
natural selection to have any status as a causal or explanatory force, it would seem that 
it is necessary that natural selection act upon some property or other of the organism 
for it to be a selective force
The “tautology problem” has long been a topic of interest, probably since the 
publication of the Origin. Popper famously retracted his own statement that evolution 
by natural selection was a mere tautology, he later claimed that it was a metaphysical
76 Hodge, “Natural Selection” in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology ed Evelyn
Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992)
p. 218
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research programme in its own right, and blamed his earlier misreading on the fact that 
many prominent evolutionists had purposely framed the principle of natural selection in 
a tautologous fashion, notably C.H. Waddington, and R.A. Fisher, J.B.S. Haldane, 
G.G. Simpson 77 The “tautology problem” is thought to be an important issue in many 
senses. Of course, there is the usual horror of admitting to the scientific community 
that natural selection is tautologous in the sense of a mere platitude, such an admission 
would be obvious ammunition for creationists, ‘creation scientists’ and others of their 
ilk seeking to show that evolutionary theory is unscientific. Furthermore, the tautology 
problem seems to occupy philosophers of biology who wish to make evolution a 
“respectable scientific theory”,78 and explain the mechanism of natural selection 
Natural selection would then need a causal story of some kind to distinguish it from 
trivial selection processes, for instance, sorting mechanisms of the kind found in 
geology. The prevailing tendency among philosophers of biology is to claim that there 
is some sort of causal connection between the organism and environment, since this in 
some way gets them out of the “tautology problem”. That is, to avoid the identification 
of natural selection with “survival o f the fittest” in its most trivial sense, it is important 
to ascribe to natural selection the status of some kind of causal process There must be 
some property of the organism that is selected by natural selection, or which is 
conserved by natural selection.
This property in evolutionary theory is called “fitness” It is related to the issue 
of whether or not natural selection as survival of the fittest is tautologous in the 
following way As Mills and Beatty characterise the relationship: ‘The concepts of 
fitness and natural selection are closely linked, since it is through the process of natural 
selection that the fittest gain predominance, according to the theory of evolution.”79 
“Fitness” is a term that refers to an organism’s survival success or reproductive 
success, or its relative success. Now notice that defining fitness as the actual 
reproductive success of an organism would also leads us into the tautology trap If we
77 Popper, Karl. “Natural Selection and its Scientific Status” in Popper Selections ed 
David Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) p. 242.
78 Robert Brandon claims that this is his aim He has worked with John Beatty on 
working out the status of fitness as a dispositional property, though he somewhat 
confusingly calls this property “adaptedness” See Brandon, R. Concepts and Methods 
in Evolutionary Biology p. 11
79 Mills, S and Beatty, J. ‘The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness” Philosophy of 
Science 46 p 264
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designate the fitness of an organism according to whether it happened to survive or 
reproduce, then we risk treating fitness as the “dormitive virtue” of evolutionary 
theory .80 So if fitness is to be defined in a non-circular manner, it must have more of a 
casual explanatory role. ‘The idea is that adaptedness is related to fitness i.e. 
reproductive success, in much the same way that solubility is related to dissolving.” as 
Robert Brandon has put it.81 Mills and Beatty formulated the ‘‘propensity interpretation 
of fitness”, which treats fitness as a dispositional property82 That is, the fitness of an 
organism is that propensity for it to survive and reproduce, and therefore is the 
property that natural selection selects. Fitness thus becomes a measure of an 
organism’s potential to survive and leave offspring. This makes fitness an empirical 
property, and allows natural selection to have some kind of causal or explanatory place 
in evolution.
The propensity interpretation of fitness is thus intended to  give natural selection 
some causal story via fitness as a dispositional property. But if a propensity 
interpretation of fitness is necessary to give a causal story for natural selection, what 
can it tell us in terms o f explanation? Defining fitness dispositionally allows biology to 
be an empirical science with limited prediction, and the Principle of Natural Selection 
then has some explanatory force. But is this really a solution? Hodge’s question of 
what sort of thing natural selection is remains unanswered. Yet this question needs 
some answer, for it is clear that in order to answer the question of whether or not 
natural selection is completely fundamental to evolutionary theory, it is necessary to 
provide some reasonable characterisation of what natural selection is. This is the very 
question that the adaptationist debate seeks to answer. Later in this thesis, when we 
address some challenges to neo-Darwinism which disagree specifically with the 
adaptationist claim that natural selection is fundamental in evolution, it will become 
clear that such challenges cannot be assessed without first addressing the extent to 
which neo-Darwinism depends upon natural selection as an evolutionary force.
80 See Scriven’s example in his 1959 (Scriven, Michael “Explanation and Prediction in 
Evolutionary Theory”, Science 130, pp. 477-81). There are two identical twins, one of 
whom is struck by lightning before he has a chance to go on and have children. Scriven 
argues that if fitness is defined as actual reproductive success or actual survival, we 
would have to assign the surviving twin a greater fitness, though they are identical in 
every respect
81 Brandon, Concepts and Methods in Evolutionary Biology, p. 49. Again, Brandon 
uses different terminology, but he is talking about what everyone else calls fitness
82 Mills, S and Beatty, J. “The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness” pp. 263-286.
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The adaptationist controversy is concerned with the relative power of natural 
selection in evolution. Some have thought that natural selection is relied upon too 
heavily as a source of change, and they would rather that evolutionary theory pay more 
attention to the possibility of change through the action of variation and heredity by 
themselves. They counter adaptationists who insist upon natural selection as being the 
only force in evolution by pointing out that such a position is in some sense 
‘unfalsifiable’ That is, as Gould and Lewontin point out, “the rejection of one adaptive 
story usually leads to its replacement by another, rather than to a suspicion that a 
different kind of explanation might be required .”*3 In order to provide criteria by which 
these different kinds of explanation might be appraised, philosophers of biology have 
tried to show that there is a way in which natural selection can be compared with 
explanations that refer to mutation or pleiotropy, for instance. However, this has led to 
a recognition that natural selection must be more precisely defined in order for such 
explanations to be properly distinguished from each other Characterisations of natural 
selection that are precise about the status of natural selection in terms that the 
philosophy of science would accept have been rare. Philosophers of biology seeking to 
avoid the ‘tautology trap’ of natural selection as “survival of the fittest” have tried to 
give at least the concept of “fitness” itself more causal power by treating it as a 
disposition. Yet even this has not resolved the issue of in what sense natural selection 
is a causal agent, or the related issue of how one could characterise it as a force or law, 
or principle.
3.1.3 Defining Natural Selection
In conclusion, I want to draw attention to the difficulties caused by evolutionists and 
philosophers of biology alike in attempting to define natural selection formally, outside 
any considerations of the other mechanisms in evolution. First, the constraints of 
philosophy of science, strengthened perhaps by Popper’s initial indictment of natural 
selection as tautologous, have been largely interpreted as a demand to include the 
principle of natural selection within some kind of causal framework, and thus to make 
it into a respectable scientific law The approaches discussed above are only 
representatives of the type of endeavour philosophy of biology has found itself 83
83 Gould and Lewontin, p 79
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engaged in: an attempt to give natural selection its own causal relationship to 
organisms, in effect to define it on its own with reference to how it ‘causes’ organisms 
in an environment to change over time. Critics of adaptationism bring this problem into 
sharper relief: their position seems to be: “if you can’t tell us what natural selection is, 
you can’t properly contrast explanations of change due to natural selection from 
explanations due to different causes, and everything will end up being claimed to be an 
adaptation due to natural selection”. Resulting attempts to tighten up the definition of 
natural selection have seemed to have a different effect. By formalising the definition of 
natural selection so as to distinguish it from other forces like random genetic drift or 
pleiotropy, natural selection as a cause seems to have lost much of its force.
For this reason, 1 suggest that natural selection can only be interdefined, or 
defined with reference to, the other two components of evolution, variation and 
heredity. Attempts to define natural selection in isolation from these other components 
will not so much be doomed to failure, and cause a skewed picture of the function of 
research programmes in biology. This skewed picture will make it impossible to 
interpret what parts of evolutionary theory are in conflict with neo-Darwinism and 
which are merely augmentations of previously accepted orthodoxy, a project I wish to 
pursue in the Part II of this thesis. It will be seen in the next two sections of this 
chapter that the same effect occurs with the components of variation and heredity
There is one further issue to be recognised in the adaptationist controversy. 
Part of the claim that natural selection is the most important force in evolution might 
involve the notion that natural selection provides the sole source of order in evolution. 
Given what we have seen about the interplay between variation and natural selection, it 
is clear that natural selection as a culling mechanism can be conceived of as a sorting 
device that removes unfit variations from the gene pool In chapter 2 we saw that 
evolution through variation, natural selection, and heredity is a process that conserves 
certain forms by means of reproduction and heredity, and that without the hereditary 
component, evolution would be nothing but constant disorganised change. We also 
saw that the rejection of Lamarckism meant that variation was random with respect to 
adaptational advantage. Natural selection can be conceived of as providing order by 
sorting through these random variations. This could also be interpreted so that 
evolution describes a process that creates order out of chaos, and natural selection is 
the most important element in this process.
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It has been argued that this interpretation of natural selection as the sole source 
of order is predicated on two beliefs about evolution.*4 First, it rests upon the idea that 
variation as undirected, or as uncoupled from adaptive advantage, means that variation 
can occur in any direction. Second, it rests upon the ideas borrowed from 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics (heavily relied upon by population 
geneticists) that systems left to their own devices will tend toward entropy or disorder. 
Natural selection provides the “Maxwell’s Demon” in this type of analysis. Both of 
these claims have at their heart a characterisation of the role of chance, or chaos as 
opposed to order, and this opposition deserves further discussion as we turn to the role 
of chance in evolutionary theory.
3.2 Variation
The concept of randomness plays a key role in evolutionary theory. But what is the 
exact nature of this role? There are, as Sober has noted, two roles that chance can have 
in evolutionary theory First, evolutionary theory, as we have noted, claims that natural 
selection acts upon variation in the hereditary material, and furthermore all variation in 
this hereditary material occurs at random, that is, unconnected with adaptational 
advantage As Francis Crick has put it, “Chance is the only source of true novelty” .84 5 
Crick therefore views chance as a characterisation of variation that then becomes 
available to natural selection. Second, we could say that randomness is part and parcel 
of evolutionary theory itself, through the functioning of natural selection as an agent of 
change. That is to say, evolutionary theory, as a statistical, probabilistic theory, 
necessarily incorporates an element of chance. But  ^as I will show, it is not easy to see 
an important difference between these two interpretations in terms of the neo- 
Darwinist research programme. Both interpretations fail to define the exact role of 
chance in evolutionary theory.
We have seen that the Modem Synthesis and its understanding of the nature of 
natural selection required that any variations in the genome of the organism be 
statistically independent, meaning that such variations or mutations are not directed by
84 Kauffman, p.8.
85 Crick, F. Life Itself: Its Origin and Nature (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 
p. 58
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the influence of the environment in any way. Natural selection plays no role in the 
generation of variation by the organism. The environment preserves or rejects the 
phenotypes influenced by new variant genotypes after such variance has been 
generated. This is part of the anti-Lamarckist constraint of evolutionary theory as we 
saw in chapter 2. And it is in this way only, I will conclude, that evolutionary theory 
regards the concept of chance. That is to say, chance as an aspect of variation, the 
second element of neo-Darwinism, while it invites some further metaphysical 
considerations, is always interpreted in such a way that chance is incorporated in terms 
of mechanisms that serve to retain the fundamental anti-teleological basis of neo- 
Darwinism.
3.2.1 Randomness and Indeterminacy
The issue of randomness or chance is a perennial problem in the philosophy of biology. 
To evolutionists, it proves to be a source of constant confusion, whilst to philosophers, 
a source of constant argument. To begin with, it is clear that in the historical context of 
debates about biology and nature before Darwin, the role of chance was already a very 
tricky issue It has been argued that mechanists, vitalists, and teleologists all denied the 
importance of chance, yet nevertheless were prepared to enlist chance as a weapon in 
the context of ideological debates.86 Mechanists, in their opposition to vitalism, denied 
that anything was due to chance, given that they were Laplacian determinists But 
these same mechanists, in opposition to teleologists, were quite happy to affirm chance 
as an antidote to Creator-driven design. There were some vitalists that denied chance, 
but there were some vitalists who were also indeterminists. The theologist/teleologists 
in the tradition of Paley designated chance as mere absence of design, that is, they did 
not construe chance in any positive way. It seems that the choice o f one’s metaphysics 
does influence one’s view of the role of chance, but not in a particularly predictable 
way.
Yet, in many ways it makes little difference to the practice of biology which 
commitments one has with regard to determinism. For instance, both Wright and 
Fisher were indeterminists, but clearly they both had quite different interpretations of 
the role of chance in biology, as we have seen Furthermore, they were both happy to
Gigerenzer, et al., p. 13286
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use determinism-laden theory in their quest to understand the laws of population 
biology. Wright himself claimed that his indeterminism made no difference at all to his 
views on biology .*7 We can safely say that the issue of determinism and indeterminism 
is not important in biology, insofar as it does not seem to influence the direction of 
research programmes in any obvious way.
Although determinism or indeterminism as a high-level metaphysical 
commitment has no impact on research programmes, the role of chance, construed in a 
more subtle way, does We will see how one’s view of chance can influence the 
direction of research programmes by examining some definitions o f randomness in 
evolution through Jablonka and Lamb’s appraisal of the role of randomness.87 8 Earlier it 
was noted that it is difficult to reconstruct Darwin’s own view of the role of chance in 
evolution, though it is at least clear that he did not think it particularly influential in the 
generation of variation. But in the Modem Synthesis, the acceptance o f hard 
inheritance meant that ‘chance’ was conceived of as uncorrelated with adaptive benefit. 
That is, variation in living things was due to chance, in the sense that variation arises 
randomly with respect to adaptational advantage. Now some variations are more 
adaptive, they may become more dominant because of this, and their selection is 
therefore not due to chance. But the fact that such variations that aid survival become 
dominant is not the reason they occur in the first place.
The Modem Synthesis dictated that all new heritable variations were randomly 
produced. This is in opposition to the view that mutations could be directed by the 
influence of the environment, which would be a Lamarckist view of mutation. But of 
course, there is a sense in which mutations or adaptations are not unconditionally 
random, they are random with respect to something. Dawkins suggests that random 
should be understood as “.. random with respect to adaptive advantage, although it is 
non-random in all sorts of other respects. It is selection... that directs evolution in 
directions that are non-random with respect to advantage ”89 This serves to place the 
non-random on the side of natural selection. Mutation is random in the sense that it
87 Gigerenzer, et a l , p 161
88 Jablonka, Eva and Lamb, Marion J. Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1995)
89 Dawkins, R. (1986) as quoted by Jablonka and Lamb in Epigenetic Inheritance and 
Evolution p. 56
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does not correspond with improvement or adaptation. However, Jablonka and Lamb 
have suggested that this is not what most evolutionists mean by random.
Another possible definition of mutation and randomness that Jablonka and 
Lamb suggest is that “mutation is random because it is not possible to predict which 
new variation will be produced at any moment”.90 This definition of random is of 
course more closely tied to predictability and indeterminism. These two definitions are 
quite different with respect to what types of mutations can be called ‘non-random’ or 
‘directed’. It appears that Jablonka and Lamb’s definition allows wider scope for things 
to be designated as ‘directed’ where Dawkins’ allows nearly everything to be random. 
For instance, Jablonka and Lamb suggest that Dawkins’ definition requires that even 
induced mutations through the influence of a mutagenic agent be called random, 
whereas most biologists would not see this as random, but rather as caused by the 
mutagen and hence directed in some fashion. On the other hand, Jablonka and Lamb’s 
definition poses similar problems in scope. For them, randomness is simply linked with 
predictability, or at least ignorance of which variations will be produced. Therefore 
presumably if we know the likelihood of certain mutations given the influence of a 
certain mutagenic agent, then any mutational changes here are non-random, and hence, 
‘directed’.
Sober notes in his discussion of randomness that “randomness of mutation does 
not mean that mutations are inherently unpredictable...Facts about the 
environment, concerning the presence of certain chemicals and kinds of radiation 
[mutagens]...make some sorts of mutation far more probable than others.” 91 If 
Jablonka and Lamb’s criticism is to be taken seriously, this is precisely where Dawkins’ 
definition of randomness comes unstuck; it seems to make everything seem random, 
even events that have some known probability or predictive possibility.
Thus one’s definition of randomness does have a lot to do with what role one 
assigns to natural selection. Dawkins, the arch-Darwinist, does tend to ascribe nearly 
all change to the action o f natural selection, therefore his definition of random is 
intended to dispel any Lamarckist ideas concerning the way in which variation is 
generated Thus, “Variation is generated at random, but selection among variants is 
non-random”92 is the position that Sober gives on the issue of randomness This
90 Ibid., p. 57
91 Sober, Elliott. The Nature o f Selection, p 104
92 Sober, Elliott. Philosophy o f Biology, p. 38
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definition is the same as Dawkins’ given earlier; the emphasis is on randomness as 
uncorrelated with selection pressures.
3.2.2 Random Drift vs. Natural Selection
We must now turn to the second role played by chance in evolutionary theory, as a 
necessary component in evolution by natural selection understood as an intrinsically 
statistical, probabilistic theory. Earlier it was claimed that determinism and 
indeterminism did not influence the choice of research programmes in an obvious way 
in biology However, determinism does play some limited role in delineating research 
programmes in terms of whether or not chance is seen as an alternative to ‘natural 
selection’ as an agent of evolutionary change. We will now examine this claim by 
discussing the debate between random drift and adaptationism.
Random drift hypotheses were formed to combat the “neo-Darwinian notion 
that natural selection is an all-sufficient agent of evolution”, that is to say, the 
adaptationist position.93 In the 1930’s and 40’s, the period before the ‘hardening’ of 
the Modem Synthesis, random drift hypotheses were often invoked. They were 
intended as explanations of the continued existence of traits that differed from the 
norm but had no obvious adaptive significance. In section 2.3 the dispute between 
Fisher, an ardent adaptationist, and Wright, a champion of the role of random drift in 
evolution, was described, and we saw that each came down differently on the issue of 
random drift Biologists like Wright were convinced that certain traits could take hold 
in populations not due to their adaptive significance, but rather due to changes in the 
size of populations from generation to generation
For instance, let us take two traits in a population that are different, but not 
necessarily adaptively significant (i.e. blood types). The idea is that natural selection is 
‘blind’ to these traits since they do not confer any advantage to their possessors In 
each generation, one of these traits may take hold in the population simply because 
more copies of it are passed on by chance, and in a Mendelian inheritance model this is 
more likely. In an ideal Mendelian population model, with two heterozygous parents 
Lkl, the number of Dd offspring will converge to 50% (see appendix 1) but in a real
93 Beatty, John “Random Drift” in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology ed by Evelyn 
Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992) 
p. 274
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population, the number of offspring is limited, it may be that there are fewer or more 
heterozygotes, and in the long run this ‘chance’ distribution will affect the allelic 
makeup of the population. Thus, proponents of random drift hypotheses found it 
possible to explain some allelic differences by random drift alone.
The chance element here is related to the idea of natural selection as a 
stochastic process. We saw in section 3.1 of this chapter that fitness can be treated in 
terms of propensities. That is to say, a fitter organism will leave more offspring than a 
less fit one, in the long run, and fitness merely implies the likelihood of specific 
outcomes. If natural selection is a stochastic, rather than deterministic process (where 
fitnesses are real and logically imply future distribution of organisms) then we can say 
only that the distribution of fitter offspring will converge upon a limit. In a coin­
flipping example, an infinite run of flips of a fair coin will be likely to converge on 50% 
Heads, 50% Tails according to Bernoulli’s Theorem, otherwise known as the Law of 
Large Numbers. But the actual frequency of Heads in a limited run of flips is not 
deducible from the fact that the coin is fair.94 In a limited run, the frequency of Heads 
to Tails is not likely to be 50/50, and the smaller the run, the more likely the 
distribution will diverge from the limit. This is a kind of ‘sampling error’ (although, as 
we will see in a moment, it is not the same kind o f ‘sampling error’ that occurs in 
statistical analysis). In the Mendelian example above, the idea is that small population 
size makes it more likely that there will be a divergence from the expected distribution 
of alleles, and thus random drift can have a powerful role in shaping evolution.
Notice, however, that the requirements for a drift hypothesis to be applicable 
were that the traits in question had to be ‘invisible’ to natural selection, in the sense 
that they could not be adaptively significant In the 50’s and 60’s, during the 
‘hardening’ of the Synthesis, many examples of drift were subsequently reinterpreted 
as cases o f natural selection at work In the example of blood groups, biologists 
realised that blood type could affect an individual’s susceptibility to disease, therefore 
blood type was not neutral and distributions of blood groups could be due to the action 
of natural selection. There was a resultant shift away from the use of drift hypotheses 
As Mayr put it, “[The biologist] must first attempt to explain biological phenomena 
and processes as the product of natural selection Only after all attempts to do so have 
failed, is he justified is designating the unexplained residue tentatively as a product of
94 And it is possible that even in an infinite run, the frequency need not converge.
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chance ”95 Yet Sober has noted that the distinction to be made is somewhat difficult 
here. He argues that since natural selection is by nature a stochastic process, it includes 
by necessity an element of chance. The question is not whether chance plays some role 
in evolution, but rather how important this role is, and what precisely this role is.
Beatty investigates the distinction between “drifters” and “selectionists”, that is, 
between those who believe that adaptations are the result of random drift, and those 
who think that such adaptations can be explained through the influence of natural 
selection 96 He believes that since drift is meant to be stochastic, those who study the 
action of selection pressures often use it as the null hypothesis However, he argues 
that the drift hypothesis cannot be treated as the null hypothesis, because of the nature 
o f the ‘sampling error’ in null hypotheses and drift hypotheses. We saw above that the 
drift explanation depends upon chance change in a small finite population through a 
kind of “biological sampling error”. However, Beatty notes that if one is to use a drift 
hypothesis as a null hypothesis (i.e. the hypothesis that the result is due to chance), 
then sampling error enters into the picture in a totally different way. When one is using 
a null hypothesis and one finds differences between the populations that are not 
explained by the hypothesis being tested, one generally puts this difference down to 
‘sampling error’.97 That is, only very large differences between the sampled 
populations are considered to be strong enough evidence to support the significant 
hypothesis, small differences are put down to sampling error But as we have seen, the 
drift hypothesis itself depends upon sampling error as the means of change in the 
population.
As Beatty argues, “One way of expressing the difference is to point out that 
investigators invoke random drift hypotheses in order to account for differences 
between the groups under investigation, while investigators invoke the standard null 
hypothesis in order to deny differences between the groups under consideration ”98 
Sampling error simply does not play the same role when one considers the drift
95 Mayr, E. Animal Species and Evolution (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1964)
96 Beatty, John. “Natural Selection and the Null Hypothesis” in The Ixttest on the Best 
ed. John Dupre (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1987) pp. 53-75
97 The null hypothesis states that there is no difference between the populations 
sampled The null hypothesis must be disproved for the significant hypothesis to be 
supported
98 Beatty, “Natural Selection and the Null Hypothesis”, p 63
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hypothesis separately, and when one considers the drift hypothesis as the null 
hypothesis. Therefore the drift hypothesis is an alternate hypothesis to that of natural 
selection, and should be treated accordingly experimentally. Beatty denies that 
selectionists are saying anything about the role of random drift because drift and 
selection are alternative hypotheses, not two sides o f the same coin. That is, an 
investigator who claims to have disproved the presence o f drift in a population has not 
then proven that selection is present. Beatty recommends testing both alternative 
hypotheses (selection and drift) in parallel, yet it is difficult to see how the alternative 
hypotheses of drift and selection could be qualitatively distinguished if his argument is 
correct. It seems that in order to test the two alternate hypotheses in parallel, one 
would need two experimental situations: one where selection is tested against its null 
hypothesis (which might read “no change due to selection forces, any observed change 
is merely random”) and another where random drift is tested against its null hypothesis 
(“no change due to random drift, any observed change is merely random”). Although 
Beatty is careful to point out that the drift hypothesis should in no way be used as a 
“baseline” that selection forces are to measured against, his recommendation of 
“testing the two alternates in parallel” seems inadequate. After all, are we not trying to 
discover how much of a random element there is in evolution? Testing selection 
against random drift might be pointless, but surely testing random drift against random 
drift is senseless. I am not suggesting that random drift is not a hypothesis, the point I 
am trying to make here is that it is unclear what type of null hypothesis is needed in 
order to answer any questions about the role and extent of random processes in 
evolution.
Since drift hypotheses tend to depend on traits that are not adaptively 
significant, and often it happens that these supposedly neutral traits turn out to have 
significance, it is difficult to tell whether or not one is justified in using a drift 
explanation Mayr’s methodological recommendation is an obvious response to this 
problem. Wright himself was uneasy with the ‘either/or’ view of drift and selection, he 
also believed that the real question was not ‘is this change due to random drift or 
selection?’ but rather ‘to what extent is this change due to drift, and what extent 
natural selection?’ Thus, he also thought that the two hypotheses must be tested in 
parallel. However, once again, it is hard to see how this could be done.
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3.2.3 Defining Variation
The controversy over drift still exists, even after the move away from the use of drift 
hypotheses in the Synthesis.99 The discussions of chance mentioned are important in 
biology with reference to variation in two senses. First, chance is seen as the character 
of variation, once the latter is decoupled from natural selection. Anti-Lamarckist 
moves made it impossible for natural selection to affect variation and adaptation 
directly, therefore variation was conceived o f as due to chance, and natural selection 
acted upon it only after it was generated. Second, chance is important as an 
explanation of evolutionary change in that it is constitutive of natural selection as a 
process. Whether or not this means that chance can be seen a force in contrast to that 
of natural selection, as was seen in the random drift controversy described above, 
remains a difficult issue.
To return to the problematic set up earlier, regarding the characterisation of 
variation as random with respect to advantage (that is, the anti-Lamarckist requirement 
of neo-Darwinism), we can see that the characterisation of one of the components of 
evolution by natural selection, that of variation, is constrained by the requirement of 
randomness This may be phrased as ‘random, not directed’ To define variation as 
inherently random with respect to advantage, one must be careful to distinguish this 
sense of random from other uses of the term. But equally we have seen in terms of the 
debate over random drift, that randomness must be defined with relation to some other 
force or comparative base-line. This might be phrased ‘random, not selected ’ If one 
agrees with Sober’s characterisation of evolution as by nature a stochastic process, 
necessarily entailing a certain element of chance, then it becomes difficult to locate this 
chance element at the level of mechanism or causal sequence, in just the same way as it 
is difficult to compare drift and selection hypotheses in parallel.
As was noted in the earlier discussion of Jablonka and Lamb, one’s definition 
of randomness is closely related to one’s understanding of the nature of natural 
selection. If one believes natural selection is the sole source of order out of ‘chaos’ 
then all variation will seem to be ‘random’. On the other hand, if one sees natural
99 For instance, Motoo Kimura’s “neutral hypothesis” also recommends the importance 
of chance in evolution. Kimura, Motoo. The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)
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selection as less important in the production of evolutionary novelty than the 
tendencies of variation itself, as Jablonka and Lamb seem to, then ‘randomness’ 
becomes a term which refers to probability and predictivity, and hence will only be 
applied to situations about which we have imperfect knowledge. And in the end, one’s 
definition of the randomness with respect to variation and the relative role of natural 
selection will come down to how seriously one takes evolution as a ‘stochastic theory’ 
or process.
Evolutionary theory can be seen as either a theory with a strong element of 
chance built into it, in the sense that it is a statistical theory dealing with numbers of 
populations (not organisms) under change, or it can be seen as an explanatory 
framework that explains or predicts the reasons how and why organisms change over 
time. These perspectives may be compatible with each other, but either perspective 
entails strong beliefs about the role of randomness and chance in evolutionary change 
These two perspectives on neo-Darwinism are not necessarily identifiable with 
indeterminism or determinism, though they may initially appear to correspond with 
these metaphysical beliefs. Rather, an interpretation of evolutionary theory that grants 
a strong chance element can often be played out empirically as a research programme 
intending to discover the ‘laws’ that direct this chance into ordered forms, and 
conversely, empirical research into the prevalence of randomness may be carried out by 
researchers who strongly believe in the power of deterministic laws of evolution.
So, although the role of randomness in evolutionary theory is difficult to locate 
precisely, it is clear that the notion of ‘random’ serves the role of making certain that 
variation remains uncorrelated with adaptive benefit. Whether this notion of random 
corresponds with the stochastic notion of ‘chance’ remains a somewhat difficult issue 
Perhaps again we must conclude that neo-Darwinism has great difficulty giving a 
precise formulation o f variation in evolutionary theory, even though it does agree that 
variation must be undirected, random with respect to advantage, in order for neo- 
Darwinism to remain an anti-teleological theory It should be clear that the 
adaptationist characterisation of natural selection (section 3.1.1) and the hypothesis of 
random drift (3.2.2) involved identical issues It appears that it is very difficult for neo- 
Darwinism to answer the question of whether chance or natural selection is more 
important in the process of evolution, given its own minimal definition of the
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mechanism involving these two elements. Perhaps the role of heredity, the third 
element, can be more easily delineated by neo-Darwinism
3.3 Heredity
We saw in chapter 2 that the concept o f  heredity had been refined by Weismann and 
Mendel, and both served to constrain the functioning of heredity so that it did not 
violate any of neo-Darwinism’s anti-Lamarckist strictures. Yet many aspects of the 
nature of heredity were left unresolved by these moves. For instance, it was clear that 
heredity conserved the traits of the parent organism and passed them on to the 
offspring with some fidelity, and this necessarily meant that some kind of information 
was being transmitted, but what kind? And it was clear that the Weismann Barrier 
meant that natural selection could act on the organism, but not directly on the genes 
themselves. This meant that the actual hereditary material was only indirectly available 
to the action o f selection. If this was the case, then was it also the case that heredity 
itself was nothing more than a copying mechanism? Could it too have properties that 
created variation? We saw earlier that the Mendelians certainly thought so What role 
did heredity, as conceived of genes or DNA, have in evolution? I would now like to 
address some of the issues surrounding this question by looking more closely at the 
notion of information. I will conclude by placing these issues in the context of 
Dawkins’ work and the “unit of selection” debate. I will argue that behind the 
reductive scheme in Dawkins’ answer to the unit of selection problem, there lies a 
commitment to Weismannism, the anti-Lamarckist prohibition enshrined in neo- 
Darwinism. And furthermore, I will argue that this anti-Lamarckist prohibition comes 
not from the idea of genes, or heredity in themselves, but from the inappropriate use of 
certain metaphysically overdetermined metaphors concerning the idea of information
3.3.1 Heredity as a mechanism
In section 2.1.3 Darwin’s ideas concerning heredity were discussed, and it was noted 
there that Darwin’s own theory of heredity, Pangenesis, was intended to explain how 
offspring were more or less similar to their parents, yet also how they were different 
Fidelity in evolution is important, but not perfect fidelity, for without some variation,
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there would be no material for natural selection to act upon. Darwin’s early attempts 
to propose a physical mechanism to explain how this fidelity functions should show us 
that the functioning of heredity, the third component of Darwinism and neo- 
Darwinism, is unlike that of the other components. In the cases of natural selection, 
and of variation, these concepts were (and are) delineated by use of more metaphysical 
conceptions. That is, historically natural selection has been defined as either an ‘active 
force’ somewhat akin to a metaphysical force of nature, or conversely, it has been 
given the characterisation as the ‘result’ of the interaction of organism and 
environment, which itself has a decidedly mechanistic metaphysics behind it. Similarly, 
variation, with its constraint as ‘random’ in neo-Darwinism, has been particularly open 
to metaphysical characterisation, if only for the reason that the concepts of 
‘randomness’ and ‘chance’ have varying interpretations and importance to both 
determinists and indeterminists, materialists and teleologists, mechanists and vitalists. 
Furthermore, as has been argued above, ‘random’ has important definitional 
ambiguities that stem from mathematics and statistics themselves, and even if these 
subject areas are not generally seen as arenas for ‘metaphysical’ debate, there is no 
denying the impact of Newton and Laplace on these issues, not to mention Democritus 
and Zeno.
But heredity seems somehow different. For issues concerning heredity, 
historically at least, seem to have been decided on more physical grounds, that is, in 
terms of the delineation of certain mechanisms. From Pangenesis, through Weismann, 
and all the way to Crick and Watson, the characterisation of heredity has been an 
elucidation of mechanism, rather than anything else. How do traits get transmitted 
through a lineage or organisms? Through the blood, through “gemmules”, through the 
“germ line”, through the transcription and translation of DNA, of course It seems 
nothing could be simpler, and today it seems that there is nothing that DNA cannot 
explain. But things are not so simple, in fact heredity has been influenced by 
metaphysical considerations, and these influences have in turn found expression in anti- 
Lamarckist mechanisms
There is no shortage, of course, of detractors of DNA-mythologising, from 
scientists to ethicists. There are many criticisms: ranging from claims that the 
interaction between genes and environment is of an order of complexity which we 
could never even begin to fathom, to claims that DNA itself is less important in
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heredity than other cellular or environmental factors. I would like to set aside such 
‘empirical’ arguments against the straightforward understanding of the nature of 
heredity in order to address a different issue: that of the interdefinition of heredity with 
the other components of neo-Darwinism.
Heredity needs a notion o f fidelity, of ‘copying’, and this notion is associated, 
for most biologists, with the physical mechanism of transcription and translation of 
DNA. But this act of transmission, or copying also requires a notion of ‘genetic 
information’ as the stuff that gets transmitted. And here, I would like to argue, is 
where things are more complicated than the cut-and-dried physical manifestation of 
heredity might lead one to believe. This is related to the unit of selection debate as 
well. Darwin’s Pangenesis, we might notice, does not have the same constraints, it 
does not posit any template, or unique entity in which the hereditary information 
resides, but rather it has particles from the organism moving around the body and 
collecting in the sex organs to generate a new organism Rather than one mechanism, it 
postulates many So although Pangenesis seeks to explain fidelity, why organisms 
resemble their parents, it does not deal with ‘copying’ in quite the same way as a 
physical mechanism which must ‘transcribe’ or ‘transmit’ genetic information from one 
generation to the next. So information is presupposed by any hereditary mechanism 
which it thought to copy information from one parent organism to its offspring But 
‘genetic information’ in biology today is used more extensively, even if these usages 
are not consistent with each other.
3.3.2 Heredity and Information
ft would be worthwhile to look for a moment at why and how ‘genetic information’ as 
a concept came to be used in modem biology There are several reasons for this, one 
of which is the discovery of the structure of DNA, which seems to lend itself to a 
‘digital’ interpretation. Shortly before Watson and Crick delineated this structure, John 
von Neumann had already published an influential paper titled ‘The General and 
Logical Theory of Automata” in 1951 100 In it, he examined the notion of a “self- 
reproducing machine”, one capable of building itself according to a pre-specified
100 See von Neumann, John Theory of Self-reproducing Automata Posthumously ed 
Arthur Burks (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press: 1949)
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program or blueprint. These automata needed a kind of warehouse which contained 
the parts with which the machine was constructed, as well as a blueprint which detailed 
the way in which they themselves were constructed. Von Neumann concluded that in 
order for each automaton to reproduce itself it would need to read its own blueprint, 
thenconstruct another automaton according to these instructions. This new automaton 
would have to be provided with its own blueprint to enable it to reproduce itself, and 
so on. After Crick and Watson showed the structure of DNA, it seemed natural for 
many to see DNA as the ‘program’ or ‘blueprint’ that the organism executed, and each 
base pair might be seen as a ‘bit’ of information 101 And the living organism was 
perhaps as von Neumann had described, it had its own blueprint for construction 
(DNA), as well as a warehouse o f proteins from which it constructed itself, and this 
blueprint was also passed on as part of the constructed organism. The transcription and 
translation of DNA might operate in much the same way as a reading frame in a Turing 
machine, moving up and down the strand and ‘decoding’ the information contained 
there Thus ‘information’ came to be used in biological metaphors, in terms of 
‘computability’. In chapter 2 it was already made clear that the Mendelians had treated 
heredity as particulate, and it should be clear that this move allowed units of heredity 
to be treated as logically discrete. Once genes or DNA base-pairs were treated as 
discrete logical units, or bits of information, it was possible to apply computation- 
oriented descriptions to heredity as a system.
George Kampis notes that there are several properties inherent in speaking of 
‘genetic information’ in the above sense “(1) it is sequential, (2) it has an alphabet, (3) 
it can be transcribed letter to letter, and (4) it can be ‘decoded’, or translated, piece by 
piece.” Kampis concludes by noting that these properties also define a 
transformational, formal language 102
Because of this emphasis on ‘decoding’ an informational ‘message’, it was not 
long before Shannon entropic information (language borrowed from physics to 
characterise a mathematical theory of communication) was enlisted in the attempt to
101 The quantification of information as “bits” is founded on the work of Shannon, 
Claude E. and Weaver, Warren. The Mathematical Theory o f Communication 
(Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press 1949)
102 Kampis, George. Self-Modifying Systems in Biology and Cognitive Science: A New 
Framework for Dynamics, Information and Complexity (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
1991)p 421
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describe living things in terms of ‘information’.105 These efforts, though not in the end 
successful in giving any sensible characterisation of genes or organisms formally, were 
nevertheless highly influential. It seems that biology has long since given up trying to 
define the information content of any genome, but the idea of ‘gene as program’ has 
not yet been abandoned. The approach that treats genes as programme has also been 
called neo-preformationist by some commentators, for instance Mahner and Bunge 103 04
So information still has strong associations with the neo-Darwinist conception 
of heredity for historical and theoretical reasons alike. Far from being characterised 
entirely in terms of physical mechanism, heredity was invested with metaphysical 
concepts from its modem inception. The physical nature o f DNA lent itself readily to a 
computational paradigm, and this has not been completely abandoned To see why this 
is, we may now turn to the “unit of selection” debate.
3.3.3 Heredity and the Unit of Selection
The debate centres on the level at which natural selection is supposed to act. The 
question at the root of the unit of selection debate is whether traits evolve because they 
benefit individual organisms or because they are good for the group in which the 
occur. Darwin’s original formulation suggests that he believed that natural selection 
operated only on individuals; poorly adapted individuals would lose out to better- 
adapted individual in their species Controversy was attracted by “group selectionists”
103 See for instance Gatlin, Lila. Information Theory and the Living System (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1972). These attempts ended in “sheer nonsense” as 
Kampis remarks, not only because these “informational contents” were non-specific 
between living and dead cells, for instance, but also because the Shannon notion of 
informationjineasured by reference to entropy, is nothing like the information described 
in computational models. Furthermore, Shannon entropy (upon which information is 
defined in a communicating system with a sender and receiver) is already a corruption 
of the definition of entropy in physics. A critical discussion of the notion of information 
in Shannon is provided in Kampis pp. 406-10, and in Tor Norretranders’ The User 
Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size (New York: Penguin Books, 1998) pp. 
23-41, Kampis points out that the application of Shannon information to living systems 
was fundamentally flawed, and Norretranders examines the various confusions 
surrounding the equivalency of Shannon entropy and entropy in physics.
104 Mahner, Martin and Bunge, Mario. Foundations of Biophilosophy (Berlin: Springer 
Verlag, 1997) p. 280
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(specifically V.C. Wynne-Edwards and others)105 when they suggested that natural 
selection could act upon groups of individuals and species as a whole 106 Species for 
them would play the role Darwin set aside for individuals, they too would lose out to 
better-adapted species. In essence, what was being suggested was that if the unit of 
selection was only the individual organism, then nature could only be selfish and 
competitive. If the organism is the exclusive unit of selection, then adaptations that 
were ‘altruistic’, or good for the group of organisms, could never evolve. Richard 
Dawkins provided a third alternative by suggesting that selection could act at the level 
of genes, and individuals should be viewed as mere receptacles for these genes 107
The unit of selection debate, although it appears to be focused upon a fairly 
narrow debate concerning the evolution of altruism, is much more fundamental. 
Dawkins believes that it is of central importance to any theory that proposes to explain 
adaptations and to what end they are directed.
Are they for the benefit of the individual organisms, for the benefit of 
the group or species of which it is a member, or for the benefit of some 
smaller unit inside the individual organism? Adaptations for the good of 
the group will look quite different from adaptations for the good of the 
individual108
105 Dawkins, Richard The Extended Phenotype (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
1982) p.82, also Maynard Smith, John. D id Darwin Get it Right?: Essays on Games, 
Sex, and Evolution (New York: Penguin 1993) p. 54
106 Group selection in the evolution of social behaviour is a complex issue in its own 
right, and there is much literature on the subject and on the wider subject of 
sociobiology. A criticism of group selection formulated in this way can be found in 
George C. William’s Adaptation and Natural Selection (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1966). More discussion can be found in works by J.B.S. Haldane such 
as The Causes o f Evolution (London: Longman’s Green. 1932; Reprint Princeton 
Univeristy Press 1990) and W. D. Hamilton, for instance, “The Genetical Evolution of 
Social Behaviour” Journal o f Theoretical Biology 7 (1964) pp. l-16;17-52. Group 
selection is claimed to be at odds with neo-Darwinism primarily because it seems to 
evade the usual element of selfish competition for limited resources. More importantly, 
it is claimed that it does not provide any mechanism for such adaptations, at least not 
in the straightforward phenotypic sense Because this formulation o f group selection is 
concerned with complex social behaviours and sociobiology, and not necessarily the 
question of the status of units of selection in themselves, it is outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, “Altruism” and approaches related to it will be discussed further in 
chapter 4
107 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, The Extended Phenotype
108 Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982) p 81
Michelle Speidel 84
Furthermore, as will become clear, the unit of selection debate concerns the role of 
mechanisms in evolutionary theory, as well as the role of explanation in neo- 
Darwinism. The “unit of selection” (or the “unit of evolution” which Maynard Smith 
suggests is more appropriate) as the ‘thing that selection acts upon’ will have to have 
something to say about how selection functions as well as how we describe this 
functioning and the mechanism involved.
The unit o f  selection debate is thus concerned with the utility o f isolating 
certain functional entities in evolution. The point I would like to make in this section of 
the chapter is that the unit of selection debate is primarily concerned with denoting 
what the ‘individual’ should be in evolutionary theory, and this will have profound 
implication for not only the third component of evolutionary theory, heredity, but for 
the other two as well Dawkins’ contribution is surely very useful in showing that ‘the 
organism’ need not end with the skin or with the outer membrane of the biological 
entity in question. However, it is possible that his recommendation of “genic 
selectionism” simply replaces the individual organism with the individual gene without 
resolving any of the issues inherent in an ‘individualist’ approach in biology.
Dawkins managed to offend nearly everyone, scientist and non-scientist alike, 
with his book The Selfish Gene. One the one hand, its title misled non-scientists into 
believing that Dawkins was claiming that it was in our genes to be selfish. His true 
claim, that genes themselves were the target of selection forces, and that organisms 
were only vehicles for the propagation of these genes, incensed biologists, who 
thought it both needlessly reductionistic and counter to common sense If genes are the 
replicators and not organisms, then why should organisms adapt for survival, and not 
the genes themselves?
Dawkins’ claim is that genes are the replicators (that which gets copied) while 
the organisms are the vehicles for their transmission. David L. Hull sees Dawkins’ use 
of “vehicle” as running counter to common sense, since if the individual is a merely 
neutral vehicle, then why should it change as a result of selection, and not the 
replicators themselves? Hull recommends that individuals should be called 
“interactors” since this would retain their role as a unit that is itself influenced by the
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environment. However, Hull believes that Dawkins is right to place emphasis on the 
replicator, and not concentrate so much on the individual organism.109
Sober notes that this is the most valuable aspect of Hull’s and Dawkins’ 
contribution, that it disentangles the unit o f heredity from the unit of selection That 
the gene is the “replicator”, the thing that gets copied from one generation to the next, 
is uncontroversial. But for Hull and Dawkins, anything that carries these replicators 
around is unimportant, it is not the vehicle or interactor that is selected, it is the 
replicators themselves. So Hull and Dawkins would like to have it.110 Therefore, the 
selfish gene hypothesis is intended to function as a unifying idea. Since the unit of 
heredity is the gene, why not let it be the unit of selection as well? For Dawkins the 
question is about whether we should call the gene or the organism the functional unit 
of evolution. Dawkins appears to think that both descriptions will turn out to be 
compatible111 though Sober is not so sure of this 112 Kitcher and Sterelny explicitly 
claim that “Dawkins’s genic selectionism offers a more general theory of evolution 13
This in itself should give some clue as to the underlying ideals behind Dawkins’ 
work on this issue. Many anti-Dawkins arguments are aimed at the issue of ‘needless 
reductionism’ which the selfish gene view o f evolution is supposed to entail114 Since 
Dawkins is clearly trying to reduce all evolutionary explanations to those dealing with 
genes, this is so. His belief is obviously that any successful explanations in evolution 
which refer to organisms can be stated in a way so that they refer to genes However, 
an issue which I believe gets obscured by this charge of reductionism is an issue about 
the status of heredity. I myself would like to leave aside the issue of reductionism in 
biology in favour of a more precise inquiry into how heredity is conceived o f in
109 Kitcher and Sterelny, “The Return of the Gene” ” Journal o f Philosophy 85 (1988), 
pp. 339-361
110 Although Sober suggests that Hull is not quite so keen as Dawkins to have the gene 
as the exclusive unit of selection. Sober, Elliott and Wilson, David Sloan “A Critical 
review of Philosophical Work on the Units of Selection Problem” Philosophy of 
Science 61 1994 pp. 534-55
111 Dawkins, in The Extended Phenotype, claims that explanations in terms of genes 
and in terms of organisms will be equivalent, by use of his example of the Necker 
Cube. However, in the preface to the 1989 edition of The Selfish Gene, he extends this 
metaphor and suggests that the “gene’s eye view” of evolution can explain more than 
an organism’s-eye view.
112 Sober, Philosophy and Biology, p. 107
113 Kitcher, Philip and Sterelny, Kim “The Return of the Gene” pp 339-361.
114 Dawkins deals with some of these objections by Rose, Lewontin and Gould in 
chapter 2 of The Extended Phenotype
Michelle Speidel 86
evolutionary theory, though it is clear that some of my discussion of this issue will be 
pertinent to the more broad issue of reductionism.
It has been noted that Dawkins’ and Hull’s proposal in the unit of selection 
debate was to make the unit of heredity, the gene, the same as the unit of selection 
(selection acts on the gene not the organism, and the gene is the unit of heredity). That 
is, they claim that since the gene is what is copied, then it should also be what is 
selected. For them, the individual can be treated as a mere receptacle for the genes For 
the individual organism itself dies, but its genes are passed on if the organism has 
reproduced. Thus the gene ought to be treated as the functional unit in evolution, for it 
is what is copied from one transient generation to the next. We ought here to be 
reminded o f Weismann’s Continuity of the Germ Plasm.115 16 Although Dawkins’ 
proposal seems to be a more general move referring to the types of explanation that 
evolutionary theory should provide, we can see that it is little more than a reaffirmation 
of the Weismannian, anti-Lamarckist requirement of neo-Darwinism For Dawkins, the 
‘information’ resides in the genes, as the immortal element and as Kampis puts it, for
Dawkins “Every phenotypic event (i.e. every evolutionary event) is recorded in the
______ „116genes.
So we may have to view Sober’s pronouncement, that Dawkins and Hull have 
disentangled the unit of heredity from the unit of selection, with some suspicion. For 
they have made them the same thing, with the neat result that all selection events 
(phenotypic events) are describable as heredity events (genotypic events). Mahner and 
Bunge remark that this move makes sense only in the context of the Modem 
Synthesis 117 As was noted in chapter 2, the population genetics strand of the Modem 
Synthesis, typified by Fisher and Wright, saw evolution in terms of changes in gene 
frequency Selection for the population geneticist is seen only in terms of these 
changing allelic frequencies, and making selection work only upon genes can be seen 
as an extension of this approach to evolution. This then, as was hinted at earlier, is a 
way to give greater consistency to the neo-Darwinist Modem synthesis Explanation of 
biological events can be given either in terms of genes or in terms of selection, offering 
a “more general theory of evolution” as Kitcher and Sterelny have it. Thus 
explanations of selection and heredity can be given in the same language, they function
115 see fn. 58
116 Kampis, p.471
117 Mahner and Bunge, Foundations o f Biophilosophy p. 117. p. 338
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by use of the same currency, which is genetic information. This, as I have argued, lends 
itself to a computational metaphor, where DNA is the ‘programme’ that controls the 
eventual characteristics of the organism. Thus the DNA genotype causes the 
phenotype much as the programme causes the computer to calculate. DNA is treated 
as a formal language. What nicer result for the true mechanist, or true determinist? Not 
only does the hereditary component cause the organism to develop, it even formally 
defines its characteristics. Mahner and Bunger aslo argue that if one treats the gene as 
that which is selected, then this cannot mean that the actual physical structure of the 
DNA itself is selected, but rather that the information encoded in the gene is selected. 
This information is what supposedly ‘benefits’ from the ‘survival’ conferred by 
replication, in Dawkins’ terms, and they deem this “good old Platonism in modem 
informational garb”" 8
So there is a strong tendency to see DNA, or the gene, as a programme with 
informational content, as a type of formal language. But a formal language must have a 
pre-established syntax, the eventual states of the computer are defined by this, but 
these eventual discrete states can never rewrite the syntax of the formal language This 
is where the anti-Lamarckist constraints of Dawkins’ position become clear. For it is 
not so much a question of equating information and heredity, or information and DNA, 
as taking information-oriented metaphors too seriously. There are no metaphysical 
constraints in heredity as such, nor in the mechanism of DNA or genetics as such, but 
there are many metaphysical constraints lurking in the often ill-defined notion of 
information.
So even if Dawkins’ genic selectionism has made evolutionary theory simpler, 
or more general in terms of explanation, by equating selection with heredity, (and it is 
not wholly clear that it has, since selection still acts upon the same ‘individual’ as the 
organism, under the description of the organism's ‘complete genome’) it has done 
something else as well It has, by treating the genetic hereditary component as a 
‘programme’ which is executed to cause the development of the organism, postulated 
a one-way flow of information as well By treating the transcription of DNA as a 
mechanism analogous to the transcription of a formal language, one in which the rules 
of syntax are pre-established and unalterable, and also claiming that selection can be 
described wholly in terms of genetic information, Dawkins has curtailed the possibility
118 Mahner and Bunge, Ibid
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of feedback from genes to environment. If the ‘information’ in DNA is the only thing 
that is available to selection, and the organism effectively disappears from evolutionary 
explanation, then there is no way for an organism or genome to alter its own 
‘blueprint’.
Thus heredity is defined as non-Lamarckist in evolutionary theory But this is 
not because of the actual physical mechanism of DNA transcription and translation, it 
is also a result of some strong metaphysical constraints associated with the notion of 
information. These come from the application of computational metaphors to biology 
The unit of selection debate concerns the functioning of entities in evolution, and the 
move to establish hereditary units (genes) as the units of selection has allowed us to 
see how the function of heredity has been constrained by metaphysical considerations. 
And, just as in the case of natural selection and variation, it is quite impossible to give 
an adequate characterisation of one of the components of evolutionary theory without 
reference to the others The way that heredity is to be understood is implicated in the 
way selection is thought to act. And this result may come as a surprise to those who 
believe that the function of heredity, since it is so closely tied to an actual physical 
mechanism, is unproblematic in evolutionary theory.
We have concluded that the third component of neo-Darwinism, heredity, is 
closely tied to the definition of mechanisms that rely heavily on a notion of 
information. Yet we have also seen that this concept, information, is, to say the least, 
somewhat problematic However, the difficulties related to giving an adequate 
characterisation of information as a concept in evolutionary theory have not prevented 
it from being a cornerstone of neo-Darwinism as an anti-Lamarckist constraint. For 
with the advent of neo-Darwinism, and the introduction of such concepts as the 
Weismann Barrier, along with the discovery of the structural properties of DNA as a 
replicating molecule, there has been a concomitant application of the term information 
to the function of biological entities at the cellular level. Information is used to denote 
the possible vectors of information flow in biological systems. Thus, the Weismann 
Barrier postulates that information can never flow from soma cells to germ cells, and 
the Central Dogma postulates that information can never flow from proteins to DNA. 
Although it may not be clear what exactly this information ‘encodes’ or ‘contains’, it 
may be said that ‘information’ as a concept has been operationalised by neo-Darwinism 
as part of neo-Darwinism’s anti-Lamarckist constraints
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In effect, neo-Darwinism, although it is made up of the three elements of 
natural selection, variation, and heredity, is largely defined by being a theory that is 
anii-Lamarckist, which is to say, cmti-teleological. The functioning of its three 
elements is characterised by disallowing Lamarckist modes of evolution. This occurs, 
in some part, because they are all three mutually dependent, or defined by way of the 
functioning of the others But the net result of this is that neo-Darwinism is an 
expression of the constraints on how biological entities can function. The second part 
of this thesis will address how this neo-Darwinist model of evolution interacts with 
some approaches to evolution which have been characterised as non-Darwinist, or 
even perhaps anti-Darwinist, such as symbiosis and bacterial evolution. But, given the 
conclusion above, if these approaches are anti-Darwinist, then must they also be 
Lamarckist? For if neo-Darwinism is defined by its exclusion of Lamarckist modes of 
evolution, then to what extent must all challenges to it be dependent on the modes of 
evolution which neo-Darwinism proscribes? In other words, the second part of this 
thesis will explore the interplay between Darwinism and Lamarckism with reference to 
some challenges to neo-Darwinist orthodoxy. In order to establish the extent to which 
these are true challenges to neo-Darwinism, we must be able to discern which aspects 
of them are truly at odds with neo-Darwinism, and inevitably these challenges will 
bring us to the issue of neo-Lamarckist mechanisms
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Part II
Symbiosis and Prokaryotes: A Challenge to 
Neo-Darwinism
"Lamarck has been so systematically laughed at that it amounts to little less than 
philosophical suicide for anyone to stand up in his behalf. ”
—Samuel Butler, Evolution, Old and New (1882)
Introduction to Part II
Part II of this thesis, chapters 4 and 5, will address the approach to evolutionary theory 
that seeks to criticise neo-Darwinism in a different way than the debates we have 
already addressed The symbiosis-based research programme criticises neo- 
Darwinism’s account of evolution and individuation, and is thus a challenge of more 
interest than challenges to neo-Darwinism which merely seek adjustments to the 
theoretical apparatus of neo-Darwinism. Symbiosis has been used to characterise the 
evolution of early life on earth by proposing that early collective cells were symbiotic 
unions Thus, it is not merely a different metaphysical perspective on evolution, but a 
programme of research which presents real mechanisms of evolution which might be 
different from those of neo-Darwinism But in order to assess whether it is a successful 
fundamental challenge to neo-Darwinism, we must tease apart its different claims, and 
see whether these are fundamental challenges to the metaphysics of neo-Darwinism. 
Then the mechanisms which symbiosis proposed must be investigated to see whether 
these mechanisms violate the core metaphysical assumptions of neo-Darwinism This 
analysis will constitute the discussions in part II.
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Chapter 4 
Symbiosis
4.1 Symbiosis-based research programmes
Symbiosis is claimed by its major proponents to be a long-neglected area of research 
within biology and evolutionary theory today. The most prominent proponent is 
probably Lynn Margulis, who proposed the Serial Endosymbiosis Theory in its modem 
form in the 1960’s. There are now many others scientists who insist upon its 
importance in biology, including James Lovelock, Sorin Sonea, Stanley Shostak, W. 
Ford Doolittle, Fritjof Capra, John Maynard Smith, Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela. More importantly for the purposes of this thesis, however, is the number of 
commentators on science who have embraced the concept of symbiosis as a ‘new 
paradigm’ of biological and evolutionary research, among them Jan Sapp, a historian 
of science, Kevin Kelley, Robert Trivers, and R. Axelrod. It is now quite common to 
find references to symbiosis in popular characterisations of biology. Authors and 
scientists who explictly defend a ‘symbiosis-based’ approach have of course many 
different reasons for allying themselves with such a concept. However, what they do 
share is a belief that first, symbiosis is in some sense incompatible with neo-Darwinism, 
and second, that a symbiosis-based research programme is better suited to provide a 
correct characterisation of evolutionary processes.
This incompatibility is predicated on several claims about the status of neo- 
Darwinism itself For instance:
“In these mathematic machinations of evolution, the number of 
individuals in a population or a species is taken as the basic measure 
The usual interactions that are explored between individuals (or 
species) are competition (for resources, space, etc.) and predation...The 
incorporation of “cost-benefit analysis” methods borrowed from 
insurance practices has led to the biologically puerile numerology that 
systematically ignores chemistry, biochemistry, molecular biology, and
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geology. Nevertheless such aseptic language dominates current 
evolutionary theory.”" 9
Thus Lynn Margulis complains that neo-Darwinism is obsessed with 
competition, rather than cooperation, that it is heavily reliant on “mechanist” 
mathematicisation, as opposed to an “organicist” outlook. Furthermore, she contends 
that neo-Darwinism must by nature focus on the “individual” and cannot properly 
focus on the symbiotic complexes that are in her view so fundamental in biology and in 
our evolutionary past19 20 She also argues that neo-Darwinism has only one mechanism 
for the generation of novelty or evolutionary innovation: random mutation, random 
meiotic recombination, that is, the gradual accumulation of favourable random 
changes 121 And  ^finally, she claims that the “chromosomal theory of inheritance”, as 
well as Mendelian analyses of “factors”, are at fault for improperly designating the 
genes in the nucleus of the cell as the proper focus of enquiry into heredity 122
So symbiosis is seen as incompatible with neo-Darwinism on several levels But 
in what sense could it be said to provide a more correct characterisation of 
evolutionary theory? We can identify four separate claims made by the proponents of 
symbiosis which are related to this question, and they need to be carefully distinguished 
from each other First, there is the broad claim corresponding with Margulis’ :omplaint 
about “mechanist” as opposed to “organicist” models of evolution. It is a little hard to 
pin down quite what is being said here, but I presume that part of it has to do with the 
idea that using methods borrowed from statistics cannot properly describe biological 
things which are thought to be in some sense ‘uncapturable’ by these methods That is, 
using such statistical analyses can only capture part, and a very small part, of living 
systems in all their complexity This is, I assume, the ‘reductionism versus holism’ 
debate at base
119 Margulis, Lynn “Symbiogenesis and Symbionticism” in Symbiosis as a Source of 
Evolutionary Innovation: Spéciation and Morphogenesis eds. Lynn Margulis and 
Rene Fester (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1991) p. 6
120 Margulis, Lynn “Symbiogenesis and Symbionticism” p 10
121 Margulis, Lynn “Symbiogenesis and Symbionticism” p 11
122 Margulis, Lynn. The Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998) p .21
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Also there is in this a claim about “the whole being more than the sum of its 
parts” as organicism has elsewhere been characterised 1231 assume that this is what is 
meant by the further claim that symbiosis can describe complex interactions, and is not 
entirely focused on individuals, as neo-Darwinism is said to be Therefore symbiosis- 
based research programmes would provide a ‘fuller’ understanding of biological 
processes by placing complex entities at the forefront of enquiry. This further claim 
may also be addressing the issue of latent ‘essentialism’ in biology The idea here , 
first explicitly addressed by Mayr, is that Darwinism replaced essentialist thinking 
(about species, individuals, or types) with “population thinking” and thus shifted the 
focus of evolutionary thinking from thinking about “types” with properties or essences, 
to thinking about populations of organisms with shifting traits determined by the 
dynamic interactions and behaviours o f the populations 124 1 interpret Margulis’s 
position here as an indication that she believes neo-Darwinism has insufficiently come 
to terms with this shift, by continuing to focus on individuals as the basic unit of 
measure for evolution at large It is difficult to assess the impact of these types of 
claims on scientific theory using the methodology this thesis has adopted, for it is clear 
that claims which focus on organicism, reductionism, holism, essentialism and the like 
might be considered too general in scope as criticisms of any specific research 
programme. Of course, these ‘metaphysical’ criticisms surely do have some importance 
in the context of explanation in biology at large. We will leave this claim aside for the 
moment, until a fuller explanation of symbiosis is in place, and will return to it in the 
conclusion.
A second and separate claim in the ‘symbiosis’ position is that neo-Darwinism 
focuses on competition at the cost of cooperation, meaning perhaps that cooperation 
should be a central characterisation of evolution instead of “survival o f the fittest” 
Margulis and Sagan have said elsewhere that “survival of the fittest” has been “warped 
to mean that only the most ruthless win out in the ‘struggle for existence’”125, so 
perhaps they argue only with this warped and highly politicised version of natural 
selection, not with a more sober version of natural selection. Indeed, they point out
123 Capra, Fritjof The Web o f Life (New York Anchor Books 1996) p. 27
124 Mayr, Ernst. “Species Concepts and Their Application”, in Philosophy o f Biology, 
ed Michael Ruse (New York: Macmillan 1989) Also see Mayr, One Long Argument,
125 Margulis, Lynne and Sagan, Dorion. excerpt quoted in From Gaia to Selfish 
Genes: Selected Writings in the Life Sciences ed. Connie Barlow (Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press 1991) p.59
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that “fit” in evolution means “fecund”, not strong. Yet we saw earlier in section 3.1.2 
that the status of fitness as a measure in evolution is not without its problems. But I 
think it is important to recognise that it is not at all clear whether one can replace 
‘competition’ with ‘cooperation’ in a straightforward manner without identifying what 
this change would mean for a characterisation of natural selection itself. In fact, it is 
not clear whether the neo-Darwinist focus on competition is a result of how natural 
selection is thought to work, or whether competition is integral to neo-Darwinism 
itself. Questions like these need to be answered if one is to distinguish properly 
symbiosis from neo-Darwinism.
A third argument that must be identified is the idea that symbiosis provides a 
source of evolutionary innovation above and beyond the sources that are provided by 
neo-Darwinism’s theoretical apparatus. This is equally hard to pin down. First, it may 
be that “random mutation” is not thought to be a strong enough source for the many 
increases of complexity seen in evolutionary history, and symbiosis provides a better 
and more reasonable source. Or else it may be that random mutation is a source, just 
not a very important one. The same may perhaps be said of “gradual accumulation of 
random favourable mutations or changes”, where Margulis appears to be arguing 
against ‘gradualism’ in favour of a more ‘saltationist’ evolutionary story, one where 
symbiosis is the source of the ‘leaps’ Again, it is not clear whether a symbiosis-based 
research programme would entail a full denial of the importance of random mutation, 
or gradualism, or whether such a programme would merely supplement neo- 
Darwinism with another source of evolutionary change. Indeed, it is arguable whether 
neo-Darwinism itself is necessarily committed to ‘gradualism’ in this way (see section 
2. 1).
Fourth, the claim about the “chromosomal” theory of heredity must be 
examined in some detail, which introduces some interesting issues about the 
importance of research programmes in the historical sense. Jan Sapp has argued this 
point somewhat more forcefully than Margulis, claiming that what he terms the 
“nucleocentric” research programme in the early 20th century was the main reason that 
symbiotic research was ignored for the most part. This “nucleocentric” research 
position describes the belief that the nucleus was the controlling centre of the cell, and 
this position was associated with a Weismannian strong seperation between the germ ,
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or nucleus, and the soma.126 Now this may be the case contingently, but what is not 
clear is to what extent neo-Darwinism fully embraces a “nucleocentric” position. It 
may be the case that it does have a strong notion of heredity which does actively 
prevent enquiry into non-genetic loci of heredity. However, this may reside in the 
essentially anti-Lamarckist requirements of neo-Darwinism rather than in the locus of 
experimentation. We are not yet in a position to answer the question of how heredity 
functions in symbiosis-based research programmes as opposed to how it must function 
in neo-Darwinism, but it is at least clear that the issue of heredity in symbiosis is quite 
complex.
Given these considerations, this chapter will use the structure adopted 
throughout this thesis to examine these last three aspects of symbiosis I have identified. 
That is, the various symbiotic positions will be grouped according to the three 
components of neo-Darwinism: natural selection, variation, and heredity. In the case of 
the component of natural selection, symbiosis disagrees specifically with the neo- 
Darwinist ‘assumption’ that natural selection is competitive. In the case of variation, 
symbiosis approaches claim that symbiosis provides a mechanism for evolutionary 
novelty above and beyond that provided by neo-Darwinism. Finally, in the case of 
heredity, symbiosis-based approaches explicitly argue against neo-Darwinism’s 
supposed insistence upon a very limited notion of heredity, which is anti-Lamarckist 
and nucleus-oriented These three claims will be discussed in turn in this chapter.
A historical introduction to symbiosis will now be useful in setting out what the 
issues of symbiosis have been in past and present scientific work. Much of the 
following discussion is commentary on Jan Sapp’s excellent history of the subject, and 
is intended to introduce some of the issues that are raised by symbiosis, for instance, 
the metaphors of collectivity, and of the types of entities that symbiosis throws up for 
consideration. These issues will be important when we address the issue of whether 
symbiosis is a separate, or a subordinate research programme to that of neo- 
Darwinism.
126 Sapp, p. 39
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4.2 Historical Introduction to Symbiosis
4.2.1 Mutualism and Master-Slave: the early history
The first symbiotic relationships discovered in nature were those of the lichens, which 
are all associations of a fungus and an alga. In 1868, Simon Schwenderer, a Swiss 
botanist, first proposed that lichens, which had previously been inimical to Linnaean 
classification, were in fact two types of organisms locked in what he termed a ‘master- 
slave’ relationship. His ‘dual hypothesis’ as he called it, was not accepted fully until 
around 1900. Some of those who did accept the dual hypothesis were unhappy with 
Schwenderer’s assertion that the relationship was a ‘master-slave’ relation. There was 
disagreement among botanists who worked with lichens over the degree of parasitism 
in these relationships. Some saw the master-slave metaphor as too politicised, and 
replaced it with a terminology based on parasitism. Yet some saw the relation as more 
cooperative, and complained that the terminology based on parasitism carried too 
many connotations of disease and plague.
In 1877, Albert Bernhard Frank, one of the first botanists to accept the dual 
hypothesis, proposed the introduction of a neutral term that did not presuppose any 
degree of parasitism and only described the co-existence o f two species in or on one 
another: he recommended the term symbiosis.127 The coinage of the term is usually 
attributed to Anton de Bary, yet he did not himself use the term until 1879. The 
introduction of this technical term did not, however, stop the debates over the degree 
of parasitism in such relationships. Pierre Van Beneden had earlier proposed the term 
“mutualism” to describe the same types of relationships He believed that there was a 
continuum of relationships in nature from the “parasite” at one end of the continuum to 
the “free animal” at the other, with various degrees of mutual or symbiotic 
relationships falling in between.
Over time, botanists began to see more and more evidence of symbiotic 
associations in nature, ranging from complex plant and animal associations down to 
symbiotic associations between bacteria and viruses. Though the researcher’s 
immediate communities accepted many such discoveries, the biological community at
127 For this account of the early history of symbiosis see Sapp, Jan. Evolution by 
Association pp. 4-8, 35-39
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large often did not accept them until many years later. More importantly, such 
discovered symbiotic associations were often acknowledged as specific adaptations in 
nature in special isolated cases, but were not considered to have any ramifications in 
theoretical biology as general themes.
In the late nineteenth century, researchers believed that the secrets of all life 
could be found by understanding the cell. It had already been discovered that all cells 
came from other cells, and that plant and animal cells were very similar in function and 
organisation. Thus, it was thought that research into the cell would shed light on all the 
functions of the higher organism. The single cell was generally thought of as an 
individual, self-sufficient organism, but the discovery of more and more organelles, or 
separate specialised structures within the single cell, led many to adopt explanatory 
metaphors using phrases such as ‘division of labour’ and ‘cell-state’ or ‘cell-republic’. 
Researchers could be fairly specific about what the role and function of each organelle 
was, but they were unable to explain how such specialisation could have come about. 
The tendency was, therefore, to treat the entire individual cell as prior to any enquiry 
concerning the specialised functioning structures within it. Moreover, the cell itself was 
seen as the fundamental building block of higher organisms, so it was thought that an 
investigation into the cell would show much about the basic units of evolution.
There were, however, some researchers who wanted to treat individual cells as 
cooperative entities Richard Altmann, in the late 1880’s, suggested that the cell 
evolved through the conglomeration of bodies he called “bioblasts” into a collective 
colony. He believed that these bioblasts, which seemed to be present in all animal cells, 
were responsible for all cell metabolic activities. Altmann’s work was severely 
criticised, and other researchers believed these bioblasts were merely artefacts of his 
staining process. The existence of bioblasts was later supported by the work of 
Alexander Benda in 1897; these bioblasts were what we today call mitochondria. But 
Altmann’s theory of cell evolution was largely ignored.
We can see in this early history some of the tensions within symbiosis 
theorisation itself, as well as some tensions between neo-Darwinism and symbiosis. 
The early history of the term symbiosis has caused some difficulties for the usage of 
the term today. There has been a tendency to use the terms mutualism, cooperation 
and symbiosis interchangeably Margulis has argued that the term symbiosis should be 
reserved for designating relationships between organisms of different species.
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Furthermore, she believes that approaches which fail to make this important distinction 
are wholly inappropriate to dealing with symbiosis in its most important form. This will 
become important later when we examine some neo-Darwinist approaches to 
cooperative behaviour. Additionally, Margulis has recommended that terms such as 
“mutualism”, “commensualism” and “parasitism” tend to obscure the genetic aspect of 
symbiotic systems, an aspect which she believes is fundamental in understanding 
symbiosis. This ‘genetic’ element will now be explained in more detail.
4.2.2 Nucleocentrism and Lederberg: extracellular genes
The development of theories for the evolution of the cell was soon eclipsed by the 
discovery of the importance of the nucleus as the carrier of genetic information. In 
chapter 2 we examined Weismann’s ideas on the nature of heredity, and it was noted 
that Weismann’s work was a significant constraint on the Darwinist notion o f heredity 
By claiming the germ line affected the soma, but never the reverse, Weismann 
effectively denied that Lamarckist inheritance of acquired characteristics could ever 
take place. Also, the identification of the hereditary material with the nucleus had the 
consequence of identifying the organism with its germ-line alone. In the words of 
Bergson, for Weismann the organism becomes an “execresence, a bud caused to sprout 
by the germ...”128 Weismann’s work on this subject continued to gain support, and 
soon it was believed that the nucleus, as well as being the receptacle for genetic 
material, was itself responsible for the differentiation of cell organelles and their 
functions. It was noted earlier that Mendelian ideas about the particulate nature of 
heredity reinforced this belief to a large extent
The assumptions behind what Sapp has called “nucleocentrism” are manifold, 
but are related to what has already been said about the nature of heredity and variation: 
one, that the nucleus contains the genetic material; two, that this material is the source 
of development for the differentiation within cells and the maintenance of their 
metabolic functions; three, that this genetic material is that which is passed between 
generations as heritable material; four, that genetic variability is gained through random
128 Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution. Authorised translation by A. Mitchell (Lanham 
MD: University Press of America 1983) p. 27
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changes and reshuffling of this material alone; and fifth that this genetic material is self- 
contained and separated off from the external environment.129
The discovery of DNA as the carrier of hereditary information merely 
continued this trend in a different guise: the DNA was seen to be the ‘program’ that 
the cell carried out, and was responsible for all cell functions, as well as all higher 
functions of the larger organism. Research into the evolution of cells themselves was 
generally pushed aside by this research program. Since it was believed that the nucleus 
or DNA was the ‘program instructions for life’ it was left to researchers to discover its 
origin, and the evolution of the cell would presumably be secondary to this.130 Thus, 
research focused on nuclear genes as the entities that determined everything else in 
development, and the other components of the cell, the organelles, were considered 
simply as developments that the nuclear genes were responsible for. There was for 
many years little interest in understanding how these separate entities within the cell 
had come to be. They were thought, for the most part, to have been formed through 
slow accumulation of adaptations in the nuclear genotype itself, manifested in the cell 
and subjected to gradual selection.
However, the emphasis on researching the “universal code” of DNA and RN A 
also disclosed some interesting findings in the field of symbiosis. The discovery of 
bacterial genomes, as well as the discovery of viruses as “naked genes” led to research 
into the mechanisms by which these genes interacted with each other. Since it was 
known that viruses and bacteria were responsible for many illnesses, the research was 
driven by an attempt to understand the nature o f pathology. The discovery of such 
extracellular genetic particles was itself shocking to investigators, who had previously 
relied entirely on a Weismannian model of inheritance where genetic material was 
separated off from the environment by the nucleus.
As was discussed earlier, inheritance and genetic variability was thought to 
proceed between generations of cells by mutation and random shuffling of genomes 
that were self-contained It was not thought that extracellular genes could have any 
effect on genomes that already were held separately in the cell Soon it began to be 
recognised that extra-cellular genetic particles, such as viruses, could alter the genome
129 Sapp, p. 36
130 This research program is still very much alive, and the work in the 1970’s to 
construct a “primeval soup”, as well as the work o f Caims-Smith and those working 
on the “RNA-world” theory attest to this.
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o f other cells by being incorporated into them. Research seemed to show that this 
process was almost always fatal to  the host cell, and viruses were generally seen as 
worse than parasites, as harmful pathogens.
Joshua Lederberg’s work in the 1940’s began to show that the ‘host-parasite’ 
or ‘pathological’ picture of the virus-bacteria relationship was much more complex. He 
showed that viral DNA, once injected into its host, could be incorporated into the 
bacterial host’s DNA as a harmless segment of DNA, called a prophage, which would 
then replicate along with the bacterium's own genetic material. The prophage seemed 
to  confer resistance to infection from other external factors onto the bacterial host. 
Such prophages could stay inside cells for many generations, either staying inert and 
allowing the bacteria to do their replication for them, or else later become activated 
and kill their host, and be released to infect other bacteria, (see Appendix 3)
Lederberg realised that the relationship was hard to define. It seemed to be a 
host-parasite relationship since the viruses were using their bacterial hosts for 
replication. But on the other hand it could also be seen as a close symbiotic 
relationship, one which the infection-resistant host could not do without. He also 
realised that the difficulty of adequately defining such a relationship led to a larger 
problem having to do with the nature of the organism: how could one designate the 
‘normal’ components of a cell when external supposedly ‘pathological’ factors were so 
closely integrated in a cell’s normal functioning?131 Lederberg thought that prophages 
were an important source of genetic variation among bacteria, “a special form of 
sexuality”.132
Lederberg’s research into the functioning of bacteria and viruses is important in 
the history of symbiosis, and makes certain theoretical aspects of symbiosis clear. First, 
the cell’s own genome is not necessarily uniquely responsible for the functioning of the 
cell. Extra-cellular genomic factors can be implicated in normal cellular function. 
Second, the relationship in bacterial-viral associations is symbiotic, but also of 
evolutionary importance, because of the possibility of genetic change through these 
avenues. This has profound ramifications for taxonomy, as it makes it problematic to 
assume that bacteria evolved from one common ancestor, since their genomes change 
with such ease through the intervention of viruses. Thus, apart from the symbiotic
131 Sapp, pp 158-161
132 Sapp , p. 160
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relationships which subsist today between bacteria and viruses, there is also the fact 
that such relationships in the past may have been frequent, and may explain much 
about evolutionary relationships today. So we can see that symbiotic processes can 
occur at the level of ONA itself, as in the symbiotic relationship between viruses and 
bacteria. But symbiosis can also occur between different types of bacteria, each of 
which can form a cooperative relationship which persists as a functioning entity on a 
higher level or organisation. As we will see next in the discussion of Serial 
Endosymbiosis Theory, this type of ‘cooperation’ can in fact be significant from an 
evolutionary point of view.
4.2.3 Serial Endosymbiosis Theory
Lynn Margulis’s serial endosymbiosis theory, or SET, now widely accepted by the 
scientific community, theorises that in fact all complex nucleated cells (eukaryotes) 
evolved as communities of interacting free-living bacteria (prokaryotes), which 
themselves already had the ability to fulfil the functions that the eukaryotic organelles 
now fulfil.133 For instance, mitochondria, the energy producing organelles in animal 
cells, are thought to have been bacteria that had already developed an efficient oxygen- 
respiring ability, which were later incorporated into a cell host which provided 
protection against acidity and high temperatures. Thus, it is believed that eukaryotes, 
the basis of most complex plant and animal life on earth, were formed only through a 
mutually dependent relationship between various types of bacteria, (see appendix 4) 
The fundamental ideas behind SET were first proposed by the Russian biologist K.S. 
Merezhkovsky in the early 20th century, although Margulis herself was unaware of his 
contribution until the late 1980’s. Thus her ideas were not particularly new in one 
sense, but she was the first to propose SET to a western scientific audience with the 
support of current research.134
133 Margulis, Lynn. Symbiosis and Cell Evolution: Microbial Communities in the 
Archean and Proterozoic Forms, 2nd Ed. (New York: Freeman 1993) p. 2ff
134 The tale of how Margulis learned of her Russian counterparts in symbiosis research 
is a classic story of the state of science during the Cold War, and is told in L.N. 
Khakina’s Concepts o f Symbiosis: A Historical and Critical Study of the Research of 
Russian Botanists trans. Stephanie Merkel and Robert Coalson (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992) Margulis now gives credit to these Russian scientists for most 
of the ideas in SET. I set out the major tenets of SET here with credit to Margulis as is
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Margulis also discovered homologous structures in the centriole and basal 
bodies (to which flagella and cilia, (motility organelles) are attached) in both 
prokaryotes and eukaryotes. She interpreted the existence of these homologous 
structures as further evidence for SET. Margulis’ work took several years to be 
accepted, since it was thought that the homologous equivalents she discovered were 
not in themselves enough evidence to support SET. The reasons for this had to do with 
Neo-Darwinism’s conception of how and at what pace evolution occurs.
Earlier it was noted that symbiosis proponents claim that the neo-Darwinist 
synthesis, with its insistence on genetic change through random reshuffling o f genetic 
material acted upon by natural selection, suggested that evolution could only happen 
slowly and very gradually. Some opponents of the SET insisted that eukaryotes could 
only have evolved gradually from prokaryotic ancestors. ‘Gradualist’ detractors of 
endosymbiosis expected to see a slow, gradual accumulation of adaptations rather than 
a series of endosymbiotic events. Though some agreed that SET was “aesthetically 
pleasing” they believed there must be a “missing link” as yet undiscovered, that would 
show the gradual transformation of prokaryote to eukaryote.135 The homologous 
structures that Margulis had seen were interpreted as exactly what one would expect in 
a gradually transformed lineage from prokaryote to eukaryote. It is in this sense that 
symbiosis has been claimed to provide a source of evolutionary novelty that contradicts 
the gradualist assumption o f neo-Darwinism. This claim will be considered in more 
detail in 4.3.2 below,* I introduce it here merely as an example of historical reception of 
symbiosis theory
But the most significant aspect of SET in terms of symbiosis is the fact that the 
collective nature of the eukaryotic cell means that there is more than one genomic 
component involved, and thus^in terms of evolutionary descent, that there is more than 
one common ancestor involved in eukaryotic cells. Since mitochondria have their own 
genetic RNA component, this means that there is an avenue of heredity distinct from 
the nuclear genetic component. Furthermore, the centrioles and basal bodies involved 
in cell motility have also been conjectured to have a genetic component, as they appear
the common custom with recognition that she is the proponent of these ideas most well 
known in the West
135 Sapp, p. 161
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to be self-reproducing.136 Thus, SET shows that the ‘complete genome’ as a 
characterisation o f the organism, may be a very complicated position indeed. For 
instance, Dawkins’ strong Weismannian commitments, and his genetic reductionism, 
seem to lead him toward a view which claims that the organism might be thought of as 
the genotype as far as evolution is concerned.137 But which genotype? In effect, SET 
shows that all organisms are made up o f more than the genetic component of their own 
particular species. Each eukaryotic cell has not only its nuclear DNA , but also RNA 
from its mitchondria and chloroplasts. Each living cell has more than one genetic 
lineage.
This brief history of symbiosis shows that the early investigation into cells as 
collective entities was overshadowed by the insistence on the importance of DNA in 
evolution at large. But as DNA came to the forefront of research programmes in 
evolution and biology, it revealed many findings that pointed to symbiosis as an 
important evolutionary phenomenon in its own right. And^ in the end, research 
programmes returned to investigating cells as collective entities, but this time as 
collective entities that were the product of several independent genealogies, as in SET. 
Thus the history of symbiosis shows the many tensions between symbiosis and neo- 
Darwinism, first as cooperation versus competition, second, as variation though 
symbiotic genetic recombination versus incremental change, and third as an 
understanding o f heredity that is not limited to vertical transmission of nuclear genes
This tension between neo-Darwinism and symbiosis also shows how neo- 
Darwinism attempted to explain away the various examples of close cooperation that 
symbiosis represented. For example, SET was dismissed as “aesthetically pleasing” but 
largely unconfirmable for many years, indicating that orthodox neo-Darwinist believed 
that they had available to them other ways of explaining the facts Margulis presented. 
And also, in the early days of symbiosis research, it was often claimed that cooperation 
was rare in comparison with competitive behaviours among organisms. How in fact 
does neo-Darwinism explain cooperation? It is important to address the ways in which 
cooperative behaviour is explained by orthodox neo-Darwinism before we can assess 
to what extent symbiosis can challenge neo-Darwinism as insufficiently ‘cooperative’.
136 Although this has been contested by Maynard Smith and EOrs Szathmary in The 
Major Transitions in Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 142-145.
137 Or, as Henri Bergson put it, Weismannism leads to a position “as if the organism 
itself were only an excrescence’^  Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution, p. 27
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4.3 How does neo-Darwinism deal with cooperation?
Sapp’s outline of the history of symbiosis notes that in the early days o f plant biology, 
where some of the first symbiotic systems had been recognised, the debate about 
symbiosis was, on one level, a debate about how terminology should be applied to such 
systems. Yet;on another level, it was marked by political polemics regarding the nature 
of human society. The very term ‘symbiosis’ was introduced to designate a relationship 
that was neither strictly parasitic nor strictly mutualistic. In plant biology at the end of 
the 19th century, a flurry of terms were introduced, all describing various kinds of 
relationships along the continuum running from parasite to cooperative whole. Yet 
although the terms to describe these distinctions were available, the prevailing view 
was that most symbiotic relationships in plants were simply apparently mutualistic. In 
fact, they were cases of parasitism, where one party benefits at the cost of the other. 
The definition of parasitism could, perhaps, be broadened so that the host could gain 
some small benefit from the parasite, but this broadened definition did not entail that 
the relationship was in any way mutualistic.
The assumption behind this view was the belief, based on Darwin’s use of 
Malthus in no small part, that the key to evolution was selfish struggle for limited 
resources. This principle alone was thought to be the best way to understand the 
complex relationships between species. The idea that a party in a symbiotic relationship 
was not, upon closer inspection, an invidious parasitic thief was anathema to 
Darwinism’s ‘struggle for resources’ ecological principle. More broadly, it was 
thought that cooperation in the sense o f combining resources was limited to human 
society. Those biologists that were more accepting of cooperative systems in biology 
still limited their discussions of symbiotic systems to such metaphors as “master-slave”, 
where there is a kind of cooperation, though still decidedly one-sided The core of 
Darwinism, at that time, limited the kinds of perspectives that could be used to view 
symbiosis. The most important limitation was the prevailing belief that evolution 
demanded that organisms struggle against each other for limited resources.
Let us look for a moment at what this approach to cooperation leads to, in 
terms of its understanding that evolution is competitive at base
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4.3.1 Altruism, Reciprocal Altruism and Group Selection
One group of general approaches to the evolution of cooperative behaviour can be 
roughly grouped under the heading of altruism. Altruism, in its broadest form, is the 
exhibition of a type o f behaviour that increases the fitness o f another at the expense of 
one’s own. It is thought to run counter to Darwinism since any behaviour that reduces 
fitness is maladaptive and hence should be selected against in the long run. Thus the 
research programme that deals with altruism seeks to explain how such cooperation 
can be explained given the assumption that nature is essentially competitive in the neo- 
Darwinist paradigm. This research programme broadly includes such terms as 
reciprocal altruism, altruism, group-selection, kin selection, and evolutionary game 
theory. Each term will be explained in context in this section.
Reciprocal altruism, a thesis proposed by Robert Trivers in 1971, claimed that 
natural selection operated in a way such that acts of kindness would be recognised and 
repaid in kind later on, so that ‘altruistic’ acts were actually selected for by natural 
selection. Trivers specifically invoked the concept of symbiosis as an adjunct to his 
theory: “Reciprocal altruism can also be viewed as a symbiosis, each partner helping 
the other while he helps himself”138 VC. Wynne-Edwards had earlier proposed the 
group-selection hypothesis, which caused controversy by claiming that cooperation 
could be explained by the possibility that evolution could work at the level of the 
group of individuals as a whole, at the level of species, rather than at the mere level of 
individual organisms, thus suggesting that the group or species could be seen as the 
“unit of selection” . It was claimed that ‘cooperative’ strategies enlisted by species as a 
whole would be adaptive for the continuance of that species on an evolutionary level.
4.3.2 Kin Selection
The thesis of group selection has been discredited and explanations of altruism have 
been replaced with explanations that are based on the idea that the unit of selection is
138 Trivers, Robert. “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism” Quarterly Review of 
Biology 46 ( 1971 ) as quoted in Sapp, p. 199
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either the gene or the individual.139 Maynard Smith, in his own attack on group 
selectionism, pointed out that cooperation is an unstable strategy; introduce a 
competitive element into a cooperative group and the competitors will soon take over 
the cooperators. For this reason, it was thought that altruism at the intraspecies level 
ought to be explainable by Hamilton’s famous kin selection hypothesis. In the kin 
selection approach it is claimed that if evolution occurs at the level of the genotype, 
then any strategy that maximises the number of genes passed on will be an adaptive 
strategy. Strategies that do this may appear to take the form of altruism since parents 
will care for any members of the group which carry some of the parental genes into the 
next generation. The idea is that an individual’s own fitness will be sacrificed to ensure 
that its offspring will be increased On this approach, as J.B.S. Haldane remarked, one 
would be prepared to give up one’s life for exactly two brothers, or eight cousins.140 
However, it seems that any kin selection hypothesis must have some kind of kin 
recognition system in order for it to work, since there must be some way for members 
of a species to identify related members so that they can protect them. Thus the 
reciprocal altruism and kin selection approaches, by assuming competition as the rule, 
must also account for the generation o f recognition in order to explain cooperation
4.3.3 Evolutionary Game Theory
A related area of discussion which is closely related to kin selection and reciprocal 
altruism has its origins in game theory. It also is concerned to explain how cooperative 
strategies arise in an essentially competitive world Maynard Smith is credited with 
introducing game theory to the domain of biology, by using classical game theory to
139 The discrediting of Wynne-Edwards and group selection began almost immediately 
upon the suggestion that species themselves could be “units of selection”, and is now 
considered complete. However, it is hard to see why this suggestion met with such 
outrage, if all it suggests is that cooperation is a useful strategy for a group of animals, 
as well as for an individual animal. It seems that, at least in Dawkins case, the problem 
was not so much that Wynne-Edwards was promoting cooperation as assuming it. 
Dawkins thought that cooperation must be explained, not assumed, and furthermore, it 
must be explained from the individual (or gene) point o f view. (See R Dawkins, I he 
Selfish Gene) This means that groups cannot be units of selection, and if a group 
seems to have been selected against as a whole, this is simply because all or most of its 
individuals have been selected against. 1 have to admit that this distinction does not 
seem especially profitable see footnotes 106, 139
140 Maynard Smith, John D id Darwin Get it Right? p 187
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disclose evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). This approach was designed to answer 
his own objection mentioned earlier, namely, that a cooperative strategy was highly 
vulnerable to being invaded by a competitive strategy, and was thus not a stable 
strategy. Evolutionary game theory was devised to show how it was that cooperation 
could be shown to be a stable strategy. However, the results actually showed that 
cooperation and competition were equally stable strategies.141 And again, because it 
depends upon a recognition system, game theory approaches to  are confined to species 
that can recognise other individuals and remember how they act. This move makes it 
more clear what the assumptions behind evolutionary game theory are. The obvious 
problem is exactly the same as for reciprocal altruism and kin selection theories: how 
does the recognition get generated? In kin selection, it is clear that kin selection cannot 
work unless there is a kin recognition system. In reciprocal altruism, there must be a 
means by which individuals can both recognise and remember a ‘kind act’.
Axelrod and Hamilton attempted to show that the evolutionary game theory 
results were not confined to complex animal societies.142 They explicitly claim that 
their approach deals with “symbiosis”.143 They attempted to show that a simple life 
form like a bacterium could form a cooperative relationship if it was limited to
141 Classical game theory ranks individual preferences for different outcomes on a 
linear scale. Evolutionary game theory sees these preferences as differences in fitness. 
The paradigm game for altruism is the Prisoner’s dilemma. In classical game theory, 
the player’s preferences are ranked according to the best outcome, which would be for 
the player to do whatever the other player does. The best outcome is for neither to 
confess, the next best is for one player to “rat out” the other. In evolutionary game 
theory, the game is iterated, that is, played over and over, each play affecting the next 
Results given by this iteration show that there are two “stable” strategies (in the sense 
given by Maynard Smith as the least “invadable” by other strategies) and they are 
called “Defect” and “Tit-for-tat”. Roughly they go as follows: In Defect, the payoff 
matrix shows that it is better for player 1 to defect, no matter what player 2 does. Also, 
it is better for player 2 to defect no matter what player 1 does. Though it would be 
better for both to cooperate, neither wants to run the risk of being a “sucker” when the 
other player decides to defect. In Tit-for-tat, the strategy is to  cooperate at first, and 
from then on do as the other player did in the last game Since both strategies are 
equally stable, the question becomes why cooperation should evolve as a strategy at 
all. Maynard Smith supposed that the early stages of the evolution of a cooperative 
strategy would have to be something like reciprocal altruism, and claims that this is 
what Trivers’ original hypothesis could be used for. Maynard Smith, Did Darwin Get 
it Right? pp. 192-201
142 Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984)
143 Axelrod, R. p. 90, 91, 101, 219n
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continuous contact with only one other organism. This would eliminate the need for a 
recognition system:
When an organism is not able to recognise the individual with which it 
had prior interaction, a substitute mechanism is to make sure that all of 
its interactions are with the same player. This can be done by 
maintaining continuous contact with the other. This method is applied 
in most mutualisms, situations of close association of mutual benefit 
between members of different species... Another mechanism for 
avoiding the need for recognition is to guarantee the uniqueness of the 
pairing of individuals by employing a fixed place of meeting. 14
Thus the explanation of how associations between different species can be cooperative 
in the absence of a recognition system seems to appeal to the fact that such 
associations have certain characteristics: continuous association with one partner, a 
fixed spatial meeting place. But surely the evolution of these characteristics is what 
needs to be explained by evolutionary game theory. Noting that such situations are 
stable does little to explain how they can come about. Certainly it is the case that 
symbiotic partners do in fact have continuous association in a fixed spatial area, but 
surely why this association begins is that which must be explained.14 45 The ‘early stages’ 
in the evolution of such stable associations are not addressed by the evolutionary game 
theory approach. Given that the competitive strategy is as stable as the cooperative 
strategy no matter what the probability of continuous interaction in future, the problem 
of how cooperative behaviour evolved is still an issue. And again, evolutionary game 
theory appeals to another associated type o f cooperation, kin selection, to explain the 
early stages.
In fact ALL D [“Defect”] is evolutionarily stable no matter what the 
probability is of interaction continuing. This raises the problem of how 
an evolutionary trend to cooperative behaviours could ever have started
144 Axelrod, p. 100
145 And quite why such a spatio-temporally restricted situation would have any bearing 
on the need for recognition at all is interesting; perhaps it is a case of familiarity not 
breeding contempt. Also, there is no such thing as a single bacterium in nature.
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in the first place ...Genetic kinship theory suggests a plausible escape
from the equilibrium of ALL D . ”146
But kin selection theory itself depends on a kin recognition system of some kind, 
precisely what Axelrod and Hamilton were concerned to avoid the necessity of. In 
addition, remember that Axelrod and Hamilton are trying to explain how non- 
genetically related organisms could cooperate given that they have no complex 
intelligence. Kin selection could never work as an early stage in the evolution of such a 
system, since the parties involved are not genetically related. This is the whole point of 
symbiosis, that the partners are completely different from one another in the sense that 
they have different requirements for survival, and are yet involved in a close 
association. For members of the same species, cooperation may appear to be 
cooperation in the interest of some shared goal147 for both parties, butyn symbiotic 
associations between vastly different organisms, these goals may well be different for 
each partner.
It seems that all three of these approaches, kin selection, reciprocal altruism 
and evolutionary game theory, depend on each other for support, since they all 
presuppose each other. Maynard Smith appeals to reciprocal altruism for support to 
explain how cooperation could evolve in the early stages.148 Axelrod and Hamilton 
appeal to kin selection to the same ends. Kin selection appeals to reciprocal altruism to 
explain how non-genetically related partners might come to behave in altruistic 
associations All of them seem to presuppose a complex social intelligence, since all 
need a recognition system to work. They are thus confined to cooperation between 
members of the same species, and this must be a highly socially competent species. 
When trying to explain cooperative behaviours among distantly related species, they all 
seem to end up appealing to intra-species explanations for the early stage of the 
evolution of such associations.
There are several points worth drawing out of the above analysis First, both 
the altruism and game-theoretical approaches are based on the assumption that nature 
is competitive, and cooperation is a strange case that needs to be explained The
146 Axelrod, p. 96
147 Though I use this term without any teleological intent; I wish only to show that 
cooperation has some functional aspect.
148 See fn. 141, also Maynard Smith, Did Darwin Get it Right?
Michelle Speidel 110
presence of this basic assumption causes these approaches to be based largely on same- 
species considerations, resulting in the claim that cooperation is explainable by the 
attempt to ensure that one’s genes survive into the next generation. All the interesting 
things are seen as occurring between members of the same species, not between widely 
divergent species which have neither any obvious competitive interest in each other, 
nor overlapping ‘goals’. Axelrod and Hamilton are forced into their absurd hypothesis 
(that bacteria can side-step a kin recognition system by being in contact with only one 
other organism) by the notion that cooperation can only occur when an organism can 
remember a kind act and thus repay it, or remember a defection and retaliate. Second, 
the cost-benefit analysis approach that Margulis complained of earlier is obvious. This 
is also a product of the assumption that nature is essentially competitive Above I have 
shown any approaches which assume competitiveness are also forced, when dealing 
with ‘cooperative’ situations, to deal only with genetically related individuals, and can 
say nothing about associations between different species.
Thus neo-Darwinism encounters real difficulties trying to explain how 
cooperation comes about if it takes it for granted that evolution operates in such a way 
that nature is essentially competitive. And this, perhaps, is the reason that symbiosis 
seeks to challenge neo-Darwinism on this point. But what is not clear is whether this 
‘competitive’ nature is an account of natural selection itself, or if it is a result of a 
misinterpretation of natural selection. It appears that neo-Darwinism does deal poorly 
with cooperation, but this may not have anything to do with the question of whether 
natural selection is wholly dependent on competition. Moreover, even if neo- 
Darwinism is fundamentally competitive, it is up to symbiosis to recommend an 
alternative interpretation that improves upon neo-Darwinism in terms of explanation
4.4 Symbiosis: three criticisms of neo-Darwinism assessed
4.4.1 Natural Selection: Cooperation, not competition?
We may now turn to the question of to what extent neo-Darwinism’s component of 
natural selection depends upon competition rather than cooperation. In this section I 
will argue that first, natural selection does not depend necessarily upon competition as 
a mechanism for change, as the symbioticists would have it. Second, I will argue that
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even if this were the case, the idea that cooperation as a replacement for competition 
does not have any theoretical advantages for viewing biological systems more 
appropriately. At best, it is a simple reverse description of the mechanism of 
competition, not a separate and more refined component.
Earlier in section 3.1, the first component of neo-Darwinism, natural selection, 
was addressed, with a view to discovering exactly what sort of thing natural selection 
is. It was argued there that this endeavour was doomed as long as natural selection 
was discussed on it- own, divorced from its interaction with the other components of 
neo-Darwinism, variation and heredity. And earlier in section 2.1.2 it was noted that 
Darwin himself dealt with the tension in natural selection between its role as an active 
mechanism and a passive sorting system. We must now return to these considerations 
in order to address the question of to what extent natural selection is a fundamentally 
competitive mechanism.
Let us examine some characterisations of natural selection that seem to stress 
its competitive nature. It is possible to break down these definitions into two strands, 
which could be characterised as ‘natural selection as author’ and ‘natural selection as 
editor’. These might correspond roughly with the active and passive roles assigned to 
natural selection discussed earlier in this thesis. On one view, natural selection is the 
author of adaptations in the sense that natural selection is the primary mechanism by 
which certain adaptations become more prominent in any population of organisms. On 
the other view, natural selection is the editor of adaptations, such adaptations are 
generated by other mechanisms, and natural selection is the mechanism by which 
certain variations become prominent in the sense that it preserves or rejects these 
adaptations as appropriate to the environment. Both characterisations rely upon the 
existence of a population of organisms, which is winnowed down by the demands of 
the environment and its limited resources. In this sense, natural selection is dependent 
on competition as a generative mechanism for adaptations. But is natural selection 
competitive? And if it is, then does symbiosis provide a non-competitive alternative? 
And if it is possible that natural selection could be characterised as non-competitive, 
then is an alternative needed?
1 think it is uncontroversial to suggest that all evolving systems operate under 
constraints of one kind or another. This is the sense in which evolution by natural 
selection is marked by competition. We might say that in evolutionary theory, all that is
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presupposed is that the organisms exists in an environment, and this environment is the 
constraints on the organism in question. A population of organisms that is unsuited to 
the environment will be culled, regardless of whether or not there are other organisms 
around that compete with them for resources. Of course, it may be the case that there 
are other organisms in this environment, some o f which may be in a ‘competitive’ 
relationship for the same resources, but^in terms o f evolutionary theory, these can be 
thought of as part of the environment, or as constraints just like any other. Neo- 
Darwinism does not presuppose ‘competition’ between organisms in the sense of 
organisms battling it out between each other for resources, it only presupposes that 
there are limited resources, and organisms must deal with these constraints as best they 
can. And of course, these resources need not even be limited for them to act as 
constraints. If competition is simply a term that reflects the existence of constraints on 
evolving entities, then it is not wholly clear why this should be regarded as an 
inappropriate characterisation of evolution by natural selection.
If it were the case that symbiosis offered a distinct characterisation of 
evolution by natural selection, it might be an alternative of note. But it is not clear that 
it does this. As above, Margulis claims that symbiosis represents a challenge to neo- 
Darwinism in that neo-Darwinism, with its insistence on competition, tends to see 
cooperation as the exception, rather than the rule She objects to the fact that 
competition is built into any models of evolution that use the population biology 
approach, which views all evolutionary changes as changes in gene frequency:
In these mathematic machinations of evolution, the number of 
individuals in a population or a species is taken as the basic measure.
The usual interactions that are explored between individuals (or 
species) are competition (for resources space, etc.) and predation A 
simple reversing of the signs of the interaction coefficient in the Lotka- 
Volterra model turns a “competition model” into one o f “mutualism”149
I take it that here the suggestion is that neo-Darwinism sees competition in everything, 
and its use of mathematical models which prioritise predation and competition tend to
149 Margulis, Lynn “Symbiogenesis and Symbionticism” p. 6. Margulis refers to 
Boucher, DTL The Biology o f Mutualism: Ecology and Evolution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985) in the remarks I cite here
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obscure any other characterisations of evolution. But how, then, can ‘symbiotic’ 
approaches which seek alternative characterisations of evolution (which might 
prioritise cooperation, for instance) use precisely the same mathematical models? An 
alternative approach to evolution which seeks to deny the importance of competitive 
natural selection must do more than describe the same basic mechanisms differently. It 
is not enough to turn competition ‘upside down’ and call it cooperation, if it is the case 
that the very same constraints on evolving systems are being described in this move. 
And Margulis’ example of Lotka-Volterra models seems to confirm this. A reversal of 
the fundamental mechanisms of evolution must do more than force a change in 
terminology. But can symbiosis-based approaches do more than redescribe 
‘adaptations due to competition’ as ‘adaptations due to cooperation’?
What would be the ramifications of cooperation-based descriptions for 
evolutionary theory in the larger sense? If it could be shown that cooperation provided 
an explanation of the generation of adaptations above and beyond an explanation that 
relied upon competition, then this might be an important alternative. Let us take two 
explanations of adaptation and compare them. In one explanation, two organisms 
compete for the same resources, one has an advantage, natural selection selects for this 
advantage, the organism survives and the other does not (this example also might 
describe a population of organisms, some of which have the advantage, of course) In 
the other explanation, two organisms require the same limited resource, they cooperate 
in order to get it, and this ‘symbiotic’ cooperative relationship is selected for and 
persists. Now two things are clear about this comparative example: one, natural 
selection is serving exactly the same role; it preserves an adaptation in both cases. 
Two, what is at issue is not the mechanism of adaptation in terms of the 
characterisation of selection itself, but the mode by which these adaptations come to be 
generated I hope it is clear that here cooperation versus competition has nothing 
whatever to do with natural selection as a mechanism for evolutionary change in the 
sense suggested by Margulis above. That is, it is hard to see what advantage the 
second explanation has over the first in terms of treating natural selection as a 
mechanism.
Similar to my own examples above, though still somewhat distinct, is the 
argument offered by George Kampis in his Self-Modifying Systems in Biology and
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Cognitive Science150 Kampis criticises “dynamical” models (models which track 
changes in a system’s state over time, where this system is deterministic and all its 
initial states are known) by examining the differences between neo-Darwinism and 
another “challenge” to neo-Darwinism which he labels “coevolution”. As he describes 
it, neo-Darwinism assumes that the organism and the environment are sufficiently 
independent for the organism’s evolution to be determined by “external” factors, i.e. 
the environment as a separate, external entity. In coevolution, the causes of evolution 
are more “internal”, as coevolution claims that selection pressures come not from the 
external environment as such but from the selection forces acting within and between 
populations of organisms, in terms of relative “fitness”.
[Coevolution] tells how the numerousness of populations and the 
evolutionary forces depend on the network of interactions in which the 
populations occur Typical models deal with host-parasite, predator- 
prey, etc. interactions 150 51 152
Kampis goes on to show that these two approaches, in terms of the variables they 
intend to capture and track, are formally equivalent to one another “From a formal 
perspective, we have the same structure with two, equivalent, interpretations 52 Thus, 
they are mathematically and structurally identical, and hence predictively and 
explanatorily identical This result should make it more clear that ‘challenges’ to 
orthodox neo-Darwinism are not always quite what they seem; it often happens that 
the novel approach they seem to bring often disappears when they are revealed as 
‘reversals’ or redescriptions o f the terms of neo-Darwinism. For them to be a real 
challenge to neo-Darwinism, they must demonstrate more than this.
Notice also that for the symbiosis-based approach to natural selection, natural 
selection is sufficiently decoupled from the generation of variation so that it fits 
perfectly well with the neo-Darwinist, anti-teleological interpretation of evolution 
where natural selection works upon variation after such variation has arisen The 
question of cooperation versus competition as a characterisation of natural selection
150 Kampis, George. Self-Modifying Systems in Biology and Cognitive Science, p 14
151 Kampis, p. 14
152 Kampis, p. 15
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posed by symbiosis, does not seem to call the anti-teleological, anti-Lamarckist, neo- 
Darwinist interpretation into question in any fundamental way.
Our two comparative explanations do, however, show something else about the 
symbiosis-based approach to evolution. The difference in the approaches focuses the 
dispute more on the modes, or perhaps mechanisms of variation that symbiosis might 
be thought to characterise more thoroughly than neo-Darwinism. It is to the question 
of what symbiosis has to say about variation as the second component o f evolution by 
natural selection that we now turn.
4.4.2 Variation: Evolutionary Novelty through symbiosis?
Let us examine again some of Lynn Margulis’ views concerning the role of symbiotic 
systems in generating variation:
,..according to present-day neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, the 
only source of novelty is claimed to be by incorporation o f random 
mutations, by recombination, gene duplication and other DNA 
arrangements. As is emphasised by those using the term 
“symbiogenesis”, symbiosis analysis contradicts these assertions by 
revealing “Lamarckist” cases of the inheritance o f acquired 
genomes... The standard textbooks on evolution catechize all species 
and higher taxa (genera, families, phyla) as having evolved in the same 
way: by gradual accumulation of favourable mutations. .. Yet not a single 
example o f the origin o f such lower taxa (species) exists in the 
literature.
Leaving aside whether or not the specific genetic mechanisms mentioned really are the 
only ones admissible in neo-Darwinism, let us divide the ideas suggested above into 
three separate issues. One, the notion that symbiosis provides a means of variation 
generation beyond mere “random mutation”. Two, that neo-Darwinism insists upon 
‘gradualism’ in evolution, and symbiosis provides a means o f the generation of 
variation which is not ‘gradual’. And third, that symbiosis is in some sense
133 Margulis, Lynn. “Symbiogenesis and Symbionticism”, p 11
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“Lamarckist” . This third question will be dealt with in section 4.4.3, concerning 
heredity.
Many of the issues concerning ‘randomness’ were examined in the last chapter, 
and it was noted there that it is difficult to precisely locate the ‘element of chance’ in 
evolutionary theory. With no clear means of delineating the precise way in which 
‘randomness’ functions in a theory of evolution with a strong stochastic element, it is 
not easy to evaluate quite how symbiosis-based approaches are at odds with the idea of 
variation through random mutations, as neo-Darwinism seems to suggest superficially.
In section 3.2, in the discussion concerning random drift, it was noted that for 
‘randomness’ to make any sense at all as an element in evolutionary theory, it must be 
random with respect to something else. That is, random with respect to some 
ostensible or observed order in the evolutionary system. And we also saw that neo- 
Darwinism, as anti-Lamarckist, claims that mutations or adaptations are ‘random’ with 
respect to adaptive advantage, that is, adaptations do not arise because they will be 
useful in future, they merely arise ‘randomly’ and are culled by the forces of selection.
We can reconstruct the symbiotic position on randomness in two different 
ways. One, it could be that symbiosis provides a means of generation of variation that 
does not proceed by the gradual accumulation of random mutations or gene 
recombination. O^two, it may be that symbiosis denies that evolution is random in the 
sense that symbiosis is Lamarckist in process. If the former is the correct 
reconstruction, then symbiosis-based approaches must rather be characterised as ‘anti­
gradualist’ rather than simply ‘anti-random’. For what seems to be at issue is the way 
in which evolution occurs on a phylogenetic level. In the case of the symbiotic origin of 
eukaryotes, it is clear that for proponents of symbiosis, the way in which eukaryotes 
formed is, perhaps, ‘saltationalist’ rather than ‘gradualist’, since the symbiotic union of 
prokaryotes to form the eukaryote cell happened ‘all at once’, and there was no 
“missing link” in a gradual transformation through the accumulation of piecemeal 
adaptations between prokaryote and eukaryote.
But there is an important distinction to be made here, for it is not the case that 
neo-Darwinism depends solely upon random mutation as a characterisation of variation 
generation; all it requires is that variation be random with respect to advantage And 
even a symbiotic cooperative innovation does not appear to entail that this innovation 
be directed, or non-random with respect to advantage. Margulis then perhaps means to
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say that evolution happens more quickly if it is characterised by cooperative symbioses, 
rather than slow mutation. But neo-Darwinism, though it is gradualist, is not gradualist 
by depending solely on random mutations in the sense of slow changes, but rather 
through its insistence that variations are not directed by the environment
If symbiosis is ‘anti-gradualist’ then it is not obvious that it is a true challenge 
to neo-Darwinism.154 For it should be clear that none of the three elements of neo- 
Darwinism (natural selection, variation, heredity) are ‘time-indexed’ in any way. Neo- 
Darwinism does not provide any account of the rate of evolution in itself. Of course, 
there has been an enormous amount o f research on the rate o f genetic change in 
populations, on the macro- and micro-level, with a view to understanding what the 
general rate of evolutionary change must be. This information would be immensely 
valuable in evaluating the time at which species diverged, for instance. But a 
generalised rate of evolution or even of mutation rate, has been difficult to find. For 
example, Maynard Smith reports some of Haldane’s estimates in his Theory o f 
Evolution. These estimates proceed by assigning a value defined as the “intensity of 
selection” which is a measure of how many organisms in a population die because they 
are less fit than others; this value then can be used to calculate the number of deaths 
due to poor fitness in terms of the number of generations that must pass before an unfit 
trait is supplanted entirely by the fitter trait.155 But these studies simply reference the 
rate of evolutionary change under certain conditions, work only for a small number of 
fitness traits, and are, to some extent, unreliable. There is no suggestion that these seek 
to provide an account of any underlying rate of change over time. Symbiosis may, on 
this account, deny that evolution happens as slowly as neo-Darwinism claims, but it 
must be conceded that neo-Darwinism in itself has no account o f any privileged time 
scale for evolutionary change.
So if symbiosis is a criticism of gradualism, or neo-Darwinism’s dependence on 
random mutation as the only source for variation, or if it is an attempt to show that 
evolution happens more quickly than neo-Darwinism might have it, it is not clear that it 
could be classed as a challenge to neo-Darwinism of great importance If it merely 
queries the time-scale of evolution, and criticises neo-Darwinism’s dependence on
154 Maynard Smith makes a similar point in “A Darwinian View of Symbiosis” in 
Symbiosis as a Source of Evolutionary Innovation: Speciation and Morphogenesis 
eds. Lynn Margulis and Rene Fester (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1991)p 37-8
155 Maynard Smith, John The Theory o f Evolution p 47, pp 282-5
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‘random’ mutation simply as an exemplar o f neo-Darwinism’s inherent ‘gradualism’, 
then it must be said that neo-Darwinism as a research programme has little to say 
about the time-scale of evolution in this sense. If a symbiosis-based research 
programme’s assumptions have only this to say, then it is perfectly compatible with 
neo-Darwinism. At best, it might be said to  be a sub-research programme, one that 
may dispute some of the more metaphysical core assumptions of neo-Darwinism 
(gradualism being perhaps one of them) but agrees with all of the mechanisms which 
instantiate neo-Darwinism’s conception o f the way in which its three components work 
together.
Of course, if symbiosis queries neo-Darwinism’s characterisation of variation as
‘random’ for other reasons than the ones outlined above, this may be a more serious
challenge. We have seen that ‘random’ ought to be read as ‘random with respect to
adaptive advantage’ as a core mechanism o f neo-Darwinism. If symbiosis disputes this
particular reading of random, then it contravenes a significant mechanism of neo-
Darwinism, as well as its metaphysical counterpart: that is, it would violate the anti-
Lamarckist stricture of random, rather than directed, variation, and violate the anti-
teleological metaphysical assumption of neo-Darwinism by allowing variation to occur
toward an adaptive goal. This would constitute symbiosis-based research programmes
-form­
as a separate research programme tljan that of neo-Darwinism.
To return to the quote by Margulis offered above, I want merely to make it 
clear that there is some difficulty with disputing neo-Darwinism as postulating 
evolution through the accumulation of random mutations. The difficulty is that this 
characterisation may mean that neo-Darwinism is gradualist, and symbiosis is then in a 
sense ‘saltationalist’, or it may mean that neo-Darwinism is anti-Lamarckist, and 
symbiosis is Lamarckist. Clearly these are different, and the latter is far more of a 
challenge than the former The remarks by Margulis perhaps mean to say that 
symbiotic evolution is ‘saltationalist’ because it makes use of Lamarckist mechanisms 
such as the inheritance of acquired genomes. If this is correct, then symbiosis is surely 
a challenge to neo-Darwinism, but now the question must be: Are the mechanisms 
described by symbiosis truly Lamarckist, do they themselves postulate a different 
means of heredity that is outlawed by neo-Darwinism, and do they entail teleological 
evolution?
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4.4.3 Heredity: Is heredity in symbiosis Lamarckist?
We must first look at Lamarckism before we deal with Lamarckist aspects of 
symbiosis. Lamarck and the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics has 
already been introduced earlier when neo-Darwinism was characterised as an 
essentially anti-Lamarckist theory. There are, however, some more remarks that might 
be made about what Lamarckism consists of. Jablonka and Lamb note in their 
treatment of the issue of Lamarck and neo-Lamarckists that there are many important 
distinctions to be made within Lamarckism, for Lamarckism is more than simply the 
“inheritance of acquired characteristics”, and there is more to even this simple phrase 
than meets the eye.156
Lamarck himself had many sophisticated ideas about evolution and the nature 
of life in general, not all of which particularly concern us here.157 Most important, 
perhaps, are his “two laws”. The first postulates that changes in organisms and their 
structures occur through “use and disuse”, that is, a given organ will strengthen if used 
frequently, and will diminish in function if it is not used. The second law postulates that^, 
in evolutionary terms, these changes through use and disuse are heritable, they will be 
passed on to the progeny. In themselves, these ideas were neither new nor radical; as 
we have seen, even Darwin was in agreement with this characterisation of evolution to 
some extent. The most significant part of Lamarck for the purposes of this thesis is the 
fact that the environment directly produced variations that were adaptive for the 
organism. That is, an organism was not only affected by its environment, but actively 
changed to suit its conditions. For instance, a predator that preyed on fast-running
156 Jablonka and Lamb, Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The Iximarckian 
Dimension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 3-20
157 Amongst Lamarck’s ideas: a peculiar vitalist materialism where there is no 
distinction in principle between the living and non-living, but only a change in the 
organisation of living matter by which it is capable of self-organisation and progressing 
complexity Spontaneous generation was thus not only possible, but ubiquitous for 
Lamarck. Living matter exhibited a tendency toward a gradual increase in complexity 
by means of the action under natural laws of the “subtle fluids” that living matter is 
composed of. For Lamarck, there were no extinctions in nature, rather, simple forms 
were transformed into more complex forms, giving the interesting result that simple 
living forms were created more recently than complex ones (since the simpler forms 
had not yet had time to transform, and the complex forms must have been around 
longer in order to transform)
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animals would exhibit changes in its morphology that actually allowed it to run faster, 
and these changes were induced by using their legs more often. Since Lamarck did not 
provide any particular theory of heredity, there was no particular restriction on the 
actual mechanisms by which the environment could produce these changes though use 
and disuse.
Such restrictions on mechanism were provided by Weismann and later by the 
Central Dogma of DNA, as we have seen. The impossibility of “inheritance of acquired 
characteristics” by means of the Weismann Barrier or through proteins reprogramming 
DNA itself entailed some change in whether or not a certain mechanism was 
considered to be acceptable by neo-Darwinism. The inclusion of prohibitions forced a 
tighter definition of what could be considered a Lamarckist mechanism By this I mean 
that things that were previously fhought to be Lamarckist could now be assimilated by 
neo-Darwinism. For instance, f  f Weismann Barrier postulated that changes in the 
soma cells could never affect changes in the germ cells. Any mechanism where the 
soma directly affected the germ was deemed Lamarckist and therefore unacceptable. 
When the workings o f hereditary material became more clear, and the Central Dogma 
was established, the situation changed. In a sense, as the Central Dogma superseded 
the Weismann Barrier, mechanisms which violated the Weismann Barrier were now 
considered acceptable, just so long as they did not violate the strictures of the Central 
Dogma. Now it was the case that the environment could affect the organism, and 
thence its progeny, in a heritable way, but it could not directly affect the DNA of that 
organism. The phenotype was available to environmental influence, but the genotype 
was not So we can say that inheritance of acquired characteristics was possible, but 
only if these mechanisms did not affect the DNA itself. Much is made of this point by 
Jablonka and Lamb, and proponents of “epigenetic inheritance”.15*
I here distinguish between two kinds of things that are thought of as 
Lamarckist by neo-Darwinism. One is a mechanism that breaks the Weismann Barrier, 158
158 In fact, they present my argument here from exactly the other way round. They 
suggest that the more sophisticated Lamarckist and neo-Lamarckist theories become, 
the more possible it is to be a neo-Darwinist and still allow Lamarckist inheritance to 
occur as a parallel mechanism. I, on the other hand, suggest that the more narrowly 
neo-Darwinism defines what constitutes a Lamarckist mechanism, the more it can 
assimilate mechanisms previously considered Lamarckist, and thus treat them as if they 
were totally compatible with neo-Darwinism In this way, for instance, acquired 
symbiotic partners can be inherited, but this is not Lamarckist since it does not entail 
any reprogramming of the host’s genotype
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the other is a mechanism which reverses the direction of information flow of the 
Central Dogma If we consider that the Central Dogma has superseded the Weismann 
Barrier in terms of the growth of microbiology as a discipline, we would have to 
conclude that anything that violates the Weismann Barrier is acceptable, just so long as 
it does not claim that the DNA of an organism can be ‘reprogrammed’ by the organism 
itself in response to environmental pressure. In this way, the inheritance of acquired 
characters is acceptable, just so long as it does not entail reprogramming of DNA 
and/or directed evolution toward a goal. If we view these mechanisms in this way, it 
becomes clear that there is the possibility of distinguishing several types of 
‘Lamarckisms’. But this level of discussion, while showing the ways in which 
mechanisms determine what can be ruled in and ruled out of a theory, tends to conceal 
the possibility that the metaphysics behind a research programme can have unintended 
consequences in terms of the programme’s direction
Earlier in section 3.3, we considered the “unit of selection debate” and found 
that the interaction of the three components of neo-Darwinism, in themselves giving no 
indication of what kind of thing natural selection acts upon, left it open to debate 
whether natural selection selects the organism, the species, or the genotype, or even 
individual genes or parts of genes themselves Yet in order for evolution to proceed, 
selection must act upon some thing, and although the nature of this thing that it selects 
is somewhat open to debate, it is surely the case that natural selection must pick out 
some entity as that which survives, and reproduces, and it is to this entity that labels 
such as “fitness” are to be attached.
Although it is undoubtedly the case that neo-Darwinism is to a great extent 
defined by its anti-Lamarckist stance in terms of its allowable mechanisms, it is also 
true that the way these mechanisms are characterised forces neo-Darwinism to make a 
distinction between organism and environment, just so that the organism is selected by 
the environment As was made clear in the unit of selection discussion, the ‘organism’ 
need not be considered as a certain animal or plant’s phenotype, we could just as easily 
make the same distinction on another level, so that, as Dawkins does, we might think 
of the gene being selected by its environment. But whatever the nature of this entity 
that is acted upon by natural selection, be it gene, or part of gene, or actual complete 
organism, this entity must be a stable concept for neo-Darwinism To be anti- 
Lamarckist really means having a stable distinction between organism and
Michelle Speidel 122
environment, so that the organism cannot affect its own environment in a teleological 
manner, but merely adapt to it. And the two anti-Lamarckist mechanisms of the 
Weismann Barrier and the Central Dogma, though they may differ in terms of what is 
ruled in and ruled out, are both effectively means of claiming that the environment 
affects the organism, and the two are separate entities.
But if it were the case that there was a class of living things whose functioning 
called this distinction into question, and in this way was Lamarckist in nature, then they 
would point toward the way in which symbiosis can be a real challenge to neo- 
Darwinism, not simply in terms of heredity, but in terms of the way all three 
components of neo-Darwinism function. And there is such a class of creature: the 
prokaryotes, or bacteria.
In the next chapter I will introduce a discussion of the nature and function of 
what I will argue are the most Lamarckist organisms around: bacteria. By seeing how 
they function, we will be able to see two important things: one, that prokaryotes or 
bacteria are essentially outside the scope of neo-Darwinism for several reasons Two, 
that the way in which bacteria function is an excellent example of how symbiotic 
processes can be seen to problematise the notion of the individual. And this, I will 
conclude, is the most important way in which symbiosis can be said to challenge neo- 
Darwinism. I will argue that symbiosis, and bacteria as an example of such symbiotic 
functioning, is not simply Lamarckist, but actually dissolves the entire 
Darwinist/Lamarckist dichotomy
Symbiosis, 1 will argue, problematises the individual on every important level, it 
problematises the in principle distinction between the organism and environment, 
between the germ and soma, between DNA and protein in terms of the Central Dogma 
of Biology We have seen that the anti-Lamarckist constraints of neo-Darwinism 
depend upon in principle distinctions between entities on these levels. In order for 
adaptations due to the action of natural selection to be ‘undirected’, adaptations must 
be selected by the environment, there can be no sense in which the organism ‘selects’ 
its environment, and there must by this account be a distinction between organism and 
environment In the Weismann Barrier, germ cells cannot be affected by the soma cells 
of the sexually reproducing organism In the Central Dogma of Biology, information 
flows from DNA to RNA to protein, never the reverse,- the physical structure of the 
cell can never reprogram its own genetic instructions. Symbiosis problematises these
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very distinctions, it thus is not only a challenge to neo-Darwinism at this level, the level 
of heredity, but even more significantly, it means that neo-Darwinism is a theory with a 
very narrow application to a small proportion of life on this planet. The following 
chapter will thus introduce some of the ways in which these distinctions are 
problematised with reference specifically to bacteria.
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Chapter 5
Bacteria and their place in evolutionary theory
5.1 Introduction to Bacterial Evolution
Bacteria account for 97% of the biomass of life on earth. They are the oldest and, by 
some accounts, the most successful group of organisms in biological history. Lately it 
has been discovered that they can live almost anywhere: salt lakes, alkali lakes, thermal 
undersea vents, fiimaroles, geysers, polar ice caps. Not only are bacteria ubiquitous in 
our own environment, but these organisms seem capable of colonising environments 
which are known to be too extreme for any other more complex organisms 159
Most complex organisms are highly dependent on bacteria, and could be said to 
be in a symbiotic relationship with them. Plants use them to take up nutrients from the 
soil; insects use them to digest wood (in fact, the latest technology in cockroach and 
termite extermination uses antibiotics to kill the intestinal bacteria of these insects, thus 
starving the insects to death). Without our own bacterial microflora, we would not 
survive—we could not metabolise our food, or fight off infection. In a sense, the 
organisms which we call ourselves do not end with our own body cells, we must also 
include the multitude of bacterial ‘helpers’ without which we could not survive in 
order to describe the totality o f us as ‘organisms’ And as Serial Endosymbiosis Theory 
has shown, even our ‘own’ genetic complement owes some of its material to a 
bacterial lineage (as mitochondrial RNA), not even our human genotype is entirely free 
of bacterial ingredients 160
1,9 These organisms, called extremophiles for obvious reasons, are now steadily being 
cultured by microbiology for exploitation in both genetically modified foods and other 
industrial markets Those organisms which have resistance to extreme cold, heat, 
acidity and the like are being plundered for genes which can be inserted into other 
organisms, as well as being used for toxic spill cleanup and related technologies.
160 Mitochondria, the “powerhouses” in each of our cells which convert chemical 
nutrients into energy, are important in themselves in terms of the use of genetic 
“fingerprinting” to disclose human evolutionary history Since mitochondria are only 
passed on hereditarily in gamete fusion from the mother’s side only, their genetic 
complement has been used to determine a “Mitochondrial Eve”, the earliest human 
with the mitochondrial genes that we all possess today, giving a useftjl evolutionary 
clock for human evolution See Dawkins’ River out o f Eden (London: Weidenfield & 
Nicolson, 1995) for an interesting summary of this work
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Yet these organisms and their importance in evolution are often ignored by 
traditional neo-Darwinism for a variety of reasons. They could even be said to be a 
difficult, or anomalous case for neo-Darwinism, for reasons which will be argued in 
this chapter. This chapter will examine the ways in which bacteria are different to the 
kinds of organisms that neo-Darwinism is concerned with. On both a micro and macro 
level, bacteria behave in ways that are fundamentally different to the concepts 
embraced by neo-Darwinism. This chapter will also show why neo-Darwinist 
theoretical concepts do not apply to bacteria. It will be noted that neo-Darwinism’s 
conceptual inapplicability with regard to bacteria will mean that neo-Darwinism is a 
limited theory covering relatively few types o f organisms. The importance of bacteria 
in evolution means that a theory of evolution must use concepts that apply to both 
bacteria and more complex organisms if it is to be fully explanatory.
5.2 Structural differences between bacteria and other forms of life
First I will discuss the structure of bacteria and how they differ from other organisms. 
Living organisms are taxonomically divided into two groups: the prokaryotes and the 
eukaryotes. The word “prokaryote” means “before nuclei”, indicating that bacteria 
evolved without nuclei, and the nucleus was a much later evolutionary innovation 
involving the incorporation of one bacterial lineage into another, according to SET 161 
The various sorts of bacteria comprise the kingdom of prokaryotes (again accounting 
for 97% of organisms), while the eukaryotes include all other organisms At present it 
is estimated that only 5% of extant prokaryotes have been cultured.162 For simplicity’s 
sake I will use the more general term bacteria to designate the prokaryotes
Bacteria are asexually reproducing; that is, they do not reproduce through 
meiotic gamete fusion, and thus do not have available to them the reshuffling of 
genetic material that occurs in meiosis as a source of variation Bacteria divide in a 
process called binary fission where each daughter cell contains a copy of the replicated 
plasmid, or circular bacterial chromosome. Since the bacterium simply divides in two,
161 Margulis remarks that “prokaryote” means “before nuclei”, but “eukaryote” means 
“good nuclei”, perhaps an interesting indicator of neo-Darwinism’s enthusiasm for the 
Weismann Barrier Margulis, Lynn. Symbiosis attd Cell Evolution
162 Modern Bacterial Taxonomy 2nd ed., Fergus Priest and Brian Austin 
(London Chapman and Hall, 1993) p. 139
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all daughter cells are clonal; that is, they have identical genetic material. Thus the 
process by which bacteria make more of themselves is not really what we’d like to call 
sex, as it does not necessarily cause any generation of variants, but merely the 
replication of the parent cell. The means by which bacteria generate variation is very 
different. Because bacteria are asexual, variation is not primarily generated through 
random meiotic crossover, the cause of variation usually studied by neo-Darwinism. 
On the one hand, because they are clonal, bacteria have little variation. On the other 
hand, bacterial genomes are remarkably plastic, since, as we shall see, they recombine 
their genetic material in unusual ways Thus, bacteria are immensely variable, but 
again, this variation comes from avenues that are somewhat unfamiliar to neo- 
Darwinism.
On a structural level bacteria are principally different in that their genetic 
material is not contained in a nucleus, whereas eukaryotic organisms all have their 
chomosomal genes enclosed in a nucleus. In bacteria, this genetic material may take 
the form of a linear chromosome, or else it may be in the form o f a circular 
chromosome called a plasmid which is self-transmissible The lack of a nucleus is not 
merely a structurally distinctive characteristic, but in fact reflects a fundamental 
reproductive difference. As we saw in Part I, the Weismann Barrier, structurally 
enshrined in the nucleus of the cell, is a theoretical barrier to the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics and is thus a proscription against Lamarckism. The Weismann 
doctrine states that the germ (or sex cells) cannot be affected by changes in the somatic 
(or body cells) in an organism The Weismann doctrine, made familiar earlier in chapter 
4 as the ‘nucleocentric’ cell theory research programme, is based on the view that the 
nucleus is the sole container of hereditary material, and nothing else in the cytoplasm 
of the cell can affect this hereditary genetic material It thus imposes constraints on the 
information flow in evolution Since this hereditary material is separated off physically 
by the nucleus in eukaryotes, and bacteria do not have a nucleus, the Weismann Barrier 
does not apply to bacteria The lack of a nucleus marks bacteria out as non-Darwinist 
in this sense Because there is no nucleus to contain or protect the genetic material, 
bacteria can acquire genetic material in ways that eukaryotic organisms cannot.
The lack of a nucleus to bound genetic material allows bacteria to engage in 
complex gene transfer Bacteria exchange DNA and RNA in many different ways, 
customarily divided into three categories: transformation, transduction and
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conjugation. An example of the practical importance of bacterial gene transfer can be 
found in the phenomenon of multiply drug resistant bacteria. Bacteria can acquire 
immunity to antibiotics, and this is becoming a major challenge for clinical 
microbiology. The widespread use of common antibiotics has led to a world-wide rise 
in bacteria which are resistant to them. Drug resistance in bacteria is most often 
acquired though transduction and conjugation. This kind of acquisition offers several 
advantages: First, bacteria can acquire several separate and unrelated drug resistance 
factors. Second, this way bacteria have the ability to spread resistance horizontally. 
Resistance acquired in these ways is thus not restricted to vertical propagation in 
progeny. By gaining drug resistance in these ways, bacteria can acquire novel 
resistance genes from distant members of the microbial world.16’' It appears that the 
only way to fight the bacterial strategy is to frantically keep producing new antibiotics 
which the bacteria have not yet met. Vertical transmission of genetic material means 
that the material is passed on through a lineage o f organism from parent to daughter 
cells, where one cell divides into two, and each have the same complement of genetic 
material as the parent cell Bacteria do, of course, propagate themselves in this way for 
the most part However, they can also transmit genetic material horizontally, which 
eukaryotes cannot do The significance of this will be discussed in section 5 4
The area of drug resistance is a startling case of how different bacteria really 
are from the types of evolving entities that are usually delineated in neo-Darwinism. 
Historically, the phenomenon of drug resistance was thought of as being similar to 
adaptational changes in more complex organisms In the early days of microbiology, it 
was thought that bacteria gained resistance from antibiotics through accumulated 
random mutations These mutations were thought to be chance events, which were 
selectively advantageous, and so were selected for and spread throughout the 
population. These random mutations were thought to be point mutations, where only 
one base in the DNA chain was altered These point mutations were thought to 
chemically alter the bacterium’s sensitivity to drugs, and were conserved
Up until very recently, bacterial populations were still treated much as other 
ideal populations of higher animals: that is, when a given population is poorly adapted, 
most will die, and those few that are left will carry on reproducing to restore the 163
163 Microbiology 4 ed . ed . by Bernard D. Davis, Renato Dulbecco, Hernán N. Eisen, 
Harold S. Ginsberg. J.B. Lippincott Co. (Philadelphia: 1990), 220-221
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population to a stable relationship with its environment. Since most members of a 
bacterial population are clonal, they all have the same genome, and the only possible 
members to have any variation must therefore be mutants. These mutants, according to 
traditional neo-Darwinism, are the only ones able to provide new adaptations For this 
reason the mechanism of mutational strategies is the focus of much research at present 
It was traditionally believed that the only sources of mutation in a stable genome were 
either through cosmic rays or radiation, or through copying ‘mistakes’ in the process 
of either transcription, translation, or both. However, some research has indicated that 
such mistakes are part of a highly complex process of DNA repair mechanisms, and are 
not necessarily random, as previously believed. The issue of DNA repair mechanisms is 
highly complex, and will not be dealt with here However, the larger issue of 
mutational strategies is at the centre of the debate surrounding the ways in which 
organisms can adapt to their environments. It is this issue that exemplifies neo- 
Darwinism’s attempts to deal with anomalies at the level of mechanisms which violate 
its metaphysical assumptions.
5.3 Directed Mutation Hypothesis: Lamarckist Bacteria?
Directed mutation, an idea proposed by John Cairns in 1988,lh4 claims that organisms 
(specifically in this case E.coli strain MCS2) under stress from an unfriendly 
environment might experiment with their own genomes to try to come up with an 
adaptive mutation. Cairns based his work on earlier E.coli experiments by Luria and 
Delbriick,164 65 who attempted to investigate the difference between “drifters” and 
“selectionists” (described earlier in sections 2.3, 3.1.1, 3.2.2) in terms of bacterial 
mutation rates They had concluded that most, if not all, bacterial mutation was 
random, or spontaneous in nature Cairns, in contrast, proposed that the E.coli would 
only experiment with that portion o f their genomes that might possibly be effective if 
mutated This proposal was included to explain not only the apparent rapidity of the 
appearance of adaptive mutations, but also the apparent narrowness of the mutation: 
only those gene sequences that affected the nutritional capability of the bacteria
164 Cairns, J., Overbaugh, J. & Miller, S. “The origin of mutants” Nature 335 (1988), 
142-145
165 Luria, S.E. and Delbruck, M. “Mutations of bacteria from virus sensitivity to virus 
resistance” Genetics 28 (1943), 491-511
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appeared to have altered, and in many cases this was a matter of a one-base frameshift. 
This aspect of directed mutation was seen as Lamarckist, as it appeared to claim that 
the bacteria somehow sought out exactly what was needed, without having to try out 
other strategies first. In this sense, the flow of information is reversed, as the bacteria 
get information fronts ; environment that allows them to effectively and quickly adapt 
to it.
Molecular biologists, faced with this apparent contradiction to neo-Darwinism, 
displayed their customary ingenuity in proposing ways in which such adaptational 
mutation might occur without threatening conventional dogma An alternative strategy 
for bacterial populations under stress was for a subpopulation to start mutating 
vigorously at random in the hope that a lucky mutation would arise that would relieve 
the stress on the population as a whole. This approach, as can be seen, allows the flow 
of information to remain unidirectional and retains the random element necessary to 
neo-Darwinist natural selection This explanation for the apparent directed mutation of 
bacteria was favoured by Barry G H all166 Work has been done by Pat Foster and 
others to recapture the experimental results obtained by Cairns (these experimental 
results themselves are also disputed by Mittler and Lenski) under this less controversial 
theory 167 It appears that during times of nutritional stress, mutation rates are indeed 
unexpectedly high, and in particular, one-base frameshifts (exactly what was occurring 
in Cairns’ work).168 It therefore appears that the phenomena discovered in E.coli do 
not rule out either hypothesis, and can in fact accommodate both o f them 169
166 Hall, Barry G “Adaptive Evolution That Requires Multiple Spontaneous 
Mutations I. Mutations Involving an Insertion Sequence” Genetics 120 (1988), 887- 
897; Hall, Barry G. “Spontaneous Point Mutations That Occur More Often When 
Advantageous Than When Neutral” Genetics 126 (1990), 5-16; Hall, Barry G. 
“Adaptive evolution that required multiple spontaneous mutations: Mutations 
involving base substitutions” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.USA vol.88 (July 1991), 5882- 
5996
167 Foster, P.L“Directed Mutation: Between Unicorns and Goats” . J. Bad. 174 (1992), 
1711-1716; Foster, Patricia L. and Cairns, John “Mechanisms o f Directed Mutation” 
Genetics 131 (1992), 783-789
168 Mittler, John E. and Lenski, Richard E. “New data on excisions of Mu from E.coli 
MCS2 cast doubt on directed mutation hypothesis” Nature 344 (1990), 173-175; 
Mittler, John E and Lenski, Richard E. “Experimental evidence for an alternative to 
directed mutation in the bgl operon” Nature 356 (1992), 446-448; Lenski, Richard E. 
and Mittler, John E. “The Directed mutation controversy and neo-Darwinism” Science 
259(1993), 188-193
169 Bridges, Bryn A., ‘Hypermutation Under Stress’, Nature 387 (1997), 98-90.
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Sarkar’s analysis of the experimental work in directed mutation sees the 
historical root o f  the controversy in work done in the 1920’s and 30’s to try to settle 
the question of whether the evolution of bacteria was Lamarckist or Darwinist .170 The 
types of statistical methods brought to bear on experiments to settle this question are 
the same used by Cairns and others to support their directed mutation hypothesis. 
Sarkar is pessimistic about their conclusion, as he identifies several methodological 
flaws in the types of statistical analyses used. The experimental methodologies used by 
Luria and Delbriick were designed to test between the extreme position that either all 
mutations were random, or else all were directed. Sarkar argues that because the 
current methodology is the same, and can only test this extreme position, he believes 
that this allowed Cairns to resurrect the weaker position that most mutations were 
random, but some were directed. However, it is not clear that Cairns’ position is in fact 
a weak one; surely any position which claims that directed mutation can occur at all is 
bold enough Sarkar appears to be more favourably disposed to an explanation similar 
to Barry Hall’s and John Maynard Smith’s hypothesis.
The recent work of John Maynard Smith and others into mutational strategies 
examines a slightly different aspect of mutational rates 171 Maynard Smith’s work 
focuses on mutational strategies at a populational level Whereas directed mutation and 
nutritional stress theories are mainly concerned with how a single bacterium responds 
to a stressful environment, Maynard Smith asks how a subpopulation of bacteria can 
reduce their individual fitness to allow the population as a whole to benefit.
Neo-Darwinism predicts that mutation rates have evolved to be as low as 
possible, limited only by the cost of error/mutation-avoidance mechanisms, because 
most newly arising mutations are either neutral or deleterious. But it has been found 
that up to one percent of natural bacterial isolates are “mutator” clones with high 
mutation rates. These mutator clones appear to have turned off their antimutation 
mechanisms, such that they can mutate very rapidly While such rapid mutation is often 
deleterious for this small subpopulation, when a favourable adaptation does occur, it 
spreads throughout the rest of the population by “hitch-hiking”; that is, when a
170 Sarkar, Sahotra. “On The Possibility of Directed Mutations in Bacteria: Statistical 
Analyses and Reductionist Strategies” Philosophy of Science Association 1990 
Volume 1, pp. 111-124
171 Taddei, F., Radman, M ,Maynard Smith, J., Toupance, B., Gouyon, P.H., Godelle, 
B. “Role of mutator alleles in adaptive evolution” Nature 387 (1997) pp 700-704
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mutator clone is associated with a favourable mutation, it increases in frequency. Once 
the adaptation is spread, the mutator genotype can then revert to its normal 
antimutator mechanisms.
This proposal thus identifies two “tracks” in evolution by which a population 
can adapt to an environment. One is the standard neo-Darwinism “slow track” 
approach, where favourable mutations appear in a non-mutator background, by 
chance, and spread through the population through simple selection. The “fast track” 
approach takes place through the use of mutator clones, which can facilitate adaptation 
occasionally through the process described above. Maynard Smith clearly thinks that 
this scenario, which is much more orthodox in terms of its commitment to the neo- 
Darwinist view of heredity and natural selection, is a more likely explanation for the 
kinds of results Cairns identifies.
Cairns’ directed mutation hypothesis claims that there must be a means for the 
bacterial DNA to reprogram itself that runs counter to the Central Dogma of Biology, 
and thus is Lamarckist in character Thus, Cairns theorises that a mechanism must exist 
for the transfer of information from the protein back to the genome of the cell 
However, Cairns has not yet disclosed a mechanism by which transmission from 
protein to genome can occur. Sarkar concludes that until this is done, the statistical 
methodologies purporting to show the existence of directed mutation are useless The 
debate about the existence of directed mutation exhibits the kind of neo-Lakatosian 
dynamics that 1 have described throughout this thesis to accommodate the anomaly 
that directed mutations represen^, neo-Darwinism puts the burden of proof on the 
claimant: a mechanism must be supplied in order for directed mutation to be taken at 
all seriously. But what kind of mechanism would be acceptable seems to be a matter of 
metaphysical taste Maynard Smith’s favoured explanation does not admit the 
existence of any mechanism that could allow the proteins to reprogram the genes Thus 
the directed mutation that Cairns and his colleagues describe is anomalous in the sense 
that its existence would require a major auxiliary hypothesis to be added to  neo- 
Darwinism, and this auxiliary hypothesis would in fact be inconsistent with the hard 
core of neo-Darwinism. Supporters of the nutritional stress explanation, like Maynard 
Smith, are trying to protect this hard core The assumption that such mechanisms could 
not exist is derived from the hard core of the neo-Darwinist research programme.
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The debate about whether bacteria are Lamarckist can also occur at the 
level of a discussion of randomness with respect to adaptive advantage. But I will 
argue that at another level of analysis, the Darwinist/Lamarckist debate about bacteria 
has even stronger implications for neo-Darwinism as a research programme. For at the 
level of bacterial horizontal gene transfer as a mechanism for the generation of 
variation among bacteria, the issue can no longer be thought of as strictly Darwin 
versus Lamarck. In fact, this whole dichotomy is dissolved, and this has profound 
implications for neo-Darwinism as an explanatory theory.
5.4 Horizontal Gene Transfer
In the 1950’s and 60’s, it slowly became clear that the selective conservation of 
favourable random mutations was not the means by which bacteria generated drug 
resistance Rather than accumulated random mutations, bacteria instead obtained and 
spread drug resistance through a variety of other hereditary and cellular mechanisms 
which can be grouped under the term “horizontal gene transfer”. Horizontal transfer 
implies that one bacterium can insert genetic material into another, unrelated bacterium 
or bacteria, through the mechanisms of bacterial ‘sex’.
Bacteria are quite distinct from other forms of life in their sexual behaviour 
(although bacteria are technically asexual), where ‘sexual’ merely describes the 
mechanisms by which genetic material is transferred I will call these processes 
“bacterial sex” to denote them as reproduction conceived of as the generation of 
variants.172
The mechanisms of bacterial sex have led some to propose that the whole 
bacterial community must be seen as consisting in a single, heterogeneous, 
multicellular “organism” in which genetic material is in continual flux, moving from 
one group of cells to another, and where a single pool of genetic information is
172 For bacteria in general, I would recommend the use of the term “propagation” over 
“reproduction” . For reason that will become clear, bacteria are not in the business of 
faithful copying of internally cohesive genetic material; they are much more in the 
business of stealing genetic information from their environments, by any means 
available. The term reproduction is not really applicable to  bacteria, in the sense that 
bacterial division is reproductive only in the replicative sense.
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accessible to virtually every bacterial cell.173 This proposal is echoed in Margulis and 
Sagan’s remark that “Evolution is no linear family tree but change in the single, 
multidimensional being that has grown now to cover the entire surface of Earth” 174 
This consequence of the importance of bacterial horizontal gene transfer leads to some 
interesting possibilities in the area of taxonomy, for Sorin Sonea and Margulis have 
also recommended that “If the standard definition of species, a group o f organisms that 
interbreed only among themselves, is applied to bacteria, then all bacteria belong 
worldwide to a single species ”175
173 Amabile-Cuevas, Carlos F. and Chicurel, Marina E. “Bacterial Plasmids and Gene 
Flux” Cell Vol. 70 (July 24 1992), 189-199; Sonea, S. “Bacterial Evolution without 
Speciation” in Symbiosis as a Source o f Evolutionary Innovation: Speciation and 
Morphogenesis pp. 95-105
174 Margulis, Lynn and Sagan, Dorion What is Life? p. 73
175 Ibid. The difficult of arranging an honest taxonomy of viruses and bacteria throws 
up many methodological and philosophical problems. The relationship between viruses 
and bacteria is complex, and they are traditionally set apart from one another 
taxonomically, since it is recognised that viruses need hosts to replicate, while bacteria 
are capable of self-reproduction on their own However, it could easily be maintained 
that viruses are more closely related to their bacterial host/symbionts than to each 
other. The two basic schools of thought about taxonomy, the phenetic approach and 
the phylogenetic approach, both have difficulty accounting for the bacterial/viral axis 
of evolutionary relationships. The pheneticists seek to group organisms through an 
ordering of their external phenotypic characteristics. But the phenetic approach has 
largely been abandoned in the case of bacteria, which simply do not display a wide 
enough range of different phenotypic traits needed for such a taxonomic approach. The 
phylogeneticists, on the other hand, are more concerned that taxonomy reflect actual 
evolutionary lineage and “relatedness” of organisms But the phylogenetic approach 
relies on two distinct criteria to assess this relatedness, both of which are inapplicable 
to bacteria and viruses Some phylogeneticists rely on what is known of as the 
Biological Species Concept (BSC), which states that “species are groups of 
interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other such 
groups.” [E. Mayr. “Species Concepts and Their Application”, in Philosophy of 
Biology, ed. Michael Ruse (New York: Macmillan 1989) p. 138] Asexually 
reproducing organisms like bacteria, along with their viral counterparts, cannot be said 
to be reproductively isolated in any real sense, since they swap genetic information so 
readily The only way they are reproductively isolated in that they do not need other 
bacteria to mate with to reproduce, they simply divide According to the BSC, then, all 
bacteria would be members of the same species. The second phylogenetic taxonomic 
criterion is monophyly, which is insisted upon in the cladist approach. The cladist 
approach claims that since taxonomy should accurately reflect evolutionary lineage, a 
species should be a lineage that shares descent from one common set of ancestors. 
High rates of genetic interchange among bacteria mean that this “unique common 
ancestor” might be very hard to determine. Insistence on monophyly would lead to the 
bizarre result that a species of bacteria, composed of a single bacterium and all it 
descendants, might last only for hours or minutes, and each petri dish in all the
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So, for bacteria, horizontal gene transfer is not only available, but perhaps 
even ubiquitous. The mechanisms by which this type of gene transfer can occur each 
have different, but nevertheless considerable, consequences for neo-Darwinism as a 
research programme. We will now discuss the tliree mechanisms of transformation, 
transduction, and conjugation in turn.
5.4.1 Transformation
The first category of bacterial sex is called transformation. Transformation describes 
the uptake of genetic material in the external medium by a bacterium This process 
seems to be fairly random, and any portion of the available genetic material, whether it 
is in fragmented form or as a plasmid, may be taken up and incorporated into the cell. 
This type o f genetic exchange is perhaps not anomalous with regard to neo-Darwinism 
because o f its random nature. The Darwinist story of evolution insists upon the random 
generation of variants that are selectively culled by the environment At least in 
transformation, the uptake of extraneous genetic material is uncorrelated with adaptive 
benefit It is therefore possible to regard transformation in two different ways If we 
focus on the fact that this process seems to be random with regard to benefit .that is, 
that bacteria take up any extant genetic material that happens to be around--it can be 
argued that this process is perfectly compatible with neo-Darwinism in the sense that it 
does not entail that the bacteria are here evolving with any adaptive benefit in mind.
However, the fact that bacteria are here taking up genetic material from their
immediate environment means that it could be seen as more Lamarckist in character,
since the environment is directly affecting the genetic material of the organism in
question. Transformation allows alteration of the bacterial genome through direct
<K
contact with extraneous environmental genetic material This is^kind of utilisation of 
the environment that is not usually thought to be present in the more complex
laboratories in the world would each contain separate monophyletic bacterial species. 
Bacterial taxonomy is today in a state of flux, under contention from not only 
systematists, but microbiologists, virologists, and pathologists The discovery of 
“archaebacteria”, an ancient lineage of bacteria which have genes in common with both 
prokaryotes and eukaryotes, has caused further consternation about the traditional 
taxonomic distinction between prokaryotes and eukaryotes How this matter will 
eventually be resolved should be of much interest, as it may have ramifications for neo- 
Darwinism itself as a theoretical framework See for instance Dupre, Shostak and Hull 
(works cited in bibliography) for more on the issue of taxonomy.
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organisms that neo-Darwinism describes. In transformation, bacteria are able to take 
up already existing genetic components from their environment wholesale. The neo- 
Darwinist constraint on evolution by the piecemeal accumulation of random variations 
is not present.
Even if this process is random with respect to adaptive benefit, it is a type of 
horizontal heredity that neo-Darwinism does not have much to say about. Given that 
there is no ‘Weismann Barrier’ in the form of the nucleus to break through in the case 
of bacteria, we might again conclude that since bacteria cannot violate a non-existent 
prohibition of neo-Darwinism they are perfectly compatible with neo-Darwinism. But 
the fact o f horizontal gene transfer direct from environment to organism might make a 
clean distinction between ‘organism’ and ‘environment’ problematic, even if the 
organism is treated only as its genomic complement The mechanisms of the Weismann 
Barrier and the Central Dogma both codify the direction of information flow,* they 
both serve to schematise a distinction between the organism and the environment. This 
distinction is put at risk by bacterial horizontal gene transfer, so although bacteria may 
not violate any of the explicit mechanisms of neo-Darwinism, they may affect the 
metaphysical assumptions of the neo-Darwinist research programme.
Thus, bacterial transformation may problematise a distinction between 
organism and environment. If this is the case, then it is no longer a question of whether 
bacterial evolution is Lamarckist because it is in some sense anti-neo-Darwinist If the 
mechanisms of bacterial propagation and variation are not specifically outlawed by 
neo-Darwinism, it may be that bacteria are simply outside the scope of neo-Darwinism 
If this is the case, then the neo-Darwinist research programme needs only add an 
auxiliary hypothesis to accommodate them. But this auxiliary hypothesis would have to 
have the effect of allowing an organism/environment distinction to be blurred, in order 
to accommodate the fact that bacterial transformation means that the external 
environmental genetic material and the internal bacterial genome are capable of being 
united into a functional entity which is neither organism nor environment, but an 
uneasy fusion of the two. This type o f auxiliary hypothesis would in turn problematise 
neo-Darwinism’s metaphysical strictures against Lamarckism itself, or at the very least 
it might make the metaphysics of neo-Darwinism unstable
If the organism/environment distinction is affected by transformation, then it is 
even more affected by transduction. In transduction, we see an even further confusion
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of the supposedly stable entities of evolutionary theory, this time because of the 
possibility of symbiotic relationships which are more intimate than the types of 
relationships that were discussed in chapter 4.
5.4.2 Transduction
In chapter 4 it was noted that if symbiosis means nothing more than a recommendation 
of cooperation over competition, or a dismissal of the role of random mutations that is 
really a dismissal of the supposed ‘gradualism’ of neo-Darwinism, then it is not likely 
to be taken seriously as a real challenge to neo-Darwinism Furthermore, if symbiosis is 
taken as mere ‘mutualism’ or a consideration of cooperation between members of the 
same species as “kin selection”, then it has little to offer as a research programme other 
than a slight change in perspective. But if it were the case that symbiosis offered not 
only a reappraisal, but a disruption of the fundamental entities that form the basis of 
evolutionary explanation, then it would be a real challenge indeed I will now argue 
that it can do this, specifically when we consider the symbioses that bacterial 
transduction entails.
The second category of bacterial sex is transduction. Transduction is the 
uptake of genetic material through viral vectors, and it seems to be the most common 
means of bacterial genetic exchange and recombination. When exposed to ultraviolet 
radiation, otherwise healthy bacteria may explode, releasing many tiny virus-like 
entities called prophages, which can spread genes to other bacteria.176 Viruses which 
‘infect’ bacteria donate genetic information to a prokaryotic cell, and this need not 
always be fatal Bacteria are in a highly symbiotic relationship with viruses in the sense 
that the viruses are often the means by which bacteria obtain variation in their genetic 
material, and viruses are integral to bacterial ‘sex’. Viruses can take genetic material 
from one host and transfer it to another, completely different host Thus the process of 
transduction is able to move any sort of gene from one bacterial host to another 177
176 Margulis and Sagan, What is life?, p 74 Margulis hypothesises that this type of 
transduction may have been more prevalent on the early UV bombarded earth, before 
the atmosphere was in place to protect against UV rays
177 Jacob, François and Wollman, Elie L. “Viruses and Genes” (Scientific American. X  
June 1961) in Ihe Living Cell: Readings from Scientific American (WH Freeman and
Co. San Francisco 1961) p. 23
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This type of genetic exchange is an excellent example of the importance of 
symbiosis in evolution. Though the virus needs the machinery o f  the bacteria to 
reproduce itself, the virus is not necessarily in a simple parasitic relationship with the 
bacteria, although the bacteria are infected by the virus. The virus, through infecting 
the bacteria, is using the bacteria as a factory to replicate its genetic material. Yet the 
virus can also often confer beneficial genetic material on the bacteria. Viral genetic 
material can become active and cause the bacteria to make replicas of it and explode, 
releasing the copied virus, or alternatively it can behave as an inert part of the bacterial 
chromosome. When it becomes inert and integrated into the bacterial chromosome, it 
can confer upon its bacterial host a resistance to other viruses. Thus the bacteria can 
obtain immunity from viruses as a result of viral infection
To recall some of the discussion in the previous chapter about symbiosis and 
the difficulty in treating this concept as merely an index of the relative ‘altruism’ 
involved in association between organisms, we can note that the nature of the 
symbiotic relationship in the bacteria/virus transduction situation is not obviously a 
strictly parasitic one. Neither is it one of simple altruism, nor one where each party 
gains equal benefit The obvious question in such close symbiotic relationships is how 
to distinguish parasitic from altruistic symbiotic relationships Any attempt to delineate 
strict definitions of the character of relationships in this domain will call into question 
the status of the ‘organism’ in such contexts. Since the genetic material is transferred 
between bacteria and viruses in this relationship, and this genetic material can play 
quite different roles in each, it is not quite clear whose genetic material it is, or even 
who gets greater benefit If, as is often recommended, we define the organism in terms 
of its unique genetic identity, or genomic components, it is difficult to isolate the 
organism in such closely symbiotic relationships Furthermore, it is clear that 
definitions like “parasitic” or “altruistic” have no place in these symbiotic relationships. 
Since the genetic exchange cannot be easily said to benefit one organism over another, 
it may be that these types of strategies are in the interest of a higher-level 
organisational plane, and indeed, may problematise the very idea of ‘being in the 
interest o f .
Quite what the environment consists of in this type of relationship is similarly 
not immediately clear. Certainly it is different l^mthe neo-Darwinist view of the 
organism/environment distinction. In neo-Darwinism, evolution is conceived of in
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terms of the environment acting to select organisms, the organisms are relatively stable 
and the environment is the parameters or variables In ecology, the environment is seen 
as the stable element, and the organisms that make it up are the unstable, relatively 
fast-moving parameter variables. In a closely symbiotic relationship, each organism is 
the other’s environment. The easy separation between them that evolutionary theory 
calls for thus breaks down.
Again, transduction could be treated as compatible with neo-Darwinism, since 
it is not obviously Lamarckist in the sense of violating acceptable mechanisms in neo- 
Darwinism. But it is equally clear that neo-Darwinism does not really fully embrace any 
process through which the organism/environment distinction breaks down, or any of its 
functional analogues (i.e a genotype/phenotype distinction). Furthermore, in this case, 
not only is the distinction between organism and environment blurred (as in the case of 
transformation) but the entities that natural selection is supposed to act upon are also 
made more complex by the addition of a symbiotic partner or host, whose own 
environmental parameters might be different from those of the symbiotic partner The 
fact that the genome of each symbiotic partner is integral to the function of the other in 
terms of survival and reproduction makes it clear that the ‘individual organism’ is hard 
to individuate, and certainly this entity is far from stable in a bacterial/viral 
reproductive symbiosis. It might be thought that the symbiotic relationship between 
virus and bacteria could be simply explained away by neo-Darwinism by treating the 
symbiotic complex itself as a kind of individual which is available to selection as a 
whole But since the bacteria can gain immunity from viral infections sometimes, and at 
other times these infection^an be fatal, there is clearly no higher level stability available 
for this move to be made to accommodate symbiosis in this way. Additionally, 
horizontal gene transfer between viruses and bacteria entails mutual reprogramming of 
the genome in symbiotic vira^acterial relationships, which also prevents this symbiosis 
from becoming stable enough to be treated as a kind of higher-level ‘organism’ in its 
own right.
Transformation and transduction both complicate things for neo-Darwinism, by 
calling into question the distinction between organism and environment, and by 
yielding an unstable symbiotic entity which is required by neo-Darwinism to be stable. 
Conjugation, the third mechanism of bacterial sex, has been immensely important in
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evolutionary history, and yet its very existence is especially problematic for neo- 
Darwinism.
5.4.3 Conjugation
The third category of bacterial sex is conjugation. Conjugation is the process by which 
bacteria exchange genetic material through direct cell-to-cell contact. A small ring of 
DNA called the conjugation plasmid in the donor cell forms a sex pilus (a long tubular 
structure) that connects the recipient cell and the donor cell, and the genetic material is 
transferred by use of the pilus. The action of cell-to-cell contact activates replication of 
the DNA in the conjugation plasmid, and this DNA, once ‘injected’ into the recipient 
cell, replicates within it and then goes on to conjugate with other recipients
This genetic material for the sex pilus is, importantly, self-transmissible That is, 
the genetic material encodes the information for the construction of its own pilus to be 
used for its dissemination in other bacteria Though the pilus plasmid is self- 
transmissible, it cannot necessarily replicate in every bacterial host. Some pilus 
plasmids are more promiscuous than others, however. In fact, the more promiscuous 
plasmids can engage not only other bacteria, but even more distantly related 
eukaryotes in conjugation. It has been conjectured that conjugation with its 
concomitant gene transfer may have occurred between species of different kingdoms 
It has been argued that this process has been immensely important in the evolutionary 
history of life on this planet, not just for bacteria themselves, but between all types of 
life: bacteria, plants, and fungi178 This interkingdom reproductive relationship is 
definitely outlawed by neo-Darwinism, where the constraints on the vectors of genetic 
information are very controlled indeed. Conjugation is very worthy of interest, since it 
means that just about any organism can receive genetic components from any other 
Not only this, but it seems to be a case of heredity that is quite unconnected with any 
known form of replication mechanism.
178 Amâbile-Cuevas, Carlos F. and Chicurel, Marina E. “Bacterial Plasmids and Gene 
Flux” Cell Vol 70 (July 24 1992), 189-199; Dahlberg, C., Bergstrom, M., Andreasen 
M., Christensen B.B, Molin S., Hermansson, M “Interspecies bacterial conjugation by 
plasmids from marine environments visualized by gfp expression” Molecular Biology 
and Evolution vol. 15 no. 4 (1998), 385-390
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We have seen that the nucleus, and the doctrine of Weismann, requires that no 
extracellular genetic material can penetrate the nuclear barrier and reprogram the 
genome of the eukaryotic organism. The environment, then, can never affect the actual 
genes of the organism, but can only select the somatic components of the organism. 
But in conjugation the external environment is directly affecting the genome of another 
organism, and worse, conjugation is able to penetrate the nucleus of eukaryotes and 
insert itself into the genome, thus even violating the Weismann Barrier.
Because conjugation is somewhat like viral transduction, although not requiring 
a viral agent, the concept of the organism is further complicated by conjugation 
plasmids Conjugation plasmids are self-replicating, but unlike viruses, they are not 
inert when not in contact with a bacterial host. Above it was noted that the symbiotic 
relationship between viruses and bacteria in transformation and transduction called the 
concepts of the organism as well as the concept of the environment into question. The 
case of conjugation similarly disturbs a definition o f an organism, even if the organism 
is treated as its unique genotype alone. The plasmid is certainly a part of the bacterial 
genome in a way that viral DNA is not, but clearly the plasmid has its own agenda, 
which has little to do with the bacterium as an organism The plasmid factor is 
simultaneously an internal part of the bacterial genome, and an external component 
that functions as an infectious agent Neo-Darwinism has little to say about this type of 
heredity.
Conjugation can also be used in obtaining drug resistance, and this can happen 
even when living and dead cells are mixed together. It appears that even dead cells are 
capable of conjugation I think it is safe to say that genetic exchange between living 
and dead organisms is somewhat outside the scope of neo-Darwinism Jack Heineman 
puts the importance o f conjugation in very clear terms:
Plasmids reproduce by horizontal transfer to organism of at least three 
different biological kingdoms—a microbiological ‘bestiality’ of sorts.
The apparent promiscuity of plasmids violates teleological 
preconceptions about their function In assuming that plasmids encoded 
sexual attributes of prokaryotes, the unexpressed expectation was that 
the potential for genes to transfer among bacteria, and from bacteria to 
eukaryotes, would be limited in the same way that recombination is
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between multicellular creatures of different species When genes were 
seen to exchange between prokaryotes o f different genera, ‘bacterial 
sex’ was viewed as either altruistic (donation of beneficial genes, such 
as antibiotic or phage resistance, to potential competitors) or as 
understandable as an example of selfish plasmid replication. [...] The 
barriers to plasmid transmission have been routinely overestimated.” 179
5.5 Conclusion
We can now see exactly how these three types o f bacterial sex affect neo-Darwinism 
In each case, it becomes difficult to pick out a stable entity that is an ‘organism’. 
Worse, we cannot even pick out a unique genotype that might be a unit of selection, as 
Dawkins’ genic selectionism recommends As we saw earlier in the cases of 
transduction and conjugation, the genetic material in the form of the phage or plasmid 
is functioning in a very external manner Though it is endogenous to the bacterium at 
certain stages, it is not really a permanent part o f the genome, and thus is not in this 
sense a part of the organism. As an external element, it is not available as a target of 
natural selection in the same way a genotype or phenotype might be. And symbiotic 
relationships between bacteria and viruses, which occur at the level of the genome, 
similarly make it difficult to delineate a stable genome.
To conclude, we may recall the effects of these horizontal gene transfer events 
might have on neo-Darwinism as a theory. Because the Weismann Barrier does not 
hold for bacteria, since they do not have nuclei, we cannot say that bacteria are 
Lamarckist, since they do not violate this type of anti-Lamarckist stricture. But 
certainly they are not particularly Darwinist either, since what they do problematises 
some of the basic metaphysical assumptions of neo-Darwinism. One may conclude that 
they are outside the scope of neo-Darwinism But if this is true, certain conclusions are 
unavoidable. If bacteria are outside the scope of neo-Darwinism, and bacteria 
constitute 97% of life on Earth, then neo-Darwinism is therefore a theory that has very 
limited scope, and describes only the evolution o f a tiny proportion of organisms.
179 Heineman, Jack A “Looking sideways at the evolution of replicons” in Horizontal 
Gene Transfer eds Michael Syvanen and Clarence I Kado (London: Chapman and 
Hall, 1998) p 14, 18
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X  But^ if bacteria are not outside the scope of neo-Darwinism, and may be 
accommodated by it by the addition of certain auxiliary hypotheses which would 
explain them away, then the effects of these additional auxiliary hypotheses on the neo- 
Darwinism research programme must be examined. These auxiliary hypotheses would 
have to have the effect of allowing an organism/environment distinction to be blurred, 
since the fact of horizontal gene transfer makes the delineation of stable evolutionary 
entities problematic. If the stability of these entities is allowed to be called into 
question, the neo-Darwinist research programme might be rendered entirely 
unrecognisable as neo-Darwinism.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: Lessons for the Philosophy of Biology and 
Evolutionary Theory
6.1 Summary of the Results
We can now review the major points that have been raised by the inquiry of this thesis. 
First, let us review the results of part I, chapters 2 and 3, the analysis of Darwinism and 
the move to neo-Darwinism, using the methodology outlined in chapter 1. It was noted 
there that Darwinism itself was initially consistent with many metaphysical views 
concerning the nature of the living, some of which were teleological and finalist. These 
were eventually pushed to the side by the mechanisms neo-Darwinism increasingly 
began to depend upon, and these mechanisms ruled out any teleological or vitalist 
interpretations by prohibiting Lamarckist heredity. Thus, it was affirmed that natural 
selection was not a force that moved evolution toward any final goal, and it was not a 
creative force, or at least, it was only creative insofar as it preserved adaptations that 
were already created, by whatever means. In chapter 3 it was shown that this 
definition was all that neo-Darwinism had to say about what natural selection is: that 
is, it was defined by what it was not, in the sense that the ways the three elements 
worked in relation to each other (natural selection culling unfit variations after these 
variations were present) determined how natural selection acted. Natural selection 
could not be defined as a principle, or a law or a force in itself, this decision could only 
be made by reference to the interdefinition of natural selection with variation and 
selection.
Similarly, variation was initially able to fit within various metaphysical views of 
life; it could be seen as either the mere ‘raw material’ for natural selection to act upon, 
and variation or change toward an environment. Again, the neo-Darwinist prohibition 
of Lamarckist modes of evolution meant that the organisms could not invent variations 
that were better suited to their environment, there was no change in organisms through 
use and disuse The anti-Lamarckist relationship between the organism and the 
environment took shape in the form the mechanism which postulated that the organism 
only passively responded to the environment, and did not react positively in any way.
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way. This meant that variations had to be formed in a random, or chance way; 
variation had to be random with respect to adaptive advantage. The use of statistical 
methods to describe the frequency of variations in a population lent further credence to 
the view that evolution was in some sense a random process, or at least one with an 
inbuilt chance element. But this led to the drifter/selectionist argument during the 
formation of neo-Darwinism: was variation random, but natural selection non-random? 
Was natural selection itself a random process in some way? And could a random 
process really explain the complexity of life? This argument was considered in chapter 
3, and there it was concluded that randomness was only defined as random with 
respect to adaptive advantage, whilst the precise location, function and importance of 
randomness was never fully agreed upon. Variation was generated in the organism 
through some kind of random process, since this variation could only be undirected. 
The environment through the action of natural selection directed the further progress 
of these undirected or chance changes.
In the case of heredity too, it was initially possible for heredity itself to actively 
work toward an environmental goal, in Lamarck, this was essential, through the action 
of use and disuse, and the inheritance of acquired characteristics. By these means, the 
changes that the environment required could be passed on to offspring in their totality, 
and evolution could, in theory, work much more quickly. If organisms could use 
changes inherited by their parents through the inheritance of acquired characteristics, 
then evolution could work in quick jumps, not through slow changes in each 
generation of organisms. However, these possible mechanisms of heredity were ruled 
out by the neo-Darwinist synthesis, when the particulate notion of heredity and the 
Weismann Barrier were adopted. This served to curtail the flow of information from 
organism to environment in such a way that reflected what has already been said about 
variation and natural selection. The Central Dogma of Biology, that information 
flowed from DNA to RNA to protein, but never from protein back to DNA, 
strengthened this one-way flow of information at the molecular level. The organism 
could not take up adaptive information from its environment and use it to change its 
own genetic code. In chapter 3, it was noted that information, a concept often 
depended upon for these kinds of interpretations of heredity, was by no means easy to 
define in itself. Information was necessary in the definition of heredity as a mechanism 
that copied and transmitted variations in an organism from parent to offspring, but it
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was never fully defined, All that was settled was that information flowed directly from 
organism to environment, and only indirectly from environment to organism The 
organism was passively selected by the environment, but it could not gain adaptations 
directly from it. Slow, gradual evolution through random changes acted upon by 
natural selection was the resultant interpretation settled upon through the changes to 
heredity.
Part II of this thesis attempted to address the symbiosis challenge to neo- 
Darwinism in the context of the characterisation of neo-Darwinism offered in part I. In 
order to do this, we teased apart some of the many claims of proponents o f symbiosis 
in their criticism of neo-Darwinism. Symbiosis, because it takes cooperation as a 
prominent evolutionary process, criticises neo-Darwinism for its insistence on 
competition as a characterisation of natural selection It was concluded that natural 
selection does not presuppose competition, as the symbiotic criticism claims, but it was 
also noted that cooperation between organisms that are of different, unrelated species 
is not addressed very effectively by neo-Darwinism So although neo-Darwinism’s 
construal of natural selection does not entail that natural selection works solely 
through competition, neo-Darwinism fails to come to terms with symbiosis as 
cooperative. But this, I concluded, did not mean that symbiosis offered a fundamental 
challenge to neo-Darwinism, since I argued that a cooperative and a competitive 
description of evolution would not be sufficiently distinct from one another. Each 
would offer an equivalent explanation of evolution, and for this reason this particular 
criticism of neo-Darwinism does not succeed as a new conception of evolution that 
neo-Darwinism could not accept All that would be needed is for “organism” to be 
replaced with “cooperative symbiotic entity”, both of these would be available to the 
action of natural selection as adaptations in the neo-Darwinist sense.
The symbiotic position^ that symbiosis provided a source of evolutionary 
innovation above and beyond that accepted by neo-Darwinism,can also be dealt with in 
the same way: for neo-Darwinism does not have any strictures on where variation can 
come from other than the anti-Lamarckist constraint that these variations cannot come 
directly through the environment or through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
Symbiosis as the cooperative relationship between two related or unrelated organisms 
does not appear to violate neo-Darwinism on this level, at least But if we say of a 
symbiotic entity that one organism is the other’s environment, and vice versa, there
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may be something in this. But as before, this symbiotic entity is itself available to 
natural selection as a unit of evolution, then the switch between the two terms of 
organism and environment might not make much difference. And if symbiosis claims 
that this source of evolutionary innovation consists of more than mere random 
mutation, then even this is not enough to challenge neo-Darwinism. Neo-Darwinism 
does not depend on random mutation, but it does depend upon randomness with 
respect to adaptive advantage. So neo-Darwinism can accommodate symbiosis as a 
source of innovation or variation, all it needs to do is replace “mutation” with 
“symbiotic innovation”. This symbiosis criticism of neo-Darwinism, if it is no more 
than a claim about the speed of evolution, is not a challenge to neo-Darwinism, for 
neo-Darwinism itself does not claim anything about the speed of evolution on any time 
scale.
But if this claim about symbiosis as providing a source of evolutionary 
innovation actually means that symbiosis is more than random, but in fact is directed, 
or Lamarckist, then this would violate neo-Darwinism’s fundamental metaphysical 
assumptions Do symbiotic innovations involve Lamarckist heredity? They may, if it is 
the case that in any symbiotic complex one organism is the other one’s environment, 
and if this means more than the postulation of an entity on a higher level of 
organisation. That is, if one is the other’s environment, then this union might be treated 
as a kind of ‘superorganism’ which is composed of more than one part But this 
relationship might rather blur the distinction between organism and environment in 
such a way that the neo-Darwinist anti-Lamarckist metaphysics becomes unstable. In 
order for neo-Darwinism to even be anti-Lamarckist and anti-teleological, then some 
separation between organism and environment must be in place, since this is the basis 
of its metaphysical commitments. In a sense, this is neo-Darwinism’s account of 
individuation, and this, if threatened, would present a fundamental challenge to neo- 
Darwinism.
Chapter 5 showed that there are a large number of organisms that do this, and 
these organisms, bacteria, are not only good examples of symbiosis, but furthermore, 
the biological processes they exhibit seem to threaten neo-Darwinism on a fundamental 
level. Horizontal gene transfer in particular does this. There are two possible outcomes 
from this: we might conclude that neo-Darwinism is certainly useful for describing
organisms which do not engage in horizontal gene transfer, for instance, complex
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organisms like eukaryotes (although there is some evidence at present that horizontal 
gene transfer can occur even in eukaryotes). This would mean that neo-Darwinism, far 
from being a theory which explains evolution on any level, would instead be a limited 
and narrow theory which described only a small percentage of organisms. Second, 
perhaps it is the case that neo-Darwinism can accommodate these processes which 
seem to challenge it, by changing some o f its commitments to deal with them. If this is 
the case, then what sorts of changes would be necessary? And what would these 
changes mean for evolutionary theory in terms of explanation? We may now address 
both of these possible conclusions.
6.2 The Limitations of Neo-Darwinism
The modem evolutionary paradigm of neo-Darwinism is increasingly relied upon in 
popular and technical literature alike to cast light on issues in disciplines as wide and 
varied as consciousness, sociology, history, psychology and many others This in itself 
is nothing new,'contemporary readers of Darwin (as well as Darwin himself) used the 
power of the theory of evolution by natural selection to explain issues outside of the 
realm of the strictly biological The popularisation of Darwin and neo-Darwinism has 
contributed to the extension of neo-Darwinist explanation to many wide and varied 
fields. Given this, this possibility that neo-Darwinism may be incomplete or of limited 
scope becomes more significant.
Of course, few people claim that neo-Darwinism is really complete: it is clear 
that neo-Darwinism is a changing theory, and probably not the final word on evolution 
And as this thesis has showed, it is still the case that neo-Darwinism can admit of 
multiple interpretations, and such debate is not only inescapable, but healthy And it is 
equally clear that just about every scientific theory has its theoretical shortcomings 
This is not thought to be a problem by either science or philosophy When a theory is 
incomplete, it does not need to be jettisoned, but only needs to be adjusted so that it 
may become more complete
So perhaps it is not a question of neo-Darwinism being incomplete, and by this 
token potentially completable, but rather that neo-Darwinism is simply limited. If neo- 
Darwinism simply described the evolution of eukaryotes, then perhaps another theory 
is needed to describe what neo-Darwinism cannot: the prokaryotes. Maybe an
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additional theoretical apparatus could complement neo-Darwinism in this way. But one 
must also ask whether the addition of this extra theoretical apparatus would change the 
fundamental metaphysical core of neo-Darwinism If the addition of extra mechanisms 
affects the metaphysics of the theory, the theory itself might be completely 
transformed
At this stage it would be worth addressing the field of biology which is most 
concerned with bacteria and see what types o f theoretical contributions it might bring 
to such an additional theory. Microbiology, pathology, and virology are perhaps the 
main research areas which deal with the processes that bacteria exhibit, and we might 
ask what interest it takes in neo-Darwinism as a background assumption in biology 
Furthermore, we might ask whether the field o f microbiology shows any areas in which 
the themes of this thesis might become profitable
It has already been noted that the asexual nature of bacteria does cause some 
problems for taxonomy, if taxonomy intends to categorise organisms through their 
inability to mate with other organisms Nonetheless, it is worth recognising that 
bacteria are not generally thought to be inimical to taxonomy by microbiology or neo- 
Darwinism,-it is simply recognised that they must be treated as a special case. The 
technology of microbiology today has made available many complete genomic maps of 
bacteria, and this information has been used to approach a taxonomy of bacteria and of 
viruses that is thought to accurately express evolutionary relatedness between 
organisms, in much the same way that “DNA fingerprinting” is used to establish 
relatedness among more complex organisms such as animals and humans Furthermore, 
the technology of “gene-splicing” has become very prominent in microbiology, leading 
to the many industrial technologies such as oil-eating microbes, and also to the 
development of GM foods. It seems that microbiology does have a firm grasp on 
technology, and perhaps it is possible to state that microbiology’s ‘theories’ are not 
those of neo-Darwinism, but more along the lines of those of engineering or any other 
applied science. Perhaps microbiology does not ask the question “how do we explain 
the evolution of these organisms?” except for the purpose of gaining information about 
how the evolution of bacteria might make available new technologies. If this is the 
case, perhaps microbiology no longer needs a neo-Darwinist explanation of evolution.
However, it is worth bearing in mind at least a few of the criticisms of these 
kinds of technologies For instance, one o f the major criticisms of GM food
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technologies, apart from those criticisms which question whether eating GM foods 
might be actually harmful to humans, is the possibility that such ‘unnatural’ genes 
(which are often of bacterial origin), if inserted into plants, may spread of their own 
accord to other types of organisms, thus affecting the entire ecology of areas in which 
GM foods are grown. This is a question that cannot be answered by technology alone, 
nor can it be answered by neo-Darwinism alone, for reasons which I hope this thesis 
has made clear. For neo-Darwinism is not even in a position to admit that evolution 
can occur through such a horizontal, Lamarckist mechanism, much less can it assess 
the frequency of this mechanism on an evolutionary scale.
How can such questions be framed so that the risks of GM technologies can be 
assessed? At least, there must be more interest in finding out exactly how prominent 
horizontal gene transfer is in evolution as a whole, and this is obviously being closely 
examined at the moment. Moreover, this examination of the role of horizontal gene 
transfer must be looked at as an evolutionary strategy as well, and this means that it 
must be viewed as more than simply an ‘adaptive mechanism’ for bacteria or viruses. 
As this thesis has shown, the phenomenon of horizontal gene transfer involves 
organisms of different species, and it is not helpful to treat these organisms as merely 
‘hosts’ or ‘parasites’. Nor is it helpful to treat any relationships which involve 
symbiotic horizontal gene transfer as ‘mutualist’ partners, or as a ‘cooperative whole’, 
for this simply reverses the terms by which the explanation would function. As this 
thesis has argued, explaining an evolutionary strategy that involves symbiosis must do 
more than explain this as a host-parasite interaction, for it is clear that in many cases 
the relationship is not simply one-sided, and the ‘host’ often cannot survive without its 
‘parasite’ But it is also unhelpful to view these symbiotic relationships as 
‘cooperatives’ unless one is able to explain how this ‘cooperation’ addresses the 
various strategies of its participants, for it is equally clear that these strategies may be 
directed toward different goals for each participant. If ‘cooperation’ rather than 
‘competition’ is selected for, then it must be shown how and why this occurs, and neo- 
Darwinism seems quite unable to explain this
Microbiology and virology are also concerned to understand the nature of 
pathology, that is to understand how bacteria and viruses work so as to lessen their 
impact in terms of disease. This too, is an area which has made great technological 
leaps, and again, it has been able to gain access not only to genome maps of bacteria
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and viruses, but also to uncover information which gives insight into how viruses and 
bacteria interact between the bacterial cell wall and viral protein coats. The problem of 
drug-resistant bacteria shows the importance of having an understanding of horizontal 
gene transfer very clearly. Since bacteria can gain and transfer immunity to antibiotics 
with ease, then it is clear that simply attacking bacteria with multiple antibiotics will 
only exacerbate the virulence of these bacteria. Placing bacteria in unfriendly 
environments only encourages them to gain resistance by any means possible, the more 
antibiotics, the more multiply-drug-resistant bacteria.
So, if we cannot eliminate dangerous bacteria and viruses, perhaps we can 
disarm them instead. To do this would also entail more interest in the types of 
strategies viruses and bacteria enlist to deal with their environments and propagate 
themselves. And again, it is not advantageous to treat either bacteria or viruses as 
hosts and parasites, nor as cooperative partners which use the genetic information of 
the other to procreate. Instead, these symbiotic relationships work in a different 
manner than other symbioses between different organisms which cooperate, not least 
because of the fact that genes can be passed from on to the other in a fashion which 
seems quite external to either organism Conjugation in particular seems an adaptive 
strategy which belongs to neither the donor or the recipient, and conjugation plasmids 
seem in a sense to have their own agenda Treating bacteria as either selfish, as neo- 
Darwinism appears to, or cooperative, as the symbiotic approach seems to, would not 
capture this.
So we can see that the topics this thesis has addressed do have some 
importance in the field of microbiology, even if it is the case that microbiology does 
not have much interest in the metaphysics and mechanisms identified in this thesis. 
Neo-Darwinism may be simply a limited theory that explains only eukaryotic 
organisms. If this is the case, then perhaps a complementary theory is needed to 
address the prokaryotes and viruses But this complementary theory must not share 
any of the pitfalls of neo-Darwinism if it is to be profitable It must some have means 
of dealing with entities of evolution in a way that does not simply reestablish the 
limitations of neo-Darwinism Nor can it be based on any alternative symbiosis-based 
research programme if this alternative programme simply identifies the same entities 
and mechanisms as neo-Darwinism under a different name This thesis has shown that 
neo-Darwinism is essentially an anti-Lamarckist theory, and by this metaphysical
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constraint it establishes mechanisms which serve to delineate the types of entities it 
uses for the purposes of explanation. It identifies organisms, living in environments, 
and these organisms have adaptive strategies, or fitnesses which are selected for by the 
environment. As an anti-Lamarckist move, it claims that the organism can never 
actively evolve toward an environmental goal. It also picks out entities like genes, 
which determine the phenotype Anti-Lamarckism here is expressed in the claim that 
this phenotype can never reprogram the genotype. The organism/environment, 
genotype/phenotype distinction both expresses and requires the anti-Lamarckist 
constitution of neo-Darwinism as a theory. These distinctions also single out the 
operant entities in evolution for neo-Darwinism. We have seen that these distinctions 
are problematised by bacterial evolution and symbiosis To be a general theory, and not 
just a limited one, neo-Darwinism must become more cognisant of such mechanisms 
of heredity, which it has heretofore viewed as Lamarckist. Thus, perhaps what is 
needed is a view of evolution which transcends the dichotomy between Lamarckism 
and Darwinism, and such a theory might make of neo-Darwinism a general theory that 
explains the evolution of all living things. But, since neo-Darwinism is defined by its 
anti-Lamarckist mechanism and metaphysics, transcending the Lamarckist/Darwinist 
dichotomy might well annihilate neo-Darwinism from the inside
6.3 Transcending the Darwinism/Lamarckism dichotomy
It was argued in this thesis that part o f  the reason Lamarckist modes of heredity and 
evolution were ruled out by neo-Darwinism is because such mechanisms seemed to 
allow the possibility that organisms could actively evolve toward their environment in 
an intentional or teleological fashion. But why should this have been of such concern 
to neo-Darwinism? To begin with, it is perhaps because Darwin’s theory was intended 
as a naturalistic theory of evolution that did not appeal to a Creator, or a 
preestablished plan of nature. Even this did not prevent many German biologists (and 
some English biologists) from interpreting natural selection as a kind of perfecting 
principle. This understanding of natural selection increasingly intersected with the 
belief in a ‘living force’ recommended by vitalism. And those concerned to establish a 
mechanistic view of evolution felt that this was incompatible with Darwinism This 
interpretation claimed Darwinism as a theory which simply described the laws of life,
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and such laws were analogous to Newton’s laws. No vital force was necessary on this 
view.
But it is surely possible to have a vital force that does not operate as any kind 
of perfecting principle, and indeed it is possible to treat natural selection as a force 
which is not goal-directed, although it may still be described as if it were. Jacques 
Monod’s “teleonomy”180 is an attempt to show the latter. One could perhaps describe 
organisms as if they acted toward a goal, but this is just a manner o f speaking; of 
course, natural selection is not really a teleological process. Perhaps neo-Darwinism 
can produce another such adjustment in the face of the issues raised in this thesis.
Perhaps neo-Darwinism can simply accept more of the types of mechanisms 
that it previously outlawed For instance, it might retain the Central Dogma, and 
simply allow any mechanism that does not specifically violate the Central Dogma itself. 
Thus, ‘Lamarckist’ mechanisms would be allowed, but as they came to be assimilated, 
their Lamarckist ‘sting’ would removed Perhaps these mechanisms might even be 
given greater prominence, and perhaps even the role of natural selection could be 
downplayed This then might make neo-Darwinism a more comprehensive theory. In 
this situation, we might say that neo-Darwinism could keep its metaphysics intact, by 
retaining the Central Dogma, but simply add a few extra mechanisms.
But^as I hope this thesis has shown, the kind of mechanisms that are admitted 
into a theory do have an effect on its metaphysical component. The inclusion of these 
extra mechanisms that were previously Lamarckist would entail some significant 
changes to neo-Darwinism. For if these mechanisms placed in question the definition of 
adaptations as random with respect to advantage, even if they did not specifically 
violate the Central Dogma, then neo-Darwinism would lose much o f its metaphysical 
character. If neo-Darwinism were to allow horizontal gene transfer, and bacterial 
horizontal gene transfer is in fact much more ‘directed’ than ‘random’, then this change 
would have to be reflected in the metaphysical core of neo-Darwinism What would a 
neo-Darwinism that allowed directed evolution look like? It might be unrecognisable
Perhaps these mechanisms could be assimilated if one were to simply 
downgrade the role of natural selection There might be less o f a problem with 
‘Lamarckist’ modes of heredity if it turned out that natural selection played a very
180 Monod, Jacques. Chance and Necessity. An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of 
Modern Biology trans. by Austryn Wainhouse (Collins Fontana Books, 1974), chap. 2
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small role in evolution, for then it would be possible to ascribe evolutionary change to 
the ways in which variation is created and managed. But what would neo-Darwinism 
be without natural selection? Downplaying the role of natural selection would leave the 
core of neo-Darwinism empty, for natural selection and variation need one another for 
evolution through the differential survival of variants to occur. And we have seen that 
it is difficult for neo-Darwinism to even distinguish between explanations that rely on 
natural selection and those that rely on the action of random variation. Giving up one 
of them might mean having to give up the other.
So,if it is not possible to assimilate these bacterial mechanisms and still retain 
the metaphysical core of neo-Darwinism, then maybe the metaphysics must be adjusted 
before these mechanisms can fully be integrated into a new theory. Neo-Darwinism is 
negatively defined with respect to Lamarckism, so anything that is not Lamarckist is 
thus acceptable to neo-Darwinism. Neo-Darwinism is so constrained by its anti- 
Lamarckist sentiments that it may be necessary to reevaluate the modes o f evolution 
which are thought to be entailed by Lamarckist commitments This thesis has shown 
that certain hereditary mechanisms that are present in bacteria do not fit into either of 
the categories that neo-Darwinism is so dependent upon for its very identity They are 
neither Darwinist, nor are they Lamarckist They do not so much violate Darwinism as 
fall outside it.
The fact that bacteria seem to fall outside, or even transcend^this dichotomy 
between Darwinism and Lamarckism might be of some interest in devising a change in 
the metaphysics o f evolutionary theory. Bacteria might even be an exemplar of 
evolution at large, it may be possible that their evolutionary processes also apply to 
other organisms, and can be used to explain evolution more comprehensively As 
Dawkins’ position of genic selectionism shows, it is possible to have an evolutionary 
theory which is not committed to organisms, although this position is not without its 
limitations. Even though genic selectionism tries to replace the organism with the gene, 
it still retains the same distinction between a unit of evolution and a separate selecting 
environment Genic selection treats genes as the units of evolution, but it still treats 
them as ‘selfish’ entities which obey the same laws of neo-Darwinist theory that 
organisms do. 1 do not propose a bacterial model of evolution which takes bacteria to 
be the units of evolution, for this would simply reestablish the same terms as neo- 
Darwinism What would be more useful is to treat the processes and strategies of
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bacterial gene flow themselves as paradigmatic mechanisms. The fluid and dynamic 
character of horizontal, as opposed to merely vertical, evolution could then be used to 
shed light upon other evolutionary processes
Bacterial evolution makes use of symbiosis, but these symbiotic relationships 
are temporary and fleeting. Gene trading is rife among many kinds of bacteria, yet not 
all types. Why do some bacteria engage in temporary symbioses with viruses, and 
others conjugate? Why indeed do conjugation plasmids exist, and why do they 
propagate themselves in such a manner? Bacteria and viruses, as well as conjugation 
plasmids do seem to need each other for the generation of variation and for 
propagation. But what else is created by these relationships? There is more to such a 
relationship than a simple host-parasite relationship, and more than a cooperative 
whole What kind o f  superorganism is created by such relationships, and what 
characteristics does it have?
Bacteria, as organisms that do engage in symbiotic relationships, exist as 
populations, not individuals They form supercolonies which can behave just as a 
multicellular organism might But even these relationships are temporary. We might 
ask how and why these relationships come into being and what characteristics they 
have. This might give insight into many of the processes of evolution that neo- 
Darwinism addresses today. For instance, treating organisms as members of a social 
group or population is more useful than looking at them as members of a species. 
Looking at evolution from the bacterial point of view might make available many 
different and new perspectives on life Rather than looking at organisms as passively 
responding to their environments, perhaps a bacterial perspective would allow 
descriptions which transcend the organism/environment distinction. After all, we are 
the environment for many of these organisms. And our symbiotic relationship with 
other kinds of organisms raises the possibility that it is not our own organism that is of 
interest, but the nature of the symbiotic relations themselves.
But if neo-Darwinism must come to terms with the importance of these 
symbiotic relations themselves, and these symbiotic relations must be accommodated 
by the addition of certain auxiliary hypotheses which would explain them, then the 
effects of this on the neo-Darwinism research programme will be profound. To fully 
engage with complex symbiotic relationships and horizontal heredity, neo-Darwinism 
might have to allow the organism/environment distinction to be blurred, since the fact
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of horizontal gene transfer makes the delineation of stable evolutionary entities 
problematic. If the stability of these entities is allowed to be called into question, the 
neo-Darwinist research programme might be changed beyond recognition.
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Glossary *
Adaptedness The suitability of a structure or an organism for its environment or 
lifestyle, as a result of past selection.
Allele: Any of the alternative variants of a gene
Binary Fission: in bacteria, the chief mode of division, in which a cell divides into two 
equal daughter cells, each containing a copy of the plasmid
Chloroplasts: Organelles found in plant eukaryotes which convert light into energy 
through the process of photosythesis. They are thought to have once been free-living 
prokaryotes, which are now in a permanent symbiotic relationship to other organelles 
in eukaryotes See also mitochondria, Serial Endosymbiosis Theory
Clone: adj. Clonal; a group of genetically identical individuals or cells derived ffom a 
single cell by repeated asexual divisions
Conjugation: transfer of genetic material between bacteria through a pilus
Eukaryote: Organisms with cells possessing a membrane-bounded nucleus which 
separates its genetic material from the rest of the cell. Eukaryotic cells also possess an 
extensive network of protein filaments which comprise its internal structure, as well as 
many membrane-bounded organelles in which its cellular functions are sequestered
Genome: the genetic complement of a living organism or a single cell.
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Genotype: the genetic constitution of an organism, which acting together with 
environmental factors determines a phenotype
Germ cell: a reproductive cell; gamete; also Germ Plasm: a term coined by A. 
Weismann, to denote the idea of a protoplasm that is transmitted unchanged from 
generation to generation in the germ cells, as opposed to the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics.
Gradualism: A theory that evolution progressed by the gradual modification of 
populations, and not by the sudden origin o f  new types. It is contrasted with 
saltationalism
Lamarckism: the theory of evolution chiefly formulated by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 
which embodied the principle, now taken as incorrect by Neo-Darwinism, that 
characteristics acquired by an organism during its lifetime can be inherited
Mitochondria: Small organelles found in animal eukaryotes, they are responsible for 
converting sugar into energy They are thought to have once been free-living 
prokaryotes, which are now in a permanent symbiotic relationship to other organelles 
in eukaryotes. See also chloroplasts, Serial Endosymbiosis Theory
Monophyletic: also Monophlyderiving from a common ancestor
Natural Selection: the process by which evolutionary change is chiefly driven, 
according to Darwin’s theory of evolution. Environmental factors will lead to the 
preferential survival and reproduction of those members of the population genetically 
best fitted to deal with them. Continued selection will therefore lead to certain genes 
becoming more common, and over very long periods of time, will give rise to the 
differences between organisms
Neo-Darwinism: the modem version of the Darwinist theory of evolution by natural 
selection, incorporating the principles of genetics and still placing emphasis on natural 
selection as the driving force of evolution
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Phage: (also prophage) Bacterial DNA integrated into and replicating with the 
bacterial chromosome
Phenotype: the visible or otherwise measurable physical and biochemical 
characteristics of an organism, as result of the interaction of genotype and 
environment; also, a group of individuals exhibiting the same phenotypic characters
Pilus: a tubular structure that brings bacterial cells into contact during conjugation
Plasmid: genetic material in the form of a circular ring found inside certain bacteria. It 
is self-transmissible
Pleiotropy: 1 Pleiotropy is a term that describes a situation in which one gene can have 
many different phenotypic effects, some of which are advantageous and some of which 
may be disadvantageous Because of this, it is harder for selection to weed out 
disadvantageous traits, as such traits have “hitchhiked” onto advantageous traits that 
selection would presumably preserve. Pleiotropy has therefore been mooted as an 
alternative, opposing force to that of selection.
Prokaryote: Bacteria, unicellular organisms lacking a membrane-bounded nucleus to 
separate their genetic material, also lacking mitochondria, chloroplasts and other 
membrane-bounded organelles. Their genetic material is in the form of a circular 
molecule, or plasmid
Saltationalism: Change owing to the sudden origin of a new type, that is, the 
production of a new kind of individual who gives rise to a new type of organism.
Serial Endosymbiosis Theory (SET): the idea, now generally accepted, that 
mitochondria and other chloroplasts, and possible some other organelles of eukaryotic 
cells originated as symbiotic prokaryotic organisms
Somatic cell: body cell as opposed to cells of the germ line
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Transcription: The process by which DNA is copied and an RNA template is made 
during cell division
Transduction: the transfer of genes from one bacteria to another by means of carriage 
in a virus
Transformation: the genetic modification of a bacterium by DNA which is external to 
the cell in the environment and is taken up by the cell and incorporated into the 
bacterium’s own DNA
Translation: The process by which the RNA template is used to construct a protein 
chain.
Virus: an intracellular obligate parasite, consisting of a core of either DNA or RNA, 
surrounded by a protein coat. Viruses are unable to multiply or express its genes 
outside a host cell as they require host cell enzymes to aid DNA replication
Weismann Barrier: a theoretical construct relating to the continuity of the germ 
plasm and the non-transmissibility of acquired characteristics. It assumes that germ 
cells can affect somatic cells, but not the reverse. Its physical manifestation is the 
nuclear membrane
' Definitions taken from Henderson's Dictionary o f Biological Terms, 10th ed. and 11 
ed., ed. Eleanor Lawrence, (Longman Group, 1989) also from Mayr, One Long 
Argument, and some are my own.
Michelle Speidel 160
Bibliography
Amàbile-Cuevas, Carlos F and Chicurel, Marina E. “Bacterial Plasmids and Gene 
Flux” Cell Vol. 70 (July 24 1992), 189-199 
Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution o f Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984) 
Barlow, Connie, ed. From Gaia to Selfish Genes: Selected Writings in the Life 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991)
Beatty, John. “Natural Selection and the Null Hypothesis” in The Latest on the Best 
ed John Dupré (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987) pp. 53-75.
Beatty, John. “Random Drift” in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology ed. by Evelyn Fox 
Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1992)
Bergson, Henri. Creative Evolution, Authorised Translation by A Mitchell (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1983)
Brandon, Robert. Concepts and Methods in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996)
Bridges, Bryn A. “Hypermutation Under Stress” Nature 387 (1997)
Brown, A The Darwin Wars.How Stupid Genes became Selfish Gods (London, Simon 
and Schuster 1999).
Bunge, Mario, ed. Ihe Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy (New York: Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1964)
Butler, Samuel. Evolution, Old and New (London: Fifield, 1911)
Butler, Samuel. Erewhon (Harmondsworth Penguin, 1985)
Cairns, John, and Patricia L. Foster “Adaptive Reversion of a Frameshift Mutation in 
Escherichia coif' Genetics 128 (1991), 695-701.
Cairns, John, Julie Overbaugh, and Stephan Miller “The Origin of Mutants” Nature 
335(1988), 142-145.
Caims-Smith, A.G. The Life Puzzle (Oliver and Boyd Edinburgh, 1971)
Capra, Fritjof The Web of Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1996)
Michelle Speidel 161
Cohen, Jack, and Ian Stewart, The Collapse o f Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a 
Complex World (London: Viking, 1994)
Crick, F. Life Itself: Its Origin and Nature (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 
Dahlberg, C., Bergstrom, M., Andreasen M., Christensen B.B., Molin S., Hermansson, 
M. “Interspecies bacterial conjugation by plasmids from marine environments 
visualized by gfp expression”, Molecular Biology and Evolution 15.4 (1998) 
Darlington, C. D. Darwin’s Place in History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959)
Darwin, Charles The Variation o f Animals and Plants under Domestication ed by 
Francis Darwin (London: John Murray, 1905)
Darwin, Charles. On the Origin o f Species, Edited with an Introduction and Notes by 
Gillian Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
Darwin, Charles. On Evolution: The Development of the Theory o f Natural Selection, 
Edited by Thomas F. Glick and David Kohn (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1996)
Davis, Bernard D., Dulbecco, Renato, Eisen, Heman N., Ginsberg, Harold S. eds 
Microbiology (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 4th edn 1990)
Dawkins, Richard. The Extended Phenotype (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982) 
Dawkins, Richard The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976)
Dawkins, Richard River out o f Eden (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1995) 
Dennett, Daniel. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings o f Life 
(New York: Penguin Books 1995)
Depew, David J. and Weber, Bruce, H. eds. Darwinism Evolving: Systems Dynamics 
and the Genealogy o f Natural Selection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995), 
Driesch, Hans Ihe Problem o f Individuality (London: Macmillan, 1914)
Dupre, John, ed The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1987)
Foster, Patricia L., “Directed Mutation: Between Unicorns and Goats” Journal o f 
Bacteriology 174 (1992), 1711-1716.
Foster, Patricia L., and John Cairns. “Mechanisms of Directed Mutation” Genetics 131 
(1992), 783-789.
Gatlin, Lila. Information Theory and the Living System (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972)
Gigerenzer, Gerd et al Jhe Empire o f Chance: How Probability Changed Science 
and Everyday Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
Michelle Speidel 162
Glick and Kohn: see Darwin, On Evolution.
Gould, S.J. Ontogeny and Phytogeny (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1977)
Hall, Barry G. “Adaptive Evolution That Requires Multiple Spontaneous Mutations. I.
Mutations Involving an Insertion Sequence” Genetics 120 (1988), 887-897. 
Hall, Bany G. “Adaptive Evolution That Requires Multiple Spontaneous Mutations. 
Mutations involving base substitutions” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.USA vol.88 (July
1991) , 5882-5996
Hall, Barry G. “Spontaneous Point Mutations That Occur More Often When 
Advantageous Than When Neutral” Genetics 126 (1990), 5-16.
Hamilton, W D “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour (Part I and II)” Journal 
of Theoretical Biology 7 (1964) pp. 1-16;17-52 
Heineman, Jack A. “Looking sideways at the evolution of replicons” in Horizontal 
Gene Transfer eds. Michael Syvanen and Clarence I. Kado (London: Chapman 
and Hall, 1998)
Ho, Mae-wan, and Saunders, Peter T., eds. Beyond Neo-Darwinism (London: 
Academic Press, 1984)
Hodge, M.J.S. “Darwin’s argument in the Origin" Philosophy of Science 59, pp 461- 
464.
Hodge, M.J.S. “Darwin’s theory and Darwin’s argument” in What the Philosophy of 
Biology Is (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989) pp. 163-182.
Hodge, M.J S. “Natural Selection” in Keywords in Evolutionary Biology ed Evelyn 
Fox Keller and Elisabeth A. Lloyd (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1992)
Hodge, M.J.S. “Darwin’s Argument in the Origin" Philosophy o f Science 59 (1992) 
pp. 461-464
Hull, David L. Darwin and His Critics: Ihe Reception o f Darwin’s Theory of 
Evolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973)
Hull, David L. The Metaphysics o f Evolution (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1989)
Hull, David L The Philosophy o f Biological Science (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1974)
Hull, David L. Science as a Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988)
Michelle Speidel 163
Jablonka, Eva, and Lamb, Marion J. Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The 
Lamarckian Dimension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
Jacob, François and Wollman, Elie L. “Viruses and Genes” (Scientific American June 
1961) in The Living Cell: Readings from Scientific American (San Francisco: 
W.H. Freeman and Co., 1961)
Kampis, George. Self-Modifying Systems in Biology and Cognitive Science: A New 
Framework for Dynamics, Information and Complexity (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1991)
Kauffman, Stuart. The Origins o f Order. Self-Organization and Selection in 
Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993)
Keller, Evelyn Fox, and Lloyd, Elisabeth A, eds Keywords in Evolutionary Biology 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992)
Kelly, Kevin. Out o f Control: The New Biology o f Machines (London: Fourth Estate, 
1994)
Kimura, Motoo. The Neutral Theory o f Molecular Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983)
Kitcher, Philip and Sterelny, Kim. “The Return of the Gene” Journal o f Philosophy 85 
(1988), pp. 339-361.
Khakina, L.N. Concepts of Symbiosis: A Historical and Critical Study o f the 
Research o f Russian Botanists trans. Stephanie Merkel and Robert Coalson 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)
Kohn, David, ed. The Darwinian Heritage (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1985)
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1962; 2nd edn 1970)
Kiippers, Bemd-Olaf Information and the Origin o f Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1990)
Lakatos, Imre. “Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes” 
in Lakatos, I and Musgrave, A., eds. Criticism and the Growth o f Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)
Lakatos, Imre The Methodology o f Scientific Research Programs (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978)
Michelle Speidel 164
Lakatos, Imre, and Musgrave, A. Criticism and the Growth o f Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)
Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste. Philosophie Zoologique, English trans. H. Elliot The 
Zoological Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1914)
Lenski, Richard E., and John E. Mittler. “The Directed Mutation Controversy and 
Neo-Darwinism” Science 259 (1993), 188-194.
Levins, Richard, and Lewontin, Richard. Ihe Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985)
Lovelock, James. Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979; repr. 1995)
Luria, S E and Delbrück, M. “Mutations of bacteria from virus sensitivity to virus 
resistance” Genetics 28 (1943), 491-511
Mahner, Martin, and Bunge, Mario. Foundations o f Biophilosophy (Berlin: Springer 
Verlag, 1997)
Margulis, Lynn. Symbiosis and Cell Evolution: M icrobial Communities in the 
Archean and Proterozoic Forms (New York: Freeman, 2nd edn 1993)
Margulis, Lynn “Symbiogenesis and Symbionticism” in Symbiosis as a Source o f  
Evolutionary Innovation: Spéciation and Morphogenesis eds. Lynn Margulis 
and Rene Fester (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991)
Margulis, Lynn. The Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998)
Margulis, Lynn, and Fester, Rene, eds. Symbiosis as a Source o f Evolutionary 
Innovation: Spéciation and Morphogenesis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1991)
Margulis, Lynn, and Sagan, Dorion. What is Life? (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 
1995)
Margulis, Lynn, and Sagan, Dorion What is Sex? (New York: Simon and Schuster 
1997)
Maturana, Humberto R. and Varela, Francisco J. Autopoeisis and Cognition 
(Dordrecht;London, D. Reidel, 1980)
Maynard Smith, John. “A Darwinian View of Symbiosis” in Symbiosis as a Source o f 
Evolutionary Innovation: Spéciation and Morphogenesis eds. Lynn Margulis 
and Rene Fester (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991)
Michelle Speidel 165
Maynard Smith, John. Did Darwin Get it Right?: Essays on Games, Sex, and 
Evolution (Harmondsworth Penguin, 1993)
Maynard Smith, John. The Theory of Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993)
Maynard Smith, John, and Szathmary, Eors The Major Transitions in Evolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
Maynard Smith, Jonh. Shaping Life: Genes, Embryos, and Evolution (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998)
Mayr, E. Animal Species and Evolution (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1964)
Mayr, E. “Species Concepts and Their Application”, in Philosophy o f Biology, ed.
Michael Ruse. (New York: Macmillan 1989)
Mayr, Emst. One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modem 
Evolutionary Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991)
Miller, David, ed. Popper Selections (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985)
Mills, S and Beatty, J. “The propensity interpretation of fitness” Philosophy o f Science 
46, pp. 263-286.
Mittler, John E. and Lenski, Richard E. “New data on excisions o f Mu from E.coli 
MCS2 cast doubt on directed mutation hypothesis” Nature 344 (1990), 173- 
175
Mittler, John E. and Lenski, Richard E. “Experimental evidence for an alternative to 
directed mutation in the bgl operon” Nature 356 (1992), 446-448 
Monod, Jacques. Chance and Necessity. An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of 
Modern Biology trans. by Austryn Wainhouse (London: Collins Fontana, 
1974)
Neumann, John von. Theory o f Self-reproducing Automata. Posthumously ed. Arthur 
Burks (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949)
Nerretranders, Tor. Ihe User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size (New 
York: Penguin, 1998)
Popper, Karl. All Life is Problem-Solving (London: Routledge, 1999)
Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations, (New York: Basic Books, 1962)
Popper, Karl. Ihe lx>gic o f Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959)
Popper, Karl. Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972)
Michelle Speidel 166
Poundstone, William. The Prisoner’s Dilemma (New York Anchor Books 
Doubleday, 1992)
Priest, Fergus and Austin, Brian., eds. Modem BacteriaI Taxonomy 2nd ed. (London: 
Chapman and Hall, 1993)
Ptashne, Mark. A Genetic Switch: Phage X and Higher Organisms (Cambridge, MA: 
Cell Press, 2nd edn 1992)
Ridley, Matt. The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994)
Rose, Steven. Lifelines: Biology, Freedom, Dterminism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1997)
Ruse, Michael. The Darwinian Revolution: Science Red in Tooth and Claw (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1979)
Ruse, Michael. What the Philosophy o f Biology Is (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989)
Ruse, Michael. The Darwinian Paradigm: Essays on its History, Philosophy and 
Religious Inspiration (London: Routledge, 1989)
Ruse, Michael., ed. Philosophy o f Biology (New York: Macmillan, 1989)
Sapp, Jan. Evolution by Association: A History o f Symbiosis (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994)
Sarkar, Sahotra. “On The Possibility of Directed Mutations in Bacteria: Statistical 
Analyses and Reductionist Strategies” Philosophy o f Science Association 1 
(1990), pp. 111-124.
Scriven, Michael. “Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory”, Science 130, 
pp. 477-81.
Shannon, Claude E. and Weaver, Warren. The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949)
Shostak, Stanley Death o f Life: Ihe Legacy o f Molecular Biology (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1998)
Shostak, Stanley The Evolution o f Sameness and Difference: Perpectives on the 
Human Genome Project (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999)
Sigmund, Karl Games o f Life: Explorations in Ecology, Evolution, and Behaviour 
(Harmonsdworth: Penguin, 1995)
Michelle Speidel 167
Sniegowski, Paul D. “A Test of the Directed Mutation Hypothesis in Escherichia coli 
MCS2 Using Replica Plating” Journal o f Bacteriology 177 (1995), 1119- 
1120.
Sober, Elliott., ed. Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1994)
Sober, Elliott. The Nature o f Selection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984)
Sober, Ellliot. Philosophy o f Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)
Sober, Elliott. “What is Adaptationism?” in The Latest on the Best ed. John Dupré 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1987), pp. 105-118.
Sober, Elliott and Wilson, David Sloan “A Critical review of Philosophical Work on 
the Units of Selection Problem” Philosophy o f Science 61 (1994), pp. 534-55.
Sonea, S. “Bacterial Evolution without Spéciation” in Symbiosis as a Source of 
Evolutionary Innovation: Spéciation and Morphogenesis pp. 95-105
Sterelny, K and Kitcher, P. “The Return o f the Gene” Journal o f Philosophy 85 
(1998), pp.339-361.
Sueoka, Noboru. “Directional Mutation Pressure and Neutral Molecular Evolution” 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci USA 85 (1988), 2653-2657.
Sueoka, Noboru. “Directional Mutation Pressure, Selective Constraints, and Genetic 
Equilibria” Journal of Molecular Evolution 34 (1992), 95-114.
Syvanen, Michael and Kado, Clarence I eds. Horizontal Gene Transfer (London: 
Chapman and Hall, 1998)
Taddei, F., Radman, M.,Maynard Smith, J., Toupance, B., Gouyon, P.H., Godelle, B 
“Role of mutator alleles in adaptive evolution” Nature 387 (1997) pp 700-704
Trivers, Robert ‘The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism” Quarterly Review of Biology 
46(1971).
Wilson, Fred Empiricism and Darwin's Science, The University of Western Ontario 
Series in Philosophy of Science 47 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991)
Watkins, J.W.N. “Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics” Mind 67 (1958)
Watkins, J.W.N. “Confirmation, the Paradoxes and Positivism” in The Critical 
Approach to Science and Philosophy ed Mario Bunge (New York: Free Press 
of Glencoe, 1964)
Watkins, J.W.N. “Metaphysics and the Advancement of Science” British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science 26 (1975) pp. 91-121
Michelle Speidel 168
Watkins, J.W.N. Science and Scepticism (London: Hutchinson, 1984)
Watson, James D., and Crick, Francis. “Genetical Implications of the structure of 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid” Nature 171 (1953) 964-967 
Williams, George C. Adaptation and Natural Selection (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1966).
Wynne-Edwards, V.C. Evolution Through Group Selection (Oxford: Blackwell 1986)
Appendix 1
170
Mendel's Theory of Factors studies the genotype of sexually reproducing organismtin terms of their alleles, or 
traits. In meiotic sexual reproduction, each parent contributes to the offspring by donating one factor or allele 
to the gamete. These gametes fuse in the zygote, and they arc expressed in the mature organism according to 
the relative dominance of the factor
i
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Appendix 3: Transformation, Transduction, 
and Conjugation
Frontispiece: Th e o ry  of the origin and evolution of eukaryotic cells
1 Margulis. Lynn . Symbiosis in Cell Evolution: Microbial Communities in the Archean and 
Proterozoic Eras 2ndcd. (New York. London W.H Freeman 1993)
Conjugation in E. coli (x 25,000).
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